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Editorial: $cholarship – pay to publish?

Stephen M. Marson, Ph.D, Editor, *The Journal of Social Work Values and Ethics*
Natalie R. Ames, Ed.D., Editorial Board, *The Journal of Social Work Values and Ethics*

The "vanity press" has been around decades. These are publishers who charge authors to publish their work (usually dissertations) thus enabling authors to include a book on their vitae. Rank and tenure committees assess such monographs with suspicion, and many academicians view them with scorn. How concerned should we be that the "pay-to-publish" model has now infiltrated the scholarly journal environment? Should we be skeptical of articles published in all pay-to-publish journals? Is there a way to determine if some of these journals adhere to the same standards of scholarship as traditional scholarly journals? What potential ethical issues do such publications raise for us as social workers if we are writing or reviewing for these journals?

I am a sample of one, but here are my experiences. Years ago, I was the book review editor for *The Journal of Law and Social Work*, a journal subsidized by a number of universities with which it was associated. Highly specialized journals, such as *JLSW,* typically have between 300 and 600 subscribers. Subscription rates cannot cover the cost of publication and distribution. Without universities to underwrite them, these journals cannot survive. *JLSW*, like other scholarly journals of that time, died as a result of university budget cuts. At first glance, it might appear that requiring authors to pay to publish is a reasonable alternative to ensure the survival journals. Do such journals deserve praise for using an entrepreneurial model to survive or should we view them with the same suspicion and scorn as vanity book publishers?

I submitted a manuscript to a medical-geriatric journal where it was accepted after some minor modifications. I realized that practitioners and scholars actually read this online medical journal when I began to receive requests to speak on the topic of my article. Ten years later, when I submitted another manuscript to the *same journal* the editor emailed to inform me that they had instituted the fee-for-page requirement to ensure the journal's survival. Evidently, unlike social work journals, this medical journal paid its copy editors, thus the need to charge authors a fee. Despite this explanation, and the journal's good reputation, my co-author took an uncompromising position. She did not trust fee-for-page journals, and we found another journal to publish our manuscript. In the end, I believe this journal is a reputable one – despite the fact that they charge authors a fee to publish their work.

As the editor of *The Journal of Social Work Values and Ethics*, I keep my eye on conference presentations. When I see a quality presentation, consistent with the JSWVE mission statement, I email the author and suggest submitting to our journal. Recently I received an invitation to submit a manuscript for publication. I was quite flattered until I learned there was a $60 fee-for-page charge. WOW! In my mind's eye, the price was extreme. The "feel" of the web page and the email from the journal editor made me distinctly uncomfortable. Although I have no empirical verification, my impression was that this journal was potentially exploiting junior faculty who might see paying $60 a page as a worthwhile investment to meet the demands of tenure and promotion.

I cannot say that fee-for-page journals have lower standards than traditional scholarly journals.

Some require blind referees (as does the medical-geriatric journal noted above) while others exist only to make a buck. It does appear these journals are here to stay. The problem is, we have no reliable mechanisms for distinguishing the scammers from the scholars. Articles from NPR, *Mother Jones* and *Slate* paint an unflattering picture of fee-for-page journals. The *NASW Code of Ethics* advises social workers to "seek to contribute to the profession's literature…." (5.01d, p. 24). The *Code* also enjoins us to "work toward the maintenance and promotion of high standards of practice" (5.01a, p. 24).

    If social workers pay to publish, are we maintaining and promoting high standards of practice? Have you had experience with pay-to-publish journals? If so, please share your experiences. Send your comments to smarson@nc.rr.com .

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

In the Fall issue of Journal of Social Work Values and Ethics, I wrote a controversial editorial titled *Abortion and Gay Marriages*. Following are letters in reply.

_____

From: Tamikka Gilmore
Sent: Monday, February 01, 2016 12:38 PM
To: smarson@nc.rr.com
Subject: Editorial: Abortion and Gay Marriages

Dear Editor,
I, like you, also have my Master of Social Work (MSW). I received my MSW from a small, rural town in the southeast. I am a Christian and I was born, raised, and educated in the south. I like many other clinicians, enter the profession because we have something intrinsic and unique to add to the profession. With this knowledge, we work tirelessly and with passion to assist individuals from all walks of life define and achieve their definition of success.

I do however realize that a lack of exposure does constrict one's ability to think beyond one's comfort level. I had a coworker once tell me that the relationship between her godfather and his partner of more than ten years has been the most consistent and loving relationship she has seen. In one of my law classes, we read a case study of a Muslim stewardess who did not want to serve alcohol because of her religious position. Well, the airline did not dismiss her, but worked with the other crew and staff so the stewardess would not have to serve alcohol.

While I respect Ms. Davis' moral position, if removing her name and replacing it with "Clerk of Courts for Rowan County Kentucky" was something she did not want to do or fully understood the implications that it carried, this position may not have been in her best interest.

I am a Christian and I also have my moral beliefs. I also cannot bury my head in the sand and ignore legislation and the world around me. This is not

socialism. This is believing in the dignity and worth of a person -- regardless of "who" or "what" the person represents.

I grant permission for The Journal of Social Work Values and Ethics to publish this letter.

In Service,
W. Tamikka Gilmore, MSW
Doctoral Student, Wingate University

_____

From: Melissa Hunt
Sent: Tuesday, January 26, 2016 9:18 AM
To: smarson@nc.rr.com
Subject: reaction to article

Steve,

This is my reaction to your article…
I have given a lot of thought to this article. As the article states being opposed to same sex marriage based on religious grounds are constitutionally protected. So can we compromise? Ms. Davis's did not oppose her deputies granting the license for gay marriage. The job duties changed after Ms. Davis had taken the position. We seem to be so uncompromising when it comes to liberating beliefs such as same sex marriages but not so much regarding traditional beliefs. To compare this woman to an Isis terrorist is a bit rigid and extreme but it does make one ponder Is Ms. Davis a representative of the past, dark history of Christianity or are we a society created on foundation of beliefs so complex the solutions are beyond us?

I grant permission for The Journal of Social Work Values and Ethics to publish this letter.

Melissa Hunt, MSW, LCSW

_____

From: LaVern Oxendine
Sent: Tuesday, January 19, 2016 7:01 AM
To: Stephen Marson Ph. D
Cc: LaVern S. Oxendine
Subject: Abortion and Gay Marriage/please edit as needed

Dr. Marson,
First, I totally am in agreement with your professional values in reference to abortion and gay marriages. I too would never work for an organization where my professional values and the agency's values were in conflict. You are upholding true social work profession values. Kim Davis should seek other employment where her values are not in conflict with the employing agency. Same-sex couples have the right to marry in all 50 States and its territories and no State can reserve the right only for heterosexuals.   Abortion is a hot topic too. I am a previous board member of Planned Parenthood of Central North Carolina where collectively we advocated for women's rights in reproductive health care and abortion. I definitely agree with you in that I do not see the difference between Kim Davis' position and that of ISIS where she and ISIS both believe in instilling religious ideology on others.

I grant permission for The Journal of Social Work Values and Ethics to publish this letter.

LaVern Oxendine, MSW
Retired

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From: Paul Adams
Sent: Wednesday, November 11, 2015 1:41 PM
To: Stephen Marson Ph.D
Subject: Kim Davis and the Claims of Conscience: A Response to Stephen Marson

During his recent visit to the United States Pope Francis had two meetings that spoke to the rights of conscience. One was the Little Sisters of the Poor, who refuse, as a matter of conscience, to collude in providing coverage for abortifacient drugs and contraceptives and face crippling fines as a result. The other was with Kim Davis, a non-Catholic Christian who stood by her conscience in the face of jail, slander and abuse. In that meeting the two embraced and the pope told Davis to "stay strong."

Terry Moran of ABC News asked the pope if he supported government officials who could not in conscience fulfill their duties. Francis answered that "if a person does not allow others to be a conscientious objector, he denies a right. Conscientious objection must enter into every juridical structure because it is a right, a human right." In a follow-up question, Moran asked if this applied to government officials. "'It is a human right,' Francis answered, 'and if a government official is a human person, he has that right. It is a human right'" (my emphasis). Reuters reported this exchange under the heading, "Govt workers have right to refuse gay marriage licenses –pope."

This right is a basic part of Catholic Social Teaching, as spelled out in The Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church:

Unjust laws pose dramatic problems of conscience for morally upright people: when they are called to cooperate in morally evil acts they must refuse.

Besides being a moral duty, such a refusal is also a basic human right which, precisely as such, civil law itself is obliged to recognize and protect. Those who have recourse to conscientious objection must be protected not only from legal penalties but also from any negative effects on the legal, disciplinary, financial and professional plane. (Par. 399)

The liberal position is inconsistent (some would say hypocritical) on this point. While deploring some like Davis or the Little Sisters of the Poor, they have no such trouble with others, including public officials who defy or disregard the law as a matter of conscience – for example those clerks

in San Francisco who continued to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples when it was illegal to do so. Or with President Obama's refusal to uphold laws he disagrees with, whether DOMA or immigration law. Or the scofflaw sanctuary cities. There is no outcry about accommodations to the conscience of other public officials who oppose hunting and routinely receive exemption from the requirement of their job to issue hunting licenses. The outrage is confined to issues where the accommodation is sought to exempt a public official from acting against her conscience in matters that involve the new state orthodoxy, the established religion, of sexual liberalism, which brooks no dissent. Suddenly a simple and modest request for a conscience exemption is transformed into an attempt to impose a theocracy on the republic.

Davis and the pope are not alone in seeing the importance of conscience and the gravity, for person and community in a pluralist society, of coercing people into violating it. Countless Americans have stood up, as their consciences dictated, against unjust laws, beginning with the American Revolution and extending through Lincoln, Martin Luther King and Rosa Parks, to Kim Davis. Their position was that the laws they defied were unjust, hence illegal, and it was their duty in conscience to defy them. Lincoln was, like Davis, an elected public official who defied the Supreme Court on the grounds that its ruling (Dred Scott) was an unconstitutional judicial usurpation of power. He neither resigned nor buckled like a good Nazi – the two options that Justice Kennedy recently recommended, with reference to the Third Reich.

Martin Luther King, as he sat in Birmingham jail, answered the objection of those fellow clergy who asked, if one had a duty to resist unjust laws (upholding segregation) and to obey just ones (like Brown v. Board of Education), how one was to tell them apart. His answer, appealing to St. Augustine ("an unjust law is no law at all") and St. Thomas Aquinas was this:

How does one determine whether a law is just or unjust? A just law is a man-made code that squares with the moral law or the law of God. An unjust law is a code that is out of harmony with the moral law. To put it in the terms of St. Thomas Aquinas: An unjust law is a human law that is not rooted in eternal law and natural law. Any law that uplifts human personality is just. Any law that degrades human personality is unjust.

Opinions differ on both the process and the result of Obergefell. Was the Supreme Court opinion telling states to redefine marriage an unconstitutional usurpation – in Jefferson's term, "the despotism of an oligarchy" imposing its own opinion without constitutional warrant? And was the ruling substantively a just or unjust law by King's (and Aquinas's) definition? As for those who conscientiously conclude that the law is unjust, "when they are called to cooperate in morally evil acts they must refuse."

Conscientious exemptions and accommodations are important, not for those who share the view that prevails in political and cultural elites, but precisely for those who hold unpopular but deeply held convictions. Even where pacifists were a tiny minority, democratic governments have exempted them from military service required by law.

Kim Davis

In discussing Kim Davis who acted according to her conscience in face of what she considered an unjust law, Marson goes beyond the provocative (an editor's privilege) to the frankly scurrilous. He claims to see no difference between her position and that of ISIS - a barbarous organization that rejects the claims of conscience and dissent and denies the rights of religious minorities to free exercise or even to life. He sees her, without evidence, as wanting to impose her views and establish a theocracy, just (in that respect) like ISIS.

From what I can discern, the slurs on Ms Davis's character to the effect that she is an attention-seeking intolerant theocrat are the exact reverse of the truth. She is a Christian woman of conscience and character quietly and conscientiously abstaining from doing things she considers gravely wrong. Like the lead character of the movie, Chariots of Fire, she is not campaigning or organizing a movement - she is, in this respect, no Jefferson, Lincoln, King, or Parks - much less is she seeking to install a theocracy. She simply sought an accommodation so that she could follow her conscience in the matter at hand, as county clerks have done before her on a range of issues. Davis's goal was not to prevent anyone from getting married; it was only to remove herself from being the authority authorizing those marriages. That is, her goal was never to impose her views on people trying to obtain licenses.

It is not Davis but her enemies who impose their own sexual ideology on everyone else – through the courts, the academy, through silencing debate, character assassination, and driving dissenters out of their jobs, schools, professions, careers, and businesses, and closing down the kind of freedom of conscience and discussion that Marson celebrates in the opening account of his Catholic education.

I grant permission for The Journal of Social Work Values and Ethics to publish this letter.

Paul Adams
Ave Maria, Florida

THANK YOU!!!!!!!!!!!!

Because of the confidentiality requirement associated with rules for blind reviews, I am not permitted to list members of our editorial board who volunteered their services to assess and screen manuscripts. However, you may see the list of our board members at http://jswve.org/editorial-board/. They did a great deal of work. Most of these board members have been associated with *The Journal of Social Work Values and Ethics* for the last 14 years. They freely offer their time in screening manuscripts. It is a "thankless job" because, in fact, they may not be publicly thanked.

Starting with this issue, we announce the addition of new board members within the last two years. They are:

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*These editors worked on *more than one* manuscript.

I think copy editing is the most difficult job of all volunteer positions. Copy editors are worth their weight in gold!

THANK YOU!
Stephen M. Marson, Editor
Laura Gibson, Book Review Editor

Value Conflicts in Social Work: Categories and Correlates

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Abstract

This quantitative study explores the experience and correlates of categories of reported value conflicts in social work. Results indicate variance between categories of conflict in both frequency of experiences and their correlations. In addition supporting the need for further research to distinguish categories of value conflict and implications for professional practice.

Keywords: value conflicts, professional socialization, ethics, social work values, value priorities

Introduction

Interest in the relationship between professional and personal attitudes, values and behaviors (e.g., Comartin & Gonzalez-Prendes, 2011; Landau, 1999; Osteen, 2011) is rooted in the centrality of values to the profession of social work. National and international social work organizations have developed codes of ethics that underscore professional values and guide practice. The International Federation of Social Workers Statement of Ethical Principles (IFSW, 2012) put forth principles to guide social workers' professional responsibilities (social justice, human rights and human dignity), as well as providing guidelines for professional conduct. In the United States, the preamble of the National Association of Social Workers (NASW) Code of Ethics identifies the core values of the profession as "service, social justice, dignity, worth of the person, importance of relationships, integrity and competence" (NASW, 2008). As the "foundation of social work's unique purpose and perspective" (para. 3), these values should be infused into the education and socialization of social work students to promote common values, increase professional identity and provide guidance for social work practice.

Social Work Values and Professional Socialization

The transmission of the values, ideas, ethics, and attitudes of the profession occurs through the process of professional socialization (Patchner, Gullerud, Downing, Donaldson, & Leuenberger, 1987). This dynamic process contributes to the development of professional identity and the internalization of group norms as students are integrated into the professional culture of social work (Barretti, 2004; Miller, 2010). It is also a process that is mandated by the Council on Social Work Education (CSWE) in the Educational Policy and Accreditation Standards (EPAS) as a necessary educational outcome. As an outcome of social work education, a student should "Identify oneself as a professional social worker and conduct oneself accordingly" (CSWE

EPAS, 2008, p. 3). While Urdang (2010) asserts that the "development of the professional self has long been viewed by many educators as the most essential component of graduate social work training" (p. 524), this process should begin at the undergraduate level for those in the baccalaureate social work programs.

Despite the importance of shared professional standards and ethics there are inevitably differences in social workers' personal values, political affiliations, religious beliefs, and cultural backgrounds. Osteen (2011) found that "It was not uncommon for [social work] students to encounter value incongruity at some point during their educational program" (p. 434). This value incongruity may also be encountered by practicing social workers. "Often, in the course of practice, social workers encounter situations that bring them face to face with conflict between their personal values and the values of the profession" (Comartin & Gonzalez-Prendez, 2011, p. 5). Evidence of value conflicts are also documented in a body of research in the social work literature that addresses both the nature of the core values of the profession and personal-professional value conflicts (Reamer, 2000).

Personal and Professional Value Conflicts

The literature documents the existence of professional and personal value conflicts in social work practice (e.g., Comartin & Gonzalez-Prendes, 2011; Levy, 2011; Osteen, 2011; Stewart, 2009; Streets, 2008). Previous research includes a qualitative study of students' motivations for entering the profession of social work and the congruence of personal values with professional ones (Osteen, 2011). There are also case studies and personal accounts of the resolution of personal-professional value conflicts (Comartin & Gonzalez-Prendes, 2011; Levy, 2011), and articles on the interface between religion and social work values (Hodge, 2006; Landau, 1999; Spano & Koenig, 2007; Streets, 2008). The literature suggests that both the source and resolution

of value conflicts are related to an individual's understanding and use of the NASW Code of Ethics and to individual differences in cognitive processing. Some social workers view the Code of Ethics as a guide for ethical behavior and decisions (Spano & Koenig, 2010) while some see it as a "deontological code" (Adams, 2009, para. 5). Mattison (2000) identifies differing approaches to ethical conflicts and notes that some individuals favor exercising their own discretionary judgment in situations of conflict and decisions while others prefer to follow rules or policies. Stated differently, there are individual differences as defined by absolutism and relativism (Mattison, 2000). Such differences in the use of the Code of Ethics, in differing approaches to value decisions, and in the influence of personal values on behaviors (McCarty & Shrum, 2010) all point to the need for a greater understanding of the complexity of value conflicts in social work practice.

Current study

Despite the body of research focused on the conflict and congruence between personal and professional values and beliefs (e.g., Osteen, 2011; Rosenwald, 2006; Spano & Koenig, 2007; Stewart, 2009), a greater understanding is needed as to the complexity of these conflicts and how they are experienced while being resolved by practicing social workers. An earlier exploratory study (Valutis, Rubin & Bell, 2014), using a sample of licensed social workers from one state, concluded that while few participants reported experiencing value conflicts between religious beliefs and professional roles, differences between religious and political beliefs should be further distinguished and other potential correlations further explored. The purpose of this study is to contribute to the larger body of research on professional and personal value conflicts in social work by using a quantitative survey research design to examine social workers' experience of conflicts between professional values, personal values, religious beliefs and political ideologies.

Method
Participants and procedures

Using a cross sectional survey design, a self-constructed electronic survey was made available to members of the National Association of Social Workers (NASW) and social work educators belonging to the Baccalaureate Social Work Program Directors (BPD) list-serv. The survey link was posted on the NASW Linked-In website and sent via electronic mail to all members of the BPD list-serv. A cover letter that explained the purpose of the survey, noted Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval and affirmed the voluntary and anonymous nature of the survey accompanied the survey link. The survey link was posted twice on Linked-In with a two-month interval between postings, and was emailed once to the BPD list-serv. Responses were collected through the survey software with no individual identifying information or links to users. Two hundred nineteen survey responses were received. Forty-five of the respondents answered no to the item "I am a social work practitioner" and five did not answer. These responses were removed leaving 169 participants from 40 different U.S. states included in the analyses. Of the respondents who were omitted from the study only 11 (24.4%) reported having a baccalaureate or master's degree in social work. The decision to eliminate responses of these participants was made because of the lack of clarity in their status as social work practitioners.

Measures

Survey item development was guided by previous research (Valutis, Rubin & Bell, 2014) and included both equivalent and new questions. Previously used variables included: social work practitioners' experiences of value conflicts and beliefs about the prioritization of the values used to resolve the conflict, religiosity, age, sex, years of social work experience, current primary work function, practice environment, work setting, political beliefs, and importance of religion in daily life. New survey items included specific categories of value conflicts, a scale of political activity, and additional measures of religiosity. New items related

to work settings included agency type (private or public), and faith-based agency affiliation. Items that identified social work educators were added in order to identify those directly involved in the professional socialization and integration of common values of future practitioners. A description of the measures follows.

Conflict and Priority questions

Four questions measured the dependent variable of "value conflict". Prior research has suggested that "there is a need for research of conflict and prioritization beyond and within the construct of religion" (Valutis, Rubin & Bell, 2014, p. 175). For this purpose, conflict items asked the extent to which participants experience conflict between their (a) professional and personal values, (b) professional values and religious beliefs, (c) professional values and political views, and (d) religious beliefs and political views. These Likert-type items had 5 levels of responses ranging from 1 (*never*) to 5 (*very often*).

A separate item intended to measure "value priority" asked participants for the primary source of direction for decisions when faced with any conflict between values/views ("In my social work practice, when faced with a conflict between values/views, the primary source of direction for my decision is"). Responses offered included (a) professional values, (b) personal values, (c) political views, (d) religious beliefs, or (e) other (please specify).

Work-Related Items

Participants were asked about their years of social work experience, their current primary work function and area of practice, the work setting of their current position, and years of social work experience. Although years of experience was collected as an open-ended response, it was grouped categorically for analysis with 1 = "less than 2 years", 2 = "2-5 years", 3 = "6-10 years", 4 = "11-15 years", 5 = "16-20 years" and 6 = "more than 20 years". "Current primary work function" was based on the National Association

of Social Workers (NASW) membership description categories and included direct practice, administration, advocacy/community organization, social work education, and "other." In addition, categorical variables were used to record participants' area of practice, status of agency as private, public non-profit or public for-profit, and whether the agency had a religious affiliation (faith-based).

Religiosity and Politics

Survey questions about religiosity and politics were designed to address the complexity of religious and political beliefs and practices on value conflicts and value priorities. Self-reported religiosity as well as the importance of religion in daily life were recorded as scaled responses through three separate items. Religiosity was measured by one item asking how often participants attend religious services and one item asking how often participants use religious beliefs/faith as a guide in making decisions/choices in their life. Responses to both of these items used a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*Almost never*) to 6 (*Daily*). The importance of religion in daily life was measured by the question "How important is religion to you in your daily life" with responses on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (*very unimportant*) to 5 (*very important*).

Participants' political views and involvement were measured by items asking political ideology as well as an 8-item political activity scale constructed by the authors for this survey. The political ideology item asked participants to indicate the best descriptor for their ideology on a scale from very conservative (1) to very liberal (5). Participant involvement in political activity was measured by calculating the sum of responses to 8 questions regarding various types of involvement (voting, campaigning, contacting legislators, participating in political rallies/marches/etc., helping to organize political rallies/marches/etc., signing a petition, donating or raising money for a political purpose, and engaging in a boycott). All items in this measure

used responses from 1 (never) to 3 (many times). The sum of responses to all 8 items was used as a measure of political activity with a possible range of 8-24 with higher scores indicating greater political involvement.

Results
Descriptive Analysis
Participant Characteristic Variables

Table 1 displays the demographics of the participants. The mean age of participants was 48.28 (SD = 12.99). The majority of participants were between 30 and 59 years of age (89.8%, n=123) and female (78.7%, n = 133). Participants' political beliefs were overwhelmingly liberal (m=4.31, SD=.99) with a response of "4" corresponding to "somewhat liberal" and a response of "5" corresponding to "very liberal". On the political activity scale, with a range of 8-24 and higher scores indicating greater political activity, participants scored a mean of 16.11 (SD=3.71). The mean scores on religiosity items indicated participants' attendance at religious services fell between monthly and a couple times a month (m=2.52, SD=1.51), and use of faith to guide decisions in daily life to occur between weekly and a couple times a week (m=4.31, SD=2.11) on the 6-point scale. The use of faith to guide decisions also showed greater variance among participants than attendance at religious services. The mean of the importance of religion in daily life fell between neutral and somewhat important (m=3.38, SD=1.56) on the 5-point scale. In sum, results indicate that participants report the use of faith/beliefs to guide decision in personal life to a greater extent, and with greater variance, than they report the importance of religion in their daily life. Attendance at religious services has the least reported frequency in aggregate on the religiosity items.

Finally, participants were asked with which religion they identified given a list of 10 choices and "other". Some choices received insufficient responses for data analysis, only those categories with ≥ 5 responses were used for a total of 112 responses (i.e., Protestant, Jewish, Roman

Table 1: Demographics of Participants

Participant Demographics	%	n
Sex		
Male	21.3	36
Female	78.7	133
Age		
< 30 years	7.3	10
30-39 years	28.5	39
40-49 years	27.7	38
50-59 years	33.6	46
>60 years	7.3	10
Political ideology		
Very Liberal	50.6	81
Somewhat Liberal	24.4	39
Moderate	15.6	25
Somewhat Conservative	5.0	8
Very Conservative	0.6	1
I attend religious services		
Daily	0.6	1
A couple times a week	7.9	10
Weekly	27.0	34
A couple times a month	15.9	20
Monthly	3.2	4
Almost never	45.2	57
I use my religious beliefs/faith as a guide in making decisions/choices in my life		
Daily	53.6	67
A couple times a week	8.0	10
Weekly	4.8	6
A couple times a month	5.6	7
Monthly	5.6	7
Almost never	22.4	28
Importance of Religion in daily life		
Very Important	34.4	55
Somewhat Important	21.9	35
Neutral	12.5	20
Somewhat Unimportant	9.4	15
Very Unimportant	21.9	35

Catholic, Buddhist, Agnostic and Atheist). Fifty-seven (50.9%) participants reported to be Protestant, followed by Roman Catholic (20.5%, n=23), Atheist (14.3%, n=16), Jewish (9.8%, n=11), and Buddhist (4.5%, n=5).

Work-Related Items

Table 2 illustrates the work-related responses. On average participants had 15.41 (SD = 12.56) years of social work experience, with almost a third (29.3%, n=48) reporting more than 20 years' experience. Half of the participants reported their primary work function as direct practice (50.6%, n=83) followed by social work education (31.7%, n=52). The largest percentage of participants reported working in mental health (36.0%, n=58) with almost equal numbers in the next most common areas of practice, child/family welfare (12.4%, n=19) and health (12.4%, n=19). Other categories (i.e., occupational social work, addictions, community development, public welfare, advocacy) resulted in too few responses for

Table 2: Work-Related item responses by frequency

Participant Demographics	%	n
Years of Social Work Experience		
<2 years	7.3	12
2-5 years	19.5	32
6-10 years	17.1	28
11-15 years	15.2	25
16-20 years	11.6	19
>20 years	29.3	48
Current primary work function		
Direct practice	50.6	83
Administration	8.5	14
Advocacy/Community organizer	5.5	9
Social Work Education	31.7	52
"Other"	3.7	6
Area of practice		
Aging	6.2	10
Child/Family Welfare	11.8	19
Criminal Justice	3.1	5
Health	12.4	20
Mental Health	36.0	58
Public Assistance	1.2	2
School Social Work	6.8	11
Other	22.4	36
Work setting		
Urban	49.7	81
Suburban	25.2	41
Rural	25.2	41
Type of agency		
Private	29.6	48
Public non-profit	48.8	79
Public for-profit	12.3	20
Religious affiliation (faith-based agency)		
Yes	19.1	31
No	80.9	131
Teach social work		
Yes full-time	42.3	69
Yes, part-time	9.2	15
No	48.5	79

analysis and were therefore included in the category of "other". The work settings of participants were almost half urban (49.7%, n=81) with the remaining participants evenly distributed between suburban (25.2%, n=41) and rural (25.2%, n=41) settings. Finally, almost half of the participants worked within public non-profit agencies (48.8%, n=79), more than three quarters worked within non-religiously affiliated agencies (80.9%, n=131), and an almost even number of participants were teaching social work full- or part-time (51.5%, n=84) as were not (48.5%, n=79).

Conflict and Priority Items

Table 3 includes frequencies of overall responses to the conflict items and the priority item. Overall, few participants reported frequent value conflicts on any of the four categories of conflict identified in the survey. Only 11.8% (n=19) of participants reported experiencing

Table 3: Frequencies of responses to Conflict and Priority Items

Questionnaire Item	Level of Agreement	n	%
I have experienced conflicts between my professional values and personal value			
	Very often	5	3.1
	Often	14	8.7
	Occasionally	68	42.2
	Rarely	64	39.8
	Never	10	6.2
I have experienced conflicts between my professional values and my religious beliefs			
	Very often	2	1.3
	Often	4	2.5
	Occasionally	38	23.8
	Rarely	62	38.8
	Never	54	33.8
I have experienced conflicts between my professional values and my political views			
	Very often	4	2.5
	Often	8	5.0
	Occasionally	38	23.6
	Rarely	86	53.4
	Never	25	15.5
I have experienced conflicts between my religious beliefs and my political views			
	Very often	1	0.6
	Often	11	6.9
	Occasionally	33	20.8
	Rarely	56	35.2
	Never	58	36.5
When faced with a conflict between Values/views, the primary source of direction for my decisions is			
	Professional values	138	86.3
	Personal values	11	6.9
	Political views	0	0.0
	Religious beliefs	2	1.3
	Other	9	5.6

conflicts between professional and personal values often or very often with the remainder reporting experiencing conflicts occasionally (42.2%, n=68) and rarely or never (46%, n=74). Few participants reported conflicts between professional values and political views very often or often (7.5%, n=12) with the majority reporting rarely or never (68.9%, n=111) and the remainder reporting occasionally experience conflict in this area (23.6%, n=38). The same number of participants (7.5%, n=12)

reported often or very often experiencing conflict between religious beliefs and political views, 71.7% (n=114) reporting rarely or never, and 20.8% (n=33) reporting occasionally. Even fewer participants reported often or very often experiencing conflicts between professional values and religious beliefs (3.8%, n=6), with 23.8% (n=38) reporting occasional conflicts in this area, and the remaining participants divided between rarely (38.8%, n=62) and never (33.8%, n=54)

experiencing such conflicts. In sum, the area with the fewest reported experiences of conflict was between professional values and religious beliefs. The area with most reported experiences of conflict was between professional and personal values.

The majority of participants indicated professional values (86.3%, n=138) as their primary source of direction for decisions when faced with conflict. Personal values (6.9%, n=11) and Other (5.6%, n=9) followed, with only two participants (1.3%) indicating religious beliefs and none indicating political views as a primary sources for decision making direction. All nine participants who chose "Other" completed a qualitative response. These responses were "a combination of personal/professional/religious values," "agency policy/practice," "combo of personal and professional," "dynamics of interpersonal relationships," "keeping neutral to assist client in THEIR identification," "NASW Code of Ethics," "never has been a conflict," "supervision," and "the values of my client."

Inferential Analysis

Relationships were examined between each of the following variables: conflict items, religiosity, age, and years of social work experience, political ideology, participation, and importance of religion in daily life. The results indicate interesting distinctions between correlates of each of the different conflict categories.

Both of the religiosity items and importance of religion in daily life were positively correlated with the experiences of conflict between professional values and religious beliefs (faith/belief used to guide decisions, r=.213, p=.018; attendance at religious services, r=.364, p=.000; and importance of religion in daily life r=.407, p=.000) and between religious beliefs and political views (faith/belief used to guide decisions, r=.237, p=.008; attendance at religious services, r=.210, p=.019; and importance of religion in daily life r=.369, p=.000), but not with conflicts between either professional and personal values or professional values and political views (see Table 4). The more frequently participants attend religious services, use faith/beliefs to guide

Table 4

Correlations between conflict items and religiosity items

	Importance of religion in daily life	Faith/belief used to guide decisions in daily life	Frequency of attendance at religious services
Experience conflict professional and personal values	.037	-.044	-.028
Experience conflict professional values and religious beliefs	.407**	.213*	.364**
Experience conflict professional values and political views	-.013	.112	.015
Experience conflict Religious beliefs and Political views	.369**	.237**	.210*

* $p < .05$
** $p < .01$

decision making in their lives, and report religion being important in daily life, the more conflict they experienced between professional values and religious beliefs, and between religious beliefs and political views. This was not true for conflicts between professional and personal values, or between professional values and political beliefs, so it was significant only on conflicts stating religious beliefs explicitly.

Significant positive relationships were found between all conflict items and political ideology indicating that the more liberal participants reported their political ideology to be, the fewer conflicts of any category they reported experiencing. Political activity, however, only correlated with conflict between professional values and religious beliefs and between religious beliefs and political views. So, those participants who scored higher in political activity reported fewer experiences of conflicts only in categories of conflict that included religious beliefs (see Table 5).

No significant relationships were found between conflict items and either age of the participant or years of social work experience.

Table 5

Correlations between conflict items, items of religiosity, importance of religion in daily life and political ideology and political activity

	Political ideology	Political activity
Experience conflict professional and personal values	-.256**	-.102
Experience conflict professional values and religious beliefs	-.382**	-.218**
Experience conflict professional values and political views	-.321**	-.076
Experience conflict religious beliefs and political views	-.422**	-.247**
Importance of religion in daily life	-.302**	-.210**
Faith/beliefs used to guide decisions in daily life	-.236**	-.160
Frequency of attendance at religious services	-.225*	-.152

* $p < .05$
** $p < .01$

Religion and Politics Comparisons

Comparisons of political ideology by responses to the value priority item, the primary source of directions for decisions when faced with value conflicts (professional values, personal values, political views, religious beliefs, or other) were made using a One-way ANOVA. Results revealed a significant difference (F(3, 156)=3.31, *p*=.022) in political ideology by value priority. Tukey post-hoc analysis indicates that participants who reported using professional values or other primary sources to guide decision-making when faced with a value conflict identified as more liberal (m=4.31, SD=0.85 and m=4.33, SD=1.12 respectively) than those who reported using religious beliefs as the primary sources of direction (m=2.50, SD=0.71).

Analysis using one-way ANOVAs revealed significant differences in the reported importance of religion in daily life (F(4, 112)=16.26, *p*=.000) and political ideology (F(4, 107)=4.25, *p*=.003) by religion. Tukey post-hoc analysis indicates that atheist participants rated the importance of religion in daily life lower (m=1.69, SD=1.25) than each of the other religions including Protestant (m=4.33, SD=1.02), Roman Catholic (m=3.35, SD=1.30), Jewish (m=3.73, SD=1.19) and Buddhist (m=3.60, SD=1.95). On the 5-point scale, atheists reported the importance of religion as between very and somewhat unimportant, Protestants between somewhat and very important, and all others between neutral and somewhat important. In comparisons of political ideology, Tukey post-hoc analysis indicates that Protestant participants identified as more conservative (m=3.82, SD=1.02) than either Jewish (m=4.73, SD=0.65) or atheist (m=4.71, SD=0.83) participants. On this 5-point scale Protestant participants reported political ideologies between moderate and somewhat liberal, while Jewish and atheist participants reported between somewhat and very liberal.

Correlations between the importance of religion in daily life, political ideology and political activity were also analyzed (See Table 5). Results indicate that the more liberal participants'

political ideology the less important they rated the importance of religion in daily life (r= -.302, *p*=.000), the less frequently they report using religious beliefs/faith as a guide in making decision in life (r= -.236, *p*=.009), and the less frequently they attend religious services (r= -.225, *p*=.013). The more a participant engages in political activity, the less important he/she reports the importance of religion in his/her daily life (r= -.210, *p*=.009), and the more liberal a political ideology he/she reports (r=.419, *p*=.000). Political activity was not, however, significantly correlated with either using religious faith/beliefs to guide decisions in life or the frequency of attendance at religious services.

Sex Comparisons

Results of an independent samples t-test indicated no differences between men and women in reported experience of any of the categories of conflict measured. Using Crosstabs and Chi-Square, there were also no significant differences between men and women in response to which values or beliefs are the primary source of direction for decisions in resolving the conflict.

Work-Related Comparisons

One-way ANOVAs were used to analyze differences by primary work function, area of practice, work setting, public, private nonprofit or private for profit agency type, and faith-based agency or not on responses to each of the conflict items. The only statistically significant difference found was that of the work setting (urban, suburban, rural) and conflict between professional values and religious beliefs (*F*(2, 156)=3.114, *p*=0.047). Tukey's post-hoc analysis found those who work in suburban settings (M=2.28, SD=.916) reported significantly more experience of those conflicts than those who work in urban settings (M=1.86, SD=.873). Although not statistically significant, those who worked in rural settings (M=1.93, SD=.848) were more similar to those working in urban settings in the reported experience of such conflicts.

Respondents who taught social work at a college or university were compared to respondents who did not using an independent samples t-test. No differences in the reported experience of value conflicts were found. Further analysis also showed no significant differences between those who teach and those who do not in the primary source of direction for value conflict decisions. A dichotomous variable was constructed to compare respondents in direct practice and all other types of practice with no significant results in any category of conflict measured, or in the value priority item.

Discussion

The findings of this study suggest two primary directions for discussion. The first is the overall infrequency of experience of value conflicts and consensus on the priority of professional values in guiding practice decisions when a conflict does arise. And second is the distinction between categories of conflicts indicated by variance in frequency of experience, correlates and differences by religiosity, religion, political ideology and work setting.

Experience of value conflicts and value priority in decision-making

Consistent with previous research (Valutis, Rubin & Bell, 2014) participants did not report frequent experiences of value conflicts and the vast majority of respondents indicated that they use professional values as a decision-making guide when faced with a conflict. This is encouraging as it lends additional quantitative support to the effectiveness of professional socialization in social work. Since professional socialization should facilitate the internalization of professional values and roles in social work students (Allen & Friedman, 2010; Baretti, 2004; Miller, 2010), the infrequency of conflict and priority of professional values as the primary source of direction for decision-making suggests that the socialization process may be taking place effectively. It is also possible that many students who choose a career in social work approach their education

with an existing predisposition to social work values (e.g., Abbott, 1988; Barretti, 2004; Osteen, 2011). Hughes' (2011) qualitative study of social work students provides evidence of both self-selection and effective professional socialization. While some of the student participants found it natural to align their personal values to those of the profession (i.e., self-selection), other students went through change in their personal values such that their personal values became more closely aligned with the profession (i.e., professional socialization). Osteen (2011) also noted that students were motivated by personal values to pursue an MSW, yet also faced conflicts between personal and professional values as they progressed through their education. In sum, evidence supports the presence of a common professional identity through both self-selection and the process of professional socialization.

A further understanding of the process of professional socialization is provided by current findings through the comparisons between participants who teach social work and those who do not. The results of this study did not show differences in either the frequency of value conflicts experienced nor in the primary source of direction for resolution and decision-making when faced with a conflict between the two groups. The lack of differences between social work educators and non-educators (all of whom are social work practitioners) indicates that there does not seem to be a layer of separation between the "real world" and social work education in the experience and resolution of value conflict. This bodes well for the process of professional socialization since educators, whose task it is to socialize new social workers to professional values show similarities in the experience of value conflicts of all categories, and have a similar belief that professional values should serve as the primary source of direction for decision-making.

In sum, the minimal experience of any category of value conflict for social workers and the priority of professional values in decision making indicate consistency in the professional

values held and utilized by practitioners and educators. This is both an encouraging statement on the place of professional socialization in social work and a reason to continue to explore greater depth in understanding the complexities of values and value conflicts in an effort to continuously strengthen methods of education and training for effective socialization.

Categories of value conflicts

Even with self-selection to the profession, and effective professional socialization, value conflicts do still occur although low in frequency. A critical contribution of this current study is the classification of value conflicts into four categories and the differential frequencies and correlates of each category. Although the frequency of conflict was found to be at a minimal level overall, conflicts between professional and personal values were most common while conflicts reported between professional values and religious beliefs were reported the least frequently. Furthermore, correlates of conflict categories differed significantly. Items of religiosity, for example, correlated only with conflict categories that included religious beliefs. Those higher in religiosity (higher reported importance of religion, more frequent attendance at religious services, and using religion in daily decision-making) experienced more conflict between the value conflict categories of "professional values and religious beliefs" and "religious beliefs and political views." Those scoring higher in political activity reported fewer experiences of conflicts in categories of conflict including religious beliefs. Finally the experience of value conflicts in practice were reported more often by those working in suburban settings.

On the surface these results are not surprising, yet they have important implications. On a broad level, the variance between categories of value conflict suggests that the source of value conflicts is complex and confounded by many factors including the categories of conflicts. Research, therefore, should extend beyond what seems to be a common reference to value

differences that encompass broadly "personal" values (e.g., Comartin & Gonzales-Prendez, 2011; Osteen, 2011; Spano & Koenig, 2010), and move beyond the general construct of religion (e.g., Valutis, Rubin & Bell, 2014; Levy, 2011). Current findings build on the important contributions of previous studies and indicate that greater specification of various types of value conflicts are important to our understanding and suggest directions for future research. Reference to "value conflicts" should not be overgeneralized and requires differentiation. In practice, tools such as ethical decision-making models need to consider the use of more specific terms than personal values. Reamer (2000) refers to "personal values" in his commonly cited ethical decision model, but he suggests "including religious, cultural, and ethnic values and political ideology" to further clarify and guide practitioners. Lowenberg, Dolgoff and Harrington (2000) and Mattison (2000) both guide practitioners faced with an ethical dilemma to consider their own "personal values" in relation to the dilemma. Spano and Koenig (2007) use the term "personal worldview" but do not expand further or provide additional definition as they encourage practitioners to be self-aware of one's worldview and its potential impact on practice and ethical decision-making. While we are not suggesting that these classic tools are not useful, we are suggesting that greater specificity of the terminology used in the models reflect the complexity of the construct of personal values.

A methodological limitation of this study, and more broad issue for electronic survey research (The Pew Research Center, 2015) is the use of social media to collect responses. Although internet survey research is becoming increasingly common for many reasons, similar to any survey research utilizing a nonprobability sample, results should not be overgeneralized (The Pew Research Center, 2015). In this study the use of social media for survey distribution allowed for the inclusion of participants across a national geographic area, but it could not avoid the

limitations inherent to this type of data collection. Despite these limitations, our findings contribute to the ongoing discussion of value conflicts in social work. Although we expanded previous measures of politics and religion (Valutis, Rubin & Bell, 2014), our current findings suggest that future research should include greater differentiation in the measures of religious affiliation, religiosity, and political ideology.

Conclusion

The results reported in this paper provide a foundation for a fuller understanding of the complexities of value conflicts in social work practice. They also underscore the need for additional research. Our results were similar to previous findings indicating that value conflict and prioritization may not be primarily a religious issue (Valutis, Rubin & Bell, 2014) and support the need for further research about the complexity of religious and political interactions. Future efforts are also needed to establish working definitions of the categories identified by our findings so that "personal values" and "religious beliefs" can be operationalized and differentiated. This should include the consideration of cultural influences on values. "While the profession shares a common history and intellectual basis, there are values and practices that must be acknowledged and addressed within different cultural contexts" (Hawkins & Knox, 2014, p. 249). Abbott (1999) also noted the need to examine social work values across cultures and countries. These distinctions will add clarity to categories of conflict (i.e., religious beliefs and participation, political ideologies and activity, professional values, culture) and measures should continue to be developed and expanded. Finally, although the vast majority of respondents agreed that professional values take precedence when faced with a value conflict, how those values are used can also vary. As indicated by Mattison (2000), some may favor the use of their own discretionary judgment in conflict situations, while others prefer a set of rules or policies to be followed. For this reason further research should include greater differentiation in the measure of the priorities in value conflict research.

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Exploring Workplace Bullying Through a Social Work Ethics-Informed Lens

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Abstract

Workplace bullying is a well-researched topic and a rising phenomenon in academia. When this phenomenon occurs within the social work academy, it can be detrimental to teaching and learning, social work practice, and tenure-track faculty's research productivity. This paper will examine and define workplace bullying, as well as explore the implications it has on social work ethics and academia. Recommendations for practice, research, and policy are addressed.

Keywords: workplace bullying; tenure-track faculty; social work students; social work academia; social work values/ethics

Introduction

Workplace bullying is a phenomenon that has been well researched, and findings indicate that it is detrimental to both workers and the workplace. Hallberg and Strandmark (2006) found that workplace bullying is associated with physical and psychosomatic symptoms, as well as counterproductive behaviors in the workplace, such as purposely wasting company materials and supplies, purposely completing one's work incorrectly, and purposely damaging valuable company property (Ayoko, Callon, Hartel, 2003). The effects of workplace bullying are unique to each work setting, especially in academia. Most of the literature has focused on the helping professions—especially medicine, nursing, education, and social work—because they rely heavily on the workplace for student training and professional socialization (Zapt, Einarsen, Hoel, & Vartia, 2003 as cited in Ferris & Kline, 2009). What distinguishes social work from other helping professions is a long-standing allegiance to a value-based mission and a distinct ethical framework (Reamer, 1993, p.39).

Schools of social work are teaching and learning environments for social work principles such as theory, evidence-based practice, policy, and research. Students, faculty, and internship supervisors are all active participants within the social work academy, and they are all responsible for upholding the National Association of Social Workers-Code of Ethics (NASW-COE). The NASW-COE specifies our responsibilities to our students, clients, colleagues, and practice settings. Its values include service, social justice, dignity and worth of the person, importance of human relationships, integrity, and competence. The code of ethics values are as follows (NASW Code Ethics, 2008):

- Service: to assist those in need and address social problems.
- Social justice: pursue social change, especially with the vulnerable and oppressed.
- Dignity and worth of the person: treat each person in a caring a respectful manner, mindful of individual differences and cultural and ethnic diversity.
- Importance of human relationships: relationships between and among

people are an important vehicle for change.

- Integrity: behaving in a trustworthy manner.
- Competence: aspire to contribute to the knowledge base of the profession.

Purpose

In the social work academy, the six NASW-COE values are important to teaching, learning, and practice. This paper will explore the connections between workplace bullying in the so-cial work academy and the inherent contradictions that it poses to the NASW-COE. This discussion is guided by three assumptions from the scholarly literature on workplace bullying: first, workplace bullying affects organizational culture and climate; secondly, in the social work academy, social work students are trained using the NASW-COE; and lastly, workplace bullying amongst students, from faculty to students, and amongst faculty can nega-tively influence teaching, learning, and client care.

Workplace Bullying Defined

Matthiesen and Einarsen (2010) attempted to develop a nomenclature by defining nine differ-ent types of workplace bullying:

1. dispute-related bullying (developed from an interpersonal conflict, often involving social control reactions to the perceived wrongdoing);

2. predatory bullying (the target has personally done nothing provocative that may reasonably justify the behavior of the bully);

3. scapegoating (frustration is displaced on an available target which is seen to "deserve" it);

4. sexual harassment (a target is exposed to repeated and unwanted sexual attention by a more powerful and often older coworker or superior);

5. humor-oriented bullying (ridiculing, teasing, or interpersonal humor that is asymmetrical; person- oriented humor directed towards someone in an out-group position);

6. work-related stalking (can be defined as a course of conduct in which one individual inflicts upon another repeated unwanted intrusions and communications, to such an extent that the victim fears for their safety);

7. bullying of workplace newcomers (a rite of passage in which newcomers in the workplace are met with intimidating behavior as a kind of hazing);

8. judicial derelicts (may take place when an individual perceives their self to be bullied by a system, be it bureaucrats and their decisions or the legal system itself); and

9. retaliatory acts after whistleblowing (sometimes whistleblowing leads to a victimization process where the organization or its members "shoot the messenger," that is retaliate against the person that exposed the wrongdoing) (p.213-216).

There are essentially aspects that work-place bullying shares with general bullying, such as power, aggression, and repeated acts. Power addresses hierarchy positions in the work setting such as tenured professor/tenure-track professor relationships and social work intern/client relation-ships. Aggression refers to displays of relational, verbal, and/or physical behaviors against a target (and then these acts are repeated). A person's position in the workplace can dictate the type of bullying he or she may experience. There can be upward, horizontal, and downward bullying in the workplace; upward bullying is a subordinate bul-lying a person in a managerial position, horizontal

bullying is worker bullying their co-worker, and downward bullying is perpetrated by managers against subordinates (Branch, Ramsay, & Barker, 2012; Getz, 2013). Downward bullying may be found in social work academia, for although tenure-track faculty and tenured faculty are colleagues, the relationship is inherently hierarchical because the senior faculty member votes on the tenure-track faculty's tenure.

Another term associated with workplace bullying is mobbing, which refers to to the non-sexual harassment of a coworker by a group of other members of the organization for the purpose of removing the targeted individual(s) from the department or organization (Sperry, 2009). Mobbing, like workplace bullying, is carried out by several employees. Relational aggression, a bullying subtype in which harm is caused through damage, or threat of damage, to an individual's relationships or reputation, can also be added to workplace bullying nomenclature. Relationally aggressive behaviors entail spreading rumors, negative comments shared with others when the victim is not present, sarcasm, and public embarrassment (Horton, 2014). Fogg (2008) found that these very behaviors also define academic bullies. The major difference between relational aggression and workplace bullying is the setting; relational aggression is prominent in children and adolescents in school settings, whereas workplace bullying is prominent in adults within the workplace.

Bullying behaviors in academia are effective, albeit subtle. These behaviors may include the bully's interrupting the victim while speaking at a committee meeting, spreading rumors to undermine a victim's credibility and collegiality, and ignoring the victim or shutting him or her out from social gatherings or conversations (Fogg, 2008). Furthermore, in workplace bullying, the victim typically perceives the bullying to be intentional, and intimidation is a strategy often used.

Unraveling the reasons for the various bullying behaviors listed can be difficult, but fortunately the use of the cognitive behavioral theory enhances our understanding of the reasons for workplace bullying within social work academia.

Cognitive behavioral theory (CBT) emphasizes that a person's thinking is the primary determinant of both emotional and behavioral actions and reactions to life events (Gonzalez-Prendes & Brisebois, 2012). According to CBT, an individual who displays workplace bullying behaviors has created a way of thinking that influences his or her own emotions and behaviors, more specifically bullying behaviors. Perpetrators of workplace bullying may have cognitive distortions or errors in thinking that allow them to believe that their bullying behaviors are self-preserving and beneficial.

At-Risk Status

Exposure to bullying at work may result in increased negative views of self, others, and the world (Mikkelsen & Einarsen, 2002). Research has found that those most likely to be bullied in university settings are new hires and untenured workers (McKay, Huberman-Arnold, Fratzl, & Thomas, 2008). Individuals with poor social competencies or problematic profiles (i.e. neurotic, introvert, oversensitive, and suspicious) and depression with a tendency to convert psychological distress into psychosomatic symptoms are at higher risk of workplace bullying (Girardi, Monaco, Prestigiacomo, Talamo, Ruberto, & Tatarelli, 2007). Additional risk factors for workplace bullying include leadership practices and power hierarchies, role conflicts, organizational cultures and climates, and working conditions (Einarsen, Aasland, & Skogstad, 2007; Hague, Einarsen, Knardahl, Notealaers, & Skogstad, 2011). All of these risk factors correlate with various mental health problems.

Effects of Workplace Bullying

In a setting where workplace bullying is present, physical and psychosomatic symptoms may gradually emerge in the victims (Hallberg & Strandmark, 2006). Workplace bullying may result in the following individual outcomes: depression and anxiety, lowered self-esteem, difficulty making decisions, change-related anguish, psychological strain, passive aggressive traits, somatic symptoms, stress symptoms, problems with general health, the need for attention and affection, chronic

fatigue, and troubles with sleeping (Girardi et al., 2007; Lind, Glaso, Pallesen, & Einarsen, 2009; Nielson & Einarsen, 2012; Tuckey & Neall, 2014). Additional outcomes of workplace bullying include noncompliance, expulsion from the organization/leaving the organization, problems with concentration, increased absenteeism, reduced organizational commitment and job satisfaction, reduced productivity, an altered view of the work environment, worker's compensation claims, and costs regarding interventions by third parties (Nielson & Einarsen, 2012; Gamian-Wilk, 2013). Moreover, empirical studies suggest that victims of workplace bullying may suffer from posttraumatic stress disorder and that this trauma can be just as harmful as a physical assault on the job (Bond, Tuckey, & Dollard., 2010; Rodriguez-Munoz, Moreno-Jimenez, Sanz Vergel, & Garrosa Hernandez, 2010; Mayhew, McCarthy, Chaooell, Quinlan, Barker, & Sheehan, 2004).

Student, Faculty, and Programmatic Effects

Social workers and social workers in training are tasked with the duties of "[enhancing] human well-being and [helping] meet the basic human needs of all people, with particular attention to the needs and empowerment of people who are vulnerable, oppressed, and living in poverty" ("National Association of Social", 2015, para. 1). In the social work academy, those tasked with upholding the NASW-COE are typically social work faculty and social work students. Of these individuals, social work students and tenure-track faculty are most at risk for workplace bullying due to their limited power in the political hierarchies of the academy.

Students may experience workplace bullying in their social work internship, in their social work classes, and when viewing workplace bullying amongst faculty. Ferris and Kline (2009) found that merely witnessing negative interpersonal interactions (i.e. gossip, put-downs, irritability, and negative attitudes) was particularly bothersome to some helping profession students in education,

medicine, nursing, and social work. This research concluded that students learn better when they relate to faculty members who are able to manage their own stress reactions. Social work faculty who experience workplace bullying as either victim or perpetrator may find it indirectly affects their teaching as well as their students' ability to learn. Another research study conducted with helping profession students found that medical students developed a lack of sensitivity after experiencing workplace bullying in their internship (Rosenberg & Silver as cited in Ferris & Kline, 2009). A similar lack of sensitivity in social work would affect client care and does not adhere to the NASW-COE values of dignity and worth of the person and importance of human relationships. Furthermore, any programmatic effects that develop as a result of workplace bullying would be problematic to the competence and integrity of the social work program. For example, faculty turnover due to workplace bullying may lead to adjunct professors and teaching assistants covering classes instead of more qualified tenure-track faculty.

Exploitative Mentoring

Mentoring is the collaboration between mentee and mentor, founded on openness, vulnerability, and the capacity for both parties to take risks with each other; however, power and control of knowledge can remain barriers to open communication and collaboration (Darwin, 2000). Mentorship in the field of social work is inherent in NASW-COE values (Service, Social Justice, Dignity and Worth of the Person, Importance of Human Relations, Integrity, and Competence), and our work is guided by these same principles.

Mentorship from tenured faculty is not only valuable but also indispensable in social work, especially for tenure-track professors. With the "publish or perish" statement ever present in tenure-track professors' minds, good leadership and guidance are necessities. Mentoring also has noticeable rewards for the mentor, mentee, and the university; and a correlation exists between a mentor's support and a new faculty member's feeling

connected to the organization (Schrodt, Cawyer, & Sanders, 2003). Phillips-Jones (1982) believes that mentors benefit from developing dependable, important subordinates and that the reward for the organization is that the mentor has spotted and developed new talent (as cited in Jacobi, 1991, p. 512). Still, within mentorship relationships, destructive and toxic behaviors can take place. These behaviors can undermine the mentee and lessen the mentee's trust in the university, as the behaviors' repeated existence suggests the mentor's behaviors are acceptable. This acceptance, whether passive or obvious, shows the lack of regard for the mentee's career and how this experience will influence his or her mental health. Also, dealing with certain mentor characteristics (such as inflated ego, misogynistic behavior, and micromanaging on collaborative projects/grants) can affect the tenure-track faculty in many ways.

Research has found weak connections and correlations between exploitative mentorship and workplace bullying (Darwin, 2000; Warren, 2005). Chung and Kowalski (2006) found that a lack of mentorship or poor mentorship is associated with faculty isolation, stress, burnout, and turnover. Tenure-track professors in the social work field may assume that mentorship is based on the NASW-COE and that any mentored experience will be an ethical interaction and transaction of ideas and work. However, tenured professors and mentors frequently overload newly hired tenure-track professors with work (for example, asking them to serve on committees). Work overload is common among tenure-track faculty, and it makes them vulnerable to a lack of the scholarly productivity that is needed for tenure.

The extension of the NASW-COE to include vulnerable populations, such as tenure-track social work professors, is apparent. Inherent in the NASW-COE is the resolution that those new to the field will be socialized on social work's mission, values, ethical principles, and ethical standards ("National Association of Social", 2015, para. 5). This socialization is present in the social work academy through both the mentorship relationship

and the faculty/student relationship, where power is obviously unbalanced and ethical concerns may arise when this power is abused (McDonald & Hite, 2005).

Tenure-track professors in the field of social work are expected to uphold the NASW-COE and to teach social work students the mission of the profession, which includes enhancing the well-being of all people, especially the vulnerable and oppressed. An ethical dilemma in the social work academy is the acknowledgement that there are vulnerable populations that exist within social work academia, and particular attention should be paid to their empowerment. Women faculty, faculty of color, and tenure-track faculty are all vulnerable populations; and the academy has long been known for inequality and inequity when it comes to gender and ethnicity. Compared with their female European American counterparts, female faculty of color typically teach more, advise greater numbers of students, engage in more committee work, and tend not to be included in as much collaborative research with their peers, contributing to tenure and promotion problems and flight from the academy (Mkandawire-Valhmu, Kakpo, & Stevens, 2010). Burk and Eby (2010) found that when a tenure-track professor is experiencing high levels of manipulation, the fear of retaliation may cause the tenure-track professor to remain in the relationship out of belief that a manipulative mentor might try to sabotage his or her career.

Discussion

In the social work academy, ethical concerns may exist within administrator/professor, professor/student, intern supervisor/student, and student/student relationships. The mere thought of social workers taking part in exploitative mentorship or workplace bullying should be implausible since this behavior is contrary to the NASW-COE, which was "…designed to help social workers identify relevant considerations when professional obligations conflict or ethical uncertainties arise" ("National Association of Social", 2015, para. 5). When ethical uncertainties arise and give way to

workplace bullying interactions, social workers should consult the NASW-COE to discover the best course of action. Social work practice and research are guided by our values and ethics. Therefore, social work academia has a duty to develop an understanding of workplace bullying and make sure the social work academy is one that displays integrity and respect for all individuals. Mentoring has a negative effect when it reinforces unquestioning acceptance of the existing culture (McDonald & Hite, 2005), and workplace bullying occurs because of the organizational culture (Kircher, Stilwell, Talboot, & Chesborough, 2011). The organizational culture of schools of social work should utilize the NASW-COE in their pursuit to educate professional social workers, and this education can also extend to tenure-track professors.

Conclusion

In order to raise consciousness about issues related to workplace bullying in the social work academy, we need to evaluate our methods of training social work students and how we incorporate the NASW-COE in teaching, learning, and practice. A few recommendations for successful implementation of these NASW-COE training methods are as follows:

1. Train social work field placement students before and during placements to address issues of workplace bullying problems that the student might encounter (Maidment, 2003);

2. Build an awareness, through mandatory training for social work faculty and social work intern supervisors, of potential and sometimes inevitable ethical concerns (McDonald & Hite, 2005).

Power hierarchies and poor mentorship are precursors to workplace bullying, and this can ruin the true mission of social work academia. In the social work field we deal with human behavior and with environmental influences that are unique

to each individual. The social work academy is a unique workforce that should incorporate the NASW-COE within all aspects of social work, including teaching and peer guidance.

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Toxic Boomerang: The Effect of Psychiatric Diagnostic Labeling Upon the Labeler

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Abstract

Labeling theory highlights the negative implications of psychiatric diagnoses upon the labeled but not the labeler. Diagnostic labels erode clinician empathy; in addition, they alienate the clinician from the client, and the client from the clinician. We discuss the relationship of diagnosis to professional legitimacy and authority, and suggest alternatives to labeling that promote clinician empathy and professional meaning.

Keywords: labeling, psychiatric diagnosis, empathy, meaning, professional authority

Introduction

Labeling theory has long highlighted the negative implications of psychiatric diagnostic labels upon those whom the label is placed. A prominent identified effect is that of the individual internalizing deviant characteristics associated with the diagnostic label (Lemert, 1967; Link, 1987). However, there are two parties to consider in the diagnostic relationship: those who are labeled (diagnosed) and the labeler (those who diagnose). Interestingly, little has been written about the costs of psychiatric labeling upon the labeler**,** i.e., the mental health clinician. Just as there are consequences attributed to one being labeled, there may also be definable after-effects for the labeler. The purpose of this paper is to present our construct, the "toxic boomerang" (Figure 1)**.** It is defined as an effect of modern mental health diagnosis-based practice where clinicians over-emphasize diagnostic labels which impact their

Labeling by Clinician:

Client is viewed as a diagnostic label (e.g., "borderline" "schizophrenic" "alcoholic")

Client's self-view discounted

Effect on Labeled (Client)

Lack of genuine therapeutic relationship

⬇

Client feels depersonalized

⬇

Client becomes emotionally distanced from clinician

Therapy relationship not healing, is toxic to client

Effect on Labeler (Clinician)

Interpersonally distanced from client; Client does not respond to treatment/misses sessions

⬇

Erosion of clinician empathy

⬇

Client viewed in negative terms (e.g., treatment resistant, in denial, manipulator, help-rejecting)

Therapeutic work is not meaningful to clinician;

Toxic boomerang on clinician

⬇

Loss of compassion satisfaction

⬇

Professional emptiness

Figure 1. Toxic boomerang.

ability to be empathic and therapeutic; thus leading to client alienation, a sense of lack of professional efficacy, and resultant loss of meaning in work. In this paper we explore the relationship of the toxic boomerang and (1) loss of professional meaning, and (2) the "sage complex," and its association with professional legitimacy and authority. The paper concludes with alternatives to labeling that promote clinician empathy and professional meaning.

What Is the Toxic Boomerang?

We suggest that the toxic boomerang is the outcome of clinical practice that overemphasizes diagnoses and underemphasizes empathic understanding of human distress in favor of classifying clients. Our construct that labeling affects the labeler is paradoxical: why should there be a negative impact upon the holder of power, the labeler? The theoretical basis may be found in Bandura's (1978) reciprocal determinism. Bandura theorized that an individual's behavior is influenced by personal factors and the social environment, and reciprocally, their behavior impacts the environment. At the interpersonal level, Bandura (1978) observed that "people reciprocally determine each other's actions" p. 356. Reciprocal determinism in the toxic boomerang context may emerge as follows. The therapist influences the client's behavior through the power differential inherent to labeling ("I have the answers, and my clients do not"). In turn, the client's reaction to being labeled impacts the therapeutic environment ("I don't feel helped and reject your advice"). The therapist's professional competency may initially be driven by the authority derived from diagnosing others. However, a diagnostic code-driven practice may foster a barrier between the clinician and the individual seeking help through reducing the likelihood of genuine interactions (Austrian, 2005; Wakefield, 2010; Fish, 2012), attempts to understand the other from their perspective, and provision of unconditional regard (Rogers, 1961) important to the development of therapeutic alliance and treatment

efficacy (Burns & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1992; Castonguay, Costantino, Holtforth, & Grouse, 2006). It may promote a distanced or disconnected style. Lack of connectedness or detachment has been shown to impact negatively on the formation of a therapeutic alliance (Moyers, Miller, Hendrickson, & Stacey, 2005; Ackerman & Hilsenroth, 2001; Ackerman & Hilsenroth, 2003; Kim, Wampold, & Bolt, 2006) as well as therapist effectiveness (Lafferty, Beutler, & Crago, 1989; Hersoug, Hoglend, Havik, von der Lippe, & Monsen, 2009).

The client's environmental reaction to the diagnostic label may be to feel a lack of being understood and involved in the therapeutic process (i.e., distancing). Bandura (1982) described human behavior as regulated in part by a self-evaluative component leading either to satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Power and control derived from diagnosing others may be superficial markers of therapist self-competence that may be eroded by client rejection. The clinician's reaction to the client's lack of connectivity in treatment may be a negative self-review as to professional efficacy. Thus, a negative self-evaluation, e.g., the therapist's lack of self-efficacy or the belief in one's capacity to accomplish a task, may in turn fuel dissatisfaction.

What Promotes the Toxic Boomerang?

At the practice contextual level, the prominence of psychiatric diagnosis has accelerated over the recent decades as a consequence of modern mental health practice that requires codes for billing (Austrian, 2005; Wakefield, 2010). Pressure is exerted on clinicians to focus on relegating clients to diagnostic codes. In describing the historical arch of American psychiatry, Fish (2012) noted that earlier psychodynamic psychiatry focused on the individual's distress in the context of their life history in order to develop an understanding of the underlying problem. By the 1970s, the move away from the psychoanalytically centered DSM II to the DSM-III classification system based on discrete diagnostic categories (Pierre, 2010) coincided with the burgeoning demands for

categorization driven by insurers. In addition to insurance companies, managed care medical centers and mental health licensing agencies promote a culture of diagnosis (Austrian, 2005). The forces of reimbursement and professional licensing demands discourage clinicians from practicing outside a diagnostic sphere.

How Is Loss of Meaning Related to the Toxic Boomerang?

Professional identity, for many, represents a prominent aspect of their sense of selves as well as sense of meaning (Littman-Ovadia & Steger, 2010). At the interpersonal level, social learning theory and reciprocal determinism offer this observation: one's perceptions are altered by the effects "of their actions and the observed consequences to others." (Bandura, 1978, p.356) Paradoxically, diagnosing others may ultimately erode a therapist's sense of self-efficacy and lead to dissatisfaction. That is, while the diagnostic endeavor may initially enhance the therapist's sense of mastery, it may also promote client distancing (due to labeling) and the loss of an ability to be influential in the therapeutic context. Sussman (2007) explored the literature related to why individuals choose psychotherapy as a profession and found that the desire to help may be a primary drive for a large percentage of psychotherapists. However, Sussman cautioned that the motivation to help may be much more complex than an altruistic need to relieve others of their emotional pain. Sussman's review of studies of psychotherapists over multiple decades suggests that helping others is multi-layered; i.e., driven by a desire to feel needed, to experience vicariously the relief of emotional distress, power needs, the need to express compassion, or a sense of moral duty. Sussman noted that a still deeper motive for helping others may be a desire to master or understand one's own inner conflicts or even perhaps, as a method of reparation of personal guilt for having hurt others.

Frankl's (1984) concept of an existential vacuum (emptiness in place of meaning and purpose in life) may offer a related underlying

mechanism of the toxic boomerang. What draws many mental health clinicians to the field is a sense of meaning derived from their work, be it driven by a compassion for others and a genuine desire to ease emotional pain, or other motives as noted by Sussman (2007). Stripping meaning away from work leads to emptiness and a loss of sense of purpose, creating the existential vacuum. The consequences of a lack of meaning in one's life are profound. Research in the area of meaning, defined as a sense of purpose and of significance, suggests substantial negative effects (depression, lack of social connectivity, social alienation) when individuals believe their lives to be meaningless (Heintzelmann & King, 2014). Meaning in one's work is associated with occupational satisfaction and interpersonal effectiveness (Littman-Ovadia & Steger, 2010; Stillman, Lambert, Fincham, & Baumeister, 2011). Indeed, it can be even more critical than that; as Frankl (1984) observed in the Nazi concentration camps when he was interred, he found that meaning in one's life was essential to survival.

Toxic interactions emerging from reduced clinician empathy is not a new concept. Twenty years ago Breggin (1991) coined the phrase "toxic psychiatry," referring to medical training and psychiatry residency that produced psychiatrists whose authoritarian rigidity reduced their empathy and made them ineffective therapists, which ultimately led to professional dissatisfaction. Additionally, that clinicians derive meaning from their interactions with clients was noted a decade ago by Stamm (2002) who coined the term "compassion satisfaction," referring to therapeutic work that was empathic and therefore meaningful. When compassion satisfaction diminishes, compassion fatigue (the inability to experience a sense of professional efficacy) increases (Stamm, 2002).

Why Is Labeling Toxic to Therapists?

Siegel (2007), a psychiatrist and therapist, in his work relative to the mindful brain, remarked that human connections shape our neural

connections. As such, the newly emerging field of interpersonal neurobiology (Badenoch, 2008; Cozolino, 2010) may offer one theoretical model useful to understanding the precipitants of the toxic boomerang. Interpersonal neurobiology describes the neural interaction between the therapist and client in psychotherapy. Admittedly, neurobiologic explanations may be viewed as too simplistic and mechanistic toward explaining the deeply philosophical experience of an existential vacuum that may accompany loss of meaning in work (Frankl, 1984). It offers one explanation for the the corrosive nature of labeling, i.e., the toxic boomerang to the therapist.

Interactional neurobiology theory describes how therapy stimulates right-hemisphere to right-hemisphere interactions of warmth and empathy from therapist to client which are indispensable to the healing relationship (Cozolino, 2014; Hojat, 2007). Clinicians who interact with their clients as a diagnostic label ("borderline," "dependent," "chronically depressed") rather than respond to their pain may be perceived as robotic and distant, and not empathic. The client feels disconnected from the therapist. In turn, the client's lack of connectivity is perceived by the therapist. Consequently, the right-hemisphere to right-hemisphere empathic interaction between therapist and client is not triggered, and the client does not experience relief from emotional distress. At the neurobiological level, when the therapist is perceived as distant and authoritarian by the client, there is a lack of perceived pleasure in the therapist-client interaction by both the therapist and the client. The client does not experience healing and the therapist does not experience the pleasure of healing another. The underlying brain processes related to pleasure (i.e., the dopaminergic nucleus accumbens circuitry) triggered by empathy and altruistic actions do not occur in the therapist (Hojat, 2007; Cozolino, 2010; Decety, 2011). The emotions triggered by such relationships (anxiety on the part of the client, and dissatisfaction and irritation on part of the therapist) are negative and toxic to healing. As the effects of diagnosing others (loss of meaning,

loss of pleasure) are profound, why do clinicians continue to remain fixated on this method of interacting with their clients?

The Sage Complex, Power, Authority, and Legitimacy

In the early 1900s, anthropologist Franz Boas (1989) noted astutely that people in power are slow in developing sympathy for people out of power. Mental health professionals' need to remain in authority may explain why the profession has eagerly embraced diagnostic reductionism over client-centered conceptualization of an individual (Rogers, 1961). The clinician as "labeler" may have a sense of empowerment, i.e., "I am wiser than you as I know you better than yourself." We call this the "sage complex." The current mental health professional culture as well as the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) and its predecessors offer mental health clinicians a powerful identity through legitimizing their role as the arbiters of psychological normality. Austrian (2005) described an additional lure and flaw of diagnostic labeling; it fosters a "magical" security for inexperienced clinicians that can lead to a false understanding of the person. Diagnosis may also offer mental health clinicians a sense of professional legitimacy, or equivalence, when interacting with non-mental health physicians whose work is structured around diagnosis. DSM labeling short circuits knowing a person based on the assumption that any individual can be reduced to a cluster of symptoms through jargon- based observations.

Fish (2012) described the expansion of the diagnostic categories in each DSM iteration as the reckless medicalization of normal human behavior; an endeavor that results in additional millions meeting diagnostic criteria for a mental illness, although they are not disordered. Wakefield (2010), a leading critic of the DSM, echoed this view by noting that mental health professionals adhering to this system have to reconcile that their diagnoses encroach into every aspect of normal human reaction. There is little divide between psychological normality and abnormality. Consequently, such

a classification system leads to increased vulnerability to misidentify cultural and context driven reactions as mental illness (Wakefield, 1992; Horowitz & Wakefield, 2007). In addition, the medicalization of normal reactions also has the effect of augmenting the "sageism" of the mental health professional. This is not to imply that a categorical classification system which promotes reliability in clinician understanding and treatment of the symptoms of mental disorder is of no value. Rather, the process has trumped its underlying purpose, and encouraged an institutional professional legitimacy (e.g., in a medical setting, outpatient setting, forensic setting) that is tethered to diagnostic competence. The modern clinician has, in effect, succumbed to the sage complex.

Interestingly, twenty-five years ago, social theorist Thomas Carlton (1989) wondered whether the fight by social work (and by extension psychology) for diagnostic parity with psychiatry had been "fought on the right battleground" (p.84). Carlton argued that social workers were focused by design on enhancing a client's ability to manage their lives in an effective manner when burdened by physical or mental illness. That process offered a different paradigm and professional practice model than the medical diagnostic model. Nonetheless, in the decades since Carlton's comments, many social workers and psychologists have adopted wholesale the medical model. Moreover, they have been accorded, through their respective licenses, the authority to assign labels (i.e., DSM diagnoses); indeed, they must do so for professional legitimacy (license) and for psychotherapy reimbursement from insurance providers.

Despite cautions raised by social theorists related to diagnoses (Carlton, 1989; Wakefield, 1992; Austrian, 2005; Fish, 2012; Wakefield, 2015), a narrative understanding is often rejected as not being cost-effective. Moreover, clients who defy quick categorization or characterization may be viewed by clinicians as problematic, time consuming, and may be dismissed as malingerers. As such, some mental health institutions have opted for diagnostic templates to detect malingering quickly (Lebougeois Lii, 2007). In forensic psychiatric settings, in particular, there may be the added effect of peer pressure to be able to quickly encapsulate an individual into a diagnosis, in order to demonstrate to others that you are savvy enough to spot a malingerer quickly, and can engage in an "instant diagnosis." In such settings, not labeling others may be viewed as incompetence, naiveté, and reflective of poor training. Because of this, mental health clinicians working in forensic hospitals, prisons, jails, and other related facilities face a complex set of concerns surrounding empathy in the therapeutic process that make it difficult to provide effective treatment (Maschi & Killian, 2011). In some cases this approach has led to increased client suicides and assaults (Romney, 2006). Allegations that clinicians create safety hazards, due to suspicion of poor boundaries, may be made if they do not readily place a label, such as "psychopath," on a client or articulate that they understand "criminal games" (Allen & Bosta, 1981). Clinicians may feel an intense pressure to label others due to a fear of being shunned and facing potential job loss. It may be that the new scarlet letter is "E" for Empathy.

Looking Toward the Future: Enhancing Meaning-Based Clinical Work

Given institutional and professional consequences for those who do not diagnose clients, why should clinicians be willing to approach their clients differently? A persuasive and ethical justification is that psychotherapy is substantially dependent upon the relationship between the provider and the client. More than five decades ago, both existential psychologist Rollo May (1958) and client-centered psychologist Carl Rogers (1961) underscored the importance of "being with" the client. Understanding people from their world rather than throwing techniques at them was identified then, and remains today, the core of the healing therapeutic process. Badenoch (2008) describes this as the mutuality of the therapeutic relationship toward creating empathic inner

communities. This is a construct supported by neurobiological research demonstrating interactive neural processes occurring between the therapist and the client that are critical to healing (Cozolino, 2010; Siegel, 2007).   Badenoch describes the curative process in the therapist-client relationship as one where the therapist conveys hope that in turn becomes a wellspring of healing flowing from the therapist to the client. Badenoch suggests that the paradigmatic ground of empathy and hope is what sets the foundation of mutuality. As with all dyadic human interactions, the process is not one-sided. The therapist being for and present with another (or conversely being distant) impacts the healing process for the client as well as the meaningfulness of therapists' work for themselves.

Social work practice, perhaps more than psychology and psychiatry, offers a unique mental health service poised to move in the direction of meaning-based conceptualizations of clients. Social work ethics emphasize the intrinsic value of each person (National Association of Social Workers, 2008), which provides social work with a distinct professional paradigm**:** one that has historically encompassed social policy and individual advocacy; moved from the medical model toward a person-in-environment view of mental illness; and shifted toward a holistic approach (Zastrow, 2010). Within the last four decades, Austrian (2005) noted a theoretical shift in focus, in that social workers are moving away from a linear medico-psychiatric approach to the "person-in-environment" paradigm. This shift has highlighted the importance of the person, within a context, while developing a comprehensive psychosocial understanding of the individual. Of note, this framework has been useful in guiding treatment planning by highlighting self-determination, cultural diversity, religious practices, and the value of family and friends as integral members of a support team.

Diagnostic classification views the person through the narrow lens of diagnostic categories. Over-reliance upon formal diagnostic paradigms, such as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) system, may be antithetical to understanding the person from a contextual person-in-environment perspective. Austrian (2005), in writing to social workers regarding their interface with the DSM system, warned that social workers (and we would say mental health professionals overall) should resist falling into what she calls the classification trap. The debate waged recently by prominent psychiatrists (Phillips, Frances, Cerullo, et al., 2012) as to whether the then-pending DSM 5 expansion of disorders represented abstractions rather than real conditions, as well as concerns regarding its reliability and validity (Gordon & Cosgrove, 2013), underscores Austrian's admonition to be wary of diagnostic classifications.

Diagnostic methodology remains a boundary based system that strives to fit a person into a category. It stands in contrast to an eco-system approach that represents an assessment of the person in his or her unique context. Such differences move beyond semantics. The eco-system approach does not objectify a person as may be the case with a diagnosis; for example, identifying Ms. M. as schizophrenic versus an eco-system identification describing her as Ms. M with X strengths and Y weaknesses. The eco-system approach can facilitate understanding the whole person.

Badenoch's interpersonal neurobiological approach offers a method for the clinician to be mindful and engaged. It involves *therapists* keeping a journal to help identify their inner vulnerabilities that may derail therapy. In addition, as clients share their histories, Badenoch suggests that therapists hold images of their inner community; i.e., the internalization of their inner life. This interactive process, in contrast to classification reductionism, engages therapists with their clients at a profoundly genuine level.

Conclusion

Most people do not want to be labeled, they want to be understood. There is a drive and hunger in the general public for self-understanding as evident in the movement of positive psychotherapy focused on enhancing resilience,

happiness, and success training (Seligman, 2007; Green, Oades, & Grant, 2007). This is evident in the burgeoning interest in life-enhancement and life coaching (Spence & Grant, 2007; Seligman, 2007; Redzic, Taylor, Chang, Trockel, et al., 2014). The Internet has empowered people by giving them access to technical information that was not previously accessible and comprehensible. One example is medicine, where one can conduct a search and readily find medical resources to understand a condition and its current treatments. This has contributed to non-mental health medical professionals moving away from an authoritarian ("doctor knows best") focus with their clients to a collaborative motivational process that highlights expression of empathy and reflective listening (Rollnick, Miller, & Butler, 2008; Antiss, 2009; Emmons & Rollnick, 2001). Similarly, mental health clients have access to information regarding psychiatric diagnoses and treatment. There is no longer a closed club of clinicians as the sole holders of specialized knowledge. Consequently, a result of this may be a paradigmatic change in mental health training promoted by clients seeking something deeper and more meaningful than being labeled. It may augur a movement away from the prominence of diagnosis of psychopathology toward understanding the individual who is seeking help.

This movement can also affect clinicians' response to their work. Clinicians want and need to be engaged in the empathic understanding of others, and to experience compassion satisfaction rather than compassion fatigue (Stamm, 2002). As we stated at the outset, the toxic boomerang leads to the suffering of clinicians by stripping away meaningful understanding of the people they treat, corroding their sense of self as healer, and ultimately leading to feelings of professional emptiness. The costs of such compassion dissatisfaction and professional burnout are serious in that poor judgments and errors can result in lowered efficacy (Rossi, Cetrano, Petrile, Rabbi et al., 2012; Figley, 2002; Adams, Figley, Boscarino, 2008; Kumar, 2011). The increased awareness by the general

public of mental health issues and their drive toward self-understanding offer a great opportunity for mental health to embrace a non-judgmental and collaborative process. Ultimately, this is the healing antidote to the toxic boomerang.

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How Do Students of Welfare Professions Perceive Poverty? A Study of the Factors Affecting the Judgment of Poverty

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Abstract

The study uses a factorial survey design to examine what factors in the life situation of a family respondents take into account when they appraise whether the family is poor or not. Respondents primarily rely on an income-based conception of poverty and deprivations are ascribed far less weight than income.

Keywords: poverty, judgment, factorial survey, vignette, social work

Introduction

Poverty is often studied objectively, emphasizing how poverty may be defined and measured, the causes of poverty, its magnitude and distribution in and across societies, the effects of poverty on well-being and how people cope with poverty (e.g. Ejrnæs and Larsen, 2013; Ejrnæs, Larsen and Müller, 2013; Lichter, Parisi and Taquino, 2012; Nolan and Whelan, 2007; Saunders and Naidoo, 2009; Whelan, Nolan and Maître, 2012). Little is known about how well concepts of poverty applied in research and official measures of poverty fit with the attitudes of the community and professionals working with poor people. This study addresses this gab by examining the concept of poverty held by students of welfare professions.

How poverty is conceived by welfare professionals, politicians and the general public has important implications for people living in poverty. Popular and professional conceptions of what poverty is may affect people living in poverty directly and indirectly by affecting attributions of responsibility and how social work and social policy identifies and addresses poverty. Perceptions of what poverty is and who the poor are may namely be regarded as a foundation for actions addressing poverty: If something is not perceived as poverty, it is unlikely to be addressed as such. In this context, it is particularly important to study how poverty is perceived by welfare professionals, since they are the front-line workers responding to people living in poverty. Welfare professionals may be regarded as street-level bureaucrats with considerable discretion in decisions with crucial consequences for people living in poverty (Lipsky, 1980). Understanding what welfare professionals perceive as poverty is hence an important first step in understanding and developing social work practice with people living in poverty. This is furthermore interesting in the light of research indicating that poverty does not affect social work decision making in child protection (Stokes and Schmidt, 2011). Hence, the perception of poverty in social work is important to examine.

In this study, we examine perceptions of poverty. This is done by examining judgments of whether a person is poor or not using a factorial survey. In the study, we seek to identify the factors in a family's life situation that are decisive for the family to be seen as poor. The objective of the

study is to examine what personal and contextual factors impact the perception and judgment of poverty. By examining what factors are perceived as signs of poverty by respondents, it is possible to indirectly examine the concept of poverty held by respondents. More specifically, we examine whether the concept of poverty held by respondents take into account the following aspects of a family's life situation:

- Income

- Deprivations

- Duration of deprivations

- Social background

As we discuss below, income, deprivations and the duration of deprivations are common elements in conceptualizations of poverty, and hence it is relevant to examine the extent to which respondents emphasize these elements in their understanding of poverty. Social background characteristics are included in the study in order to examine whether respondents hold different standards as to what are fair living conditions for different populations. Such differentiation in the perception of fairness of the social distribution of resources is common in discussions of poverty where students are often excluded from measures of the magnitude of poverty. However, such differentiation may also raise concerns regarding discrimination and hence it is important to examine what role social background characteristics play in the judgment of poverty. This is particularly important for a discussion of welfare professionals' attitudes towards poverty.

Concepts and Measures of Poverty

Poverty is often conceptualized in purely financial terms using the household income as an indicator of poverty. Here, a relative concept of poverty relates the household's income to the income distribution of a given society. OECD thus defines a poverty line by disposable incomes falling below 50% of the median (OECD, 2008) and the EU uses 60% of the disposable median

income as a criteria for an "at-risk-of-poverty" rate (Eurostat, 2014). In this context, we examine whether the judgment of poverty of respondents is concordant with the poverty line applied in such official statistics. If respondents perceive poverty to occur at a level of income that greatly deviates from official poverty criteria it may challenge the legitimacy of such criteria.

An alternative approach to measuring poverty transcends the purely monetary poverty lines of OECD and the EU in an attempt to capture an underlying conceptualization of poverty as a resource-based exclusion. This approach links the household income to issues of deprivation and exclusion from participation in a given society. Nolan and Whelan for instance suggest that income poverty defined by 50% of the median income is a relatively inferior indicator of poverty as a resource-based exclusion (Nolan and Whelan, 2007: 159). Here, poverty is defined by two elements: 1) people living in poverty do not have the opportunity to participate in society in ways generally found necessary in a given society; 2) this non-participation is caused by a lack of resources (see e.g. Nolan and Whelan, 2007; Hansen and Hussain, 2009). Deprivations are used to asses this resource-based non-participation (Nolan and Whelan, 2010)—an approach that is inspired by Townsend's (1979) measurement of material deprivation (though Townsend relied on income when assessing the magnitude of poverty). In a study based on Irish survey data using latent class analysis, Nolan and Whelan (2007) thus find that deprivation is the primary factor differentiating between the economically vulnerable and the rest of the population.

Measures of poverty emphasizing either income or deprivation differ with regards to their emphasis on the objective conditions (income) or more subjective elements (deprivations resulting from a combination of objective conditions and subjective choices made by vulnerable populations in coping with these conditions). Whether poverty is defined in financial terms or by deprivation has important consequences for who are identified as

poor. The overlap between income poverty and deprivation is often found to be low, indicating that a composite measure taking account of both deprivation and income may be needed to identify those groups experiencing constraints due to an enforced lack of resources (see Saunders and Naidoo, 2009). The concept of consistent poverty has been used to capture this combined situation of low income and deprivation (Callan, Nolan and Whelan, 1993).

The duration of poverty has been included in some measures of poverty. For instance the EU assesses duration of poverty in terms of a "persistent at-risk-of-poverty" rate (Eurostat, 2014) and the Danish Expert Committee on Poverty has suggested a Danish poverty line based on among other things the criteria of having disposable incomes falling below 50% of the median income *for a duration of three years* (Ekspertudvalg om fattigdom, 2013). Therefore, we examine whether the duration of poverty is held to be a defining feature of poverty by respondents.

In the study, we examine the role played by income, deprivation and duration of deprivation due to financial reasons in respondents' perception of poverty. This allows us to clarify the concept of poverty held by future welfare professionals, discuss implications for the students' future social work practice and finally discuss the legitimacy of official poverty measures.

Previous Research on Perceptions of Poverty

In a now classical piece, Fuller and Myers (1941) emphasized that social problems contain both objective conditions and subjective interpretations. This study seeks to supplement extant research by examining the perception of poverty and hence the subjective side of the social problem of poverty. Internationally, a range of studies have examined the attributions of the causes of poverty (e.g. Blomberg et al., 2013; Iyengar, 1990; Sun, 2001; Tagler and Cozzarelli, 2013) and studies have also begun to examine the relationship between such attributions and support for welfare policies (Bullock, Williams and Limbert, 2003)

as well as discussing the relationship between attributions, stereotypes and emotions (Cozzarelli, Wilkinson and Tagler, 2001) and the role of attributions in arousing emotions and help giving (Weiner, Osborne and Rudolph, 2011). An important criticism of studies of attributions of causes of poverty is directed at their use of a general notion of "the poor" failing to differentiate between attitudes towards different groups of people living in poverty (Lepianka, Oorschot and Gelissen, 2009). Our study uses the factorial survey method (described below) which allows for such differentiation of perceptions of different groups of people living in poverty, for instance in terms of gender, ethnicity and position.

Some studies have used factorial surveys to address the justice of earnings (Alves and Rossi, 1978; Sauer et al., 2009) and some have more specifically examined action tendencies towards different groups of people living in poverty in the form of distribution of scarce resources (Cook, 1979; Groskind, 1991; Iyengar, 1990; Will, 1993). A recent study of attitudes towards poverty examined the effect of beliefs and feelings about the poor as well as affective-cognitive consistency on the distribution of resources to the poor and decisions to volunteer for a food bank aimed at poverty relief (Tagler and Cozzarelli, 2013). Hence, studies have examined factors affecting action tendencies and attitudes towards the social distribution of wealth, in particular attitudes regarding public support for people living in poverty, but not lay or professional conceptions of poverty as such.

In the current study, we thus supplement extant research by examining what characteristics of a family's life situation that are conceived as signs of poverty. Hence, we do not study what people believe should be done about poverty, actual actions or action tendencies towards the poor.

Methods
Study background
The study examines actual judgments of whether a person is poor or not rather than abstract definitions of poverty held by respondents.

Examining concrete judgments of families gives a fuller picture of the respondents' perceptions of poverty than examining their abstract (theoretical) definitions and conceptions of poverty. This is because concrete judgments are not only based on theory, but may be based on both respondents' explicit experience-based knowledge, theoretical knowledge, knowledge about results of empirical research as well as tacit knowledge, assumptions and emotions. In studying judgments of whether a person is poor, we sought to clarify what aspects of a family's life situation are emphasized by the respondents and what aspects are regarded as unimportant. To this purpose, a factorial survey design was chosen.

The factorial survey (horizontal vignette methodology) is a novel method in examining perceptions of poverty (for a review on factorial surveys, see Wallander, 2009). The factorial survey is a form of survey experiment where the content of vignettes (short cases) i.e. descriptions of a family and its life situation, is systematically varied in order to determine the impact of each of the factors on the judgments made of the vignettes by the respondents. The factorial survey holds two defining features: 1) respondents are asked to judge whether different families described in vignettes are poor or not and 2) the content of these vignettes is systematically varied. The description in the vignette is varied with regards to factors which are assumed to have an impact on the poverty perception e.g. vignette person's income, deprivations, duration of deprivations, gender, age, position and ethnicity. This variation of factors makes it possible to analyze the extent to which each of these factors have an impact on respondents' normative beliefs about the concept of poverty. Hence, the factorial survey is an indirect method of studying the underlying criteria shaping judgments and attitudes. An important advantage of studying attitudes indirectly is that respondents may not be aware of what factors impact their judgments, but they are nonetheless able to make judgments in concrete situations depicted in vignettes (Alexander and Becker, 1978). As we shall show throughout the paper, this methodology

is promising in furthering research on perceptions of poverty, since it offers some unique possibilities for examining to what extent selected factors have an impact on people's judgments.

Design of the vignettes[i]

The vignettes have been developed in two versions: one describes a single adult and one describes a single parent with a 12 year old child. In each version, systematic variations of factors have been made. Each respondent judged 20 vignettes.

The main part of a factorial survey design is deciding what factors to include in the vignettes. The ways in which people in a strained financial situation differ from one another are infinite and thus the amount of factors regarding the person and his or her situation that could be relevant for a judgment of a person as poor or not is enormous. Since it is impossible to include all the factors that may be important to some respondents when making their judgments, we have selected factors based on theories of poverty, welfare and social stratification as well as previous empirical research on poverty in Denmark. The factors in the vignettes are described in the measures section.

Measures

Dependent Variable: judgment regarding degree of poverty

In relation to each vignette, respondents are asked to judge the degree to which the described person or family is poor ranging from extremely poor to extremely wealthy on a 9-point scale.

Independent Variables: factors characterizing the vignette person and characteristics of the respondents

In a factorial survey design, two types of independent variables are used: the factors varied across the vignettes and respondent characteristics. In this study, the focus is on the factors in the vignettes, but some measures of respondent characteristics were also included in the questionnaire: gender, age, children, marital status, education, year of study, income and subjective experience

of poverty. The item measuring subjective experience of poverty calls on the respondent to describe him- or herself on the same scale as the dependent variable measuring the judgment of poverty in each vignette.

Factors—Independent Variables Contained in the Vignettes

The factors varied across vignettes were the person's income, a range of factors describing material deprivations and the duration of deprivations. In addition, social background information on the person or family described in the vignette was included as factors (gender, ethnicity, age and position) in order to allow respondents to take account of elements of the person's social position and life situation. In the following, the operationalization of each factor is described in more detail.

Relative income:

Income was operationalized by taking 50% of the disposable median income as a point of departure. We then defined three income levels

symmetrically below and above this line, resulting in seven income levels. We made the difference between the income levels of equal size in percent (15% of the income at the poverty line). For the vignette-version with a parent and child we used the household equivalent disposable income.[ii]

Material deprivations:

The deprivations included in the vignettes were selected from extant research on poverty in Denmark (Ejrnæs et al., 2011) and covered five types of deprivations: daily necessities, health, leisure, social relations and material comforts. In the vignette version with a child, we have furthermore included deprivations specifically related to the child (selected from Hansen and Hussain, 2009).

The deprivations are shown in Table 1. In the vignettes, 0-4 general deprivations are included (in a pilot study we found that this was more than enough for respondents to take in). In the vignettes with a parent and a child, 0-4 deprivations related to the child were also included.[iii]

Table 1: Deprivations Varied in Vignettes

Type of deprivation	Specific deprivations
Daily necessities	Eat fresh fruit and vegetables on a daily basis Buy clothes, shoes and outerwear
Health	Visit the dentist
Leisure	Go on vacation outside the home Do leisure-time activities
Social relations	Visit friends/family (that live more than 20 km from the home) Invite guests home
Material comforts	Make repairs in the home, or replace equipment in the home that has been broken or spent
Child—daily necessities	Buy clothes and shoes for the child
Child—leisure	Let the child do sports or other leisure time activities
Child—social relations	Celebrate the child's birthday
Child—social relations and educational activities	Let the child participate in school trips, participate in club activities etc.
Child—material comforts	Buy the child a mobile phone of his or her own

Each deprivation is binary (either present or not). When discussing poverty it is important whether deprivations result from lack of resources or other hindrances. In order to emphasize the importance of financial means for the deprivations, we introduced the deprivations with the text "… has due to financial reasons refrained from…"

We also included *the duration of the deprivations* as a separate factor indicating the duration of poverty. The duration of deprivations contains durations of 1, 2 or 3 years (covering all the deprivations mentioned in the given vignette).

Social background information regarding the vignette person:

In the vignettes, we have varied gender, ethnicity, age and position. Gender and ethnicity are varied through the name of the person in the vignette, which is either a common traditional Danish feminine or masculine name or a feminine or masculine minority name of Middle Eastern (Muslim) origin that is common in Denmark. We have chosen common names with a clear cultural and gendered reference. 30% of the names of the persons in the vignettes are Middle Eastern names in order to not make the combination of names in

the vignette sample of each respondent too unlikely to encounter in the Danish society.

Age is varied in four categories in the single adult vignettes (22, 38, 54 and 70 years) and in two categories in the vignettes with a parent and a 12-year old child (38 and 54 years). Position describes affiliation with the labour market and covers three broad categories: student, employed and recipient of pension.

Constructing the Vignettes

In order to be able to separate the effect of each of the factors in the vignettes, the factors should be varied independently of each other across vignettes. This is ensured by randomly selecting the outcome of each factor to be included in each vignette (with some minor exceptions in order to preserve the realism of the vignettes). Combining the different factors at random results in over 1 million possible vignettes (the vignette universe). Due to the large vignette universe, we cannot include every combination of factors in the study. This is, however, not problematic since we draw the combination of outcomes on the factors in each vignette randomly. In Table 2 the vignette framework is shown.

Table 2: The Vignette Framework

Single adult vignette:

<Name reflecting gender and ethnicity> is *<age>* years old and single. *<He/She>* is *<position>* and has an income of *<income>* monthly after taxes. *<He/She>* has for *<duration of deprivations>* due to financial reasons refrained from *<0-4 concrete general deprivations>*.

Single parent with one child vignette:

<Name reflecting gender and ethnicity> is *<age>* years old and is alone with *<his/her>* 12 year old child. *<He/She>* is *<position>* and has an income of *<income>* monthly after taxes. *<He/She>* has for *<duration of deprivations>* due to financial reasons refrained from *<0-4 concrete general deprivations>* and *<0-4 concrete child-related deprivations>*.

Note: Varied factors are in italics.

Sample

The data was collected from a sample of students of welfare professions that are likely to encounter poverty in their future professional work. The study included Danish bachelor students from the fields of nutrition and health, nursery teaching and social work. Students rather than professionals in practice were included in the study since their judgments are important to examine in order to evaluate and improve teaching on perceiving, understanding and addressing poverty. Here, the study holds a particular relevance to educators, who may benefit from insights into the perception of poverty their students hold. Furthermore, students are the welfare professionals of tomorrow who during their future practice are likely to encounter and have to respond to the social problem of poverty.

The data was collected during scheduled lectures on either vignette methodology or poverty (with no preparatory readings on poverty) in cooperation between Metropolitan University College, University College Capital and Aalborg University. The data collection was introduced as concerning the students' perceptions of poverty and was placed in the beginning of the lecture and followed a standardized protocol.

A total of 327 respondents completed the questionnaire. 38% are students of nursery teaching, 21% are students of nutrition and health and 41% are students of social work. The sample is predominantly female, 81% of respondents are female. The age ranges from 19-57 years with an average of 25 years, 44% are married/cohabiting and 18% have children. The respondents have a relatively low monthly personal gross income: 11% have less than 5,000 DKK (app. 925 USD), 65% have 5,000-10,000 DKK (app. 925-1,850 USD) and 24% have 10,000 DKK or above with only 2% having an income of more than 20,000 DKK (app. 3,700 USD).

Analysis

The data makes it possible to perform analyses on two levels: 1) the factors in the vignettes and 2) the characteristics of respondents. Hence, there are both independent variables pertaining to the vignettes, i.e. the factors that vary across vignettes (deprivations, position, ethnicity etc.) and independent variables pertaining to the respondents (age, gender, income etc.). Thus, the data contains a hierarchical structure with both a level of vignettes and a level of respondents, making it suitable for multi-level analysis (see Hox, Kreft and Hermkens, 1991; Lolle, 2003). The analysis has been performed using multi-level linear regression analysis, more specifically by fitting random intercept models for each vignette version (single adult and single parent). In the analysis, emphasis has been on the main effects of the factors in the vignettes rather than respondent characteristics or interactions between variable within or across levels. Bivariate correlations and descriptive statistics for the two vignette versions are available upon request.

Results
Vignette characteristics

The results of the multilevel linear regression analyses are shown in Table 3. The scale of the poverty rating is 1-9 with higher ratings equaling higher degrees of poverty. The analysis of the single adult vignette shows that respondents take account of most of the information provided in the vignettes. Notable exemptions in both vignette versions are the gender and ethnicity of vignette-persons that were insignificant for the judgments of poverty. Thus, respondents do not judge poverty differently for men and women or for persons of ethnic minority and majority background.

The vignette income is the most decisive variable for the poverty ratings. When a single adult with no child moves from the reference category of 50% of the median income to the lowest income-level of 28% of the median income the poverty rating moves from *somewhat wealthy* to between *medium* and *somewhat poor* all else being equal. For the single parent vignette version, the effect of income is a little more remarked allowing the family to move three points on the nine point poverty-scale (e.g. from *wealthy* to *somewhat*

Table 3: Random Intercept Models for the two Vignette Versions (Primarily Main Effects)

	Single adult		Single parent with one child	
	b	**SE**	**b**	**SE**
Intercept	3.99***	.35	4.84***	.45
Vignette-level factors				
Gender (Male)	.06	.03	-.03	.03
Ethnicity (Danish)	-.04	.03	.05	.03
Income				
28 % of median income	1.35***	.06	1.49***	.06
35 % of median income	.67***	.06	.91***	.06
43 % of median income	.29***	.06	.38***	.06
50 % of median income	reference		reference	
58 % of median income	-.53***	.06	-.47***	.06
65 % of median income	-.79***	.06	-1.05***	.06
73 % of median income	-1.03***	.06	-1.52***	.06
Age				
22 years	reference		-	
38 years	.28***	.07	reference	
54 years	.48***	.07	-.10	.06
70 years	.14	.07	-	
Position				
working	reference		reference	
student	-.43***	.06	-.14**	.05
receiving pension	.09	.07	-.03	.05
Age*Position				
70 years*receiving pension	-.20*	.10	-	
54 years*receiving pension	-.37***	.10	.02	.08
38 years*receiving pension	-.22*	.10	-	
38 years*student	.00	.09	-	
Duration of deprivations				
no deprivations	-.09	.06	-.17*	.07
1 year	-.07	.04	-.05	.05
2 years	-.05	.04	-.04	.04
3 years	reference		reference	
Deprivations:				
Eat fresh fruit and vegetables on a daily basis	.11**	.04	.17***	.04
Buy clothes, shoes and outerwear	.18***	.04	.16***	.04
Visit the dentist	.07	.04	.02	.04
Go on vacation outside the home	-.01	.04	.04	.04
Do leisure-time activities	.07	.04	.00	.04
Visit friends/family (living >20 km from home)	.14***	.04	.09*	.04
Invite guests home	.11**	.04	.04	.04
Repairs in the home/replace equipment	.15***	.04	.11**	.04
Letting the child practice sports/hobbies	-		.12**	.04
Providing the child with clothes and footwear	-		.09*	.04
Giving the child a mobile phone	-		.03	.04
Celebrating the child's birthday	-		.17***	.04
Letting the child participate in school trips etc.	-		.07	.04

Table 3: Random Intercept Models for the two Vignette Versions (Primarily Main Effects) – continued

	Single adult		Single parent with one child	
	b	SE	b	SE
Respondent-level factors				
Gender (Female)	.00	.11	.25	.14
Age	.01	.01	-.02	.01
Married/cohabiting				
Married/cohabiting	.12	.09	.03	.12
Other family type	.00	.23	-.17	.31
Single	reference		reference	
Children (has children)	-.06	.15	.09	.19
Educational affiliation				
Nutrition and Health	.06	.11	.07	.15
Nursery Teaching	-.13	.10	-.19	.13
Social Work	reference		reference	
Income				
0-4,999 DKK/month	-.34*	.15	-.20	.19
5,000-9,999 DKK/month	reference		reference	.43
10,000-19,999 DKK/month	.24*	.11	.10	.14
20,000-29,999 DKK/month	.10	.32	.29	.43
Subjective poverty perception	.20***	.04	.18***	.05
n (ratings valid on all variables in model)	3,049		3,038	
n (respondents valid on all variables in model)	308		309	

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

poor) when moving from the highest to the lowest income level. On average moving 7-8 percentage points on the median income equal a 0.4 change on the 9-point scale in the poverty rating of the single adult vignette and a 0.5 change of the rating of the parent vignette.

The deprivations overall are far less important for the judgment of poverty than the income. All estimates of the effect of the deprivations are relatively low; on average the significant deprivations contribute 0.13 to the poverty ratings across vignette versions. To achieve the same effect in terms of poverty judgment as moving 7-8 percentage points down on the median income the person would have to suffer 3-4 deprivations. One might expect child-related deprivations to be of greater importance for the judgment of poverty than

more general deprivations, but this is not the case. Child-related deprivations are not given higher emphasis than general deprivations and the deprivations are not given higher priority in the vignette version with a child. The data does not warrant conclusions regarding which of the significant deprivations are the most important for the judgment of poverty (the estimates of these deprivations are not significantly different when performing z-tests [table not shown]).

It might be expected that interactions between income and deprivations are crucial for the perception of poverty (as would be the case if the consistent poverty measure was used [Callan, Nolan and Whelan, 1993]). This is, however, not the case, the analysis indicates that these factors are judged independently (table not shown).

Examining the concrete deprivations in both vignette versions, respondents seem to prioritize daily necessities, material things in the home and social occasions (in the single parent vignette version social occasions are prioritized to a lesser extent). Three deprivations are insignificant in both vignette versions: refraining from going on vacation outside the home, doing leisure-time activities and visiting the dentist.[iv] In the single-parent vignette version some but not all child-related deprivations are significant. "Letting the child practice sports/hobbies", "Providing the child with clothes and footwear" and "Celebrating the child's birthday" are all significant for the judgment of poverty. The deprivation "Giving the child a mobile phone" is not important for the judgments of poverty, and curiously "Letting the child participate in school trips, participate in club activities etc." is not significant either.

With regard to both vignette versions, respondents do not take account of the duration of the deprivations in their judgments.

Turning to position, it is not surprising to find that students are judged as less poor than other positions (given the transitory nature of the low-income of students). Age and position are important in the single adult vignette and relatively unimportant in the single parent vignette. When a person has a child, it seems that age and position become less important for the respondents' judgment of poverty.

The analysis has shown that respondents emphasize income in their perceptions of poverty. This raises the question of what level of income the respondents on average regard as a poverty line. If we look at the vignettes that have been given different poverty ratings separately, we can examine the average income of each poverty rating. This makes it possible to compare the poverty line applied by respondents (the shift from the rating "medium" to "somewhat poor") with official poverty lines. The OECD poverty line for a single adult in Denmark at the time of the data collection was 8,788 DKK (50% of the disposable median income, app. 1,630 USD) and the EU at-risk-of-poverty line was 10,546 DKK (60% of the disposable median income, app. 1,955 USD). The ratings of respondents on average shift from somewhat poor to medium between income levels of 7,832 DKK and 9,615 DKK (see Table 4).

Table 4: Average income for different levels of poverty judgment—single adult vignette version

	Extremely wealthy	Very wealthy	Wealthy	Somewhat wealthy	Medium	Somewhat poor	Poor	Very poor	Extremely poor
Average	11,864 DKK	11,564 DKK	11,075 DKK	10,621 DKK	9,615 DKK	7,832 DKK	6,805 DKK	5,994 DKK	5,835 DKK
Standard deviation	1142 DKK	1174 DKK	1662 DKK	1965 DKK	2288 DKK	2271 DKK	2063 DKK	1707 DKK	2196 DKK
N (vignettes)	9	47	136	384	988	834	434	192	25

In accord with the OECD poverty line, the income level perceived as poor by respondents falls below the OECD poverty line of 50% of the disposable median income and the income level perceived as medium falls above this poverty line. The same pattern is evident for the vignette version with a child, where the household equivalent income was used (table not shown). Thus, we find that the perception of poverty held by respondents is concordant with the OECD poverty line of 50% of the disposable median income.

Respondent characteristics

The intraclass correlation[v] in the single parent vignette is 0.32 and 0.25 in the single adult vignette. Hence, the amount of respondent-level variance is substantial with regards to both vignettes, demonstrating that the respondents differ in their judgments of poverty. Since the intraclass coefficient is considerable in both vignette versions, the respondents' judgments of poverty are not similar, but vary across individuals. However, examining Table 3 we find that very little of this variation can be explained using social background information on the respondents to estimate the poverty threshold. Quite surprisingly, respondents do not differ systematically in terms of educational affiliation, gender, age, marital status or having children or not in their level of poverty judgments. Subjective poverty perception is significant in both vignette versions with higher levels of poverty-experience being associated with higher poverty judgments of the vignettes.

Social background thus seems to be unimportant for the poverty threshold of respondents. Separate analyses based on gender and educational affiliations have confirmed this picture (tables not shown). Hence, respondents do generally not differ systematically based on gender and educational affiliation in the weight they ascribe to different factors in the vignettes. These separate analyses have shown great agreement regarding the significance of income for the judgment of poverty and in ascribing relatively low importance to the deprivations (in terms of the size of the estimates). Hence, respondents seem to agree across subgroups that poverty is closely related to the income of a person and does not rely heavily on the occurrence of deprivations.

Discussion

The results of this study raise interesting questions regarding the role of deprivations and the duration of deprivations for perceptions of poverty. Overall, the study shows that students place higher emphasis on the lack of economic means than on the occurrence of material deprivations. Hence, students seem to favor the objective spending opportunities of families in their judgments of poverty rather than material deprivation. That deprivations are given such little emphasis by students may be problematic, if we accept the position of Nolan and Whelan (2007: 159) that income alone is an inferior indicator of poverty. From this perspective one could argue that if students do not ascribe importance to deprivations they are in a bad position to identify and hence respond to poverty in their future practice. However, while this study allows us to conclude that students hold an income-based poverty conception it does not allow us to conclude that they overlook the significance of deprivations. Students may acknowledge deprivation as important for vulnerable populations, but perceive deprivation as a consequence of poverty rather than defining for the phenomena of poverty. Thus, students may hold poverty, deprivation and social exclusion to be distinct phenomena. In order to clarify whether students overlook the role that deprivation and social exclusion play in the life situation of a family further research is needed. Such research could use a factorial survey design similar to the design of this study, but ask respondents to assess the vignettes in terms of the seriousness of the life situation of each family and the interventions that may be relevant in order to address the described situation.

The concept of poverty held by students is in agreement with the poverty line applied by OECD, both in the emphasis on financial means and in the concrete level of income regarded as

constituting poverty. However, the concept of poverty held by students conflicts with the poverty line suggested by the Danish Expert Committee on Poverty. The Danish Expert Committee on Poverty has suggested that a person is only regarded as poor after three consecutive years with an income below 50% of the disposable median income. Remarkably, respondents did not emphasize the duration of deprivations in their judgments of the vignettes. This indicates that respondents hold a person to be poor when the person has an income below 50% of the disposable median income regardless of the duration of this situation. You are poor when you have a low income in relative terms, you do not need to experience persistent poverty to qualify for the label poor. This does not necessarily imply that the students are unaware of the importance of the duration of poverty for people living in poverty. The students may recognize the duration of poverty as important for the person's well-being, but may not perceive the duration as defining for whether a person or family is poor or not. The attitudes of the students thus challenge the legitimacy of the poverty line suggested by the Danish Expert Committee on Poverty. The Committee has proposed that the poverty line needs to be in accordance with community attitudes (Ekspertudvalg om fattigdom, 2013: 262). This study suggests that a discrepancy may exist between community attitudes regarding the duration of poverty and the poverty line suggested by the Danish Expert Committee on Poverty.

Furthermore, this study has shown that the social background of the vignette family in terms of gender and ethnicity are insignificant for the perception of poverty. This is an important and positive finding in terms of the risk of discrimination of vulnerable groups. However, as we discuss in the limitations-section, the design of the study may have affected this finding. Besides from the role of gender and ethnicity, the study has shown that age and position are taken into account in the poverty judgment. These social background factors, however, play a lesser role when a child

is included in the vignette. Thus, the presence of children in a family seems to moderate the impact of social background information on the poverty perception. This finding is interesting since it indicates that different principles of judgment are active when judging families with and without children and that the needs of children overshadow concerns over what is fair given a person's social position.

Professional front-line workers facing clients living in poverty continuously make assessments of the clients and their social situation to guide their decision-making. The factorial survey is a method that may reveal the knowledge and assumptions that professionals base their decision-making on and it is therefore a useful tool to study professional decision-making and qualify practice with vulnerable populations. Even though the factorial survey does not examine judgments as they occur in contextualized actual social interaction (cf. Parkinson and Manstead, 1993), it holds several advantages in the study of perceptions of poverty. By indirectly examining social judgments through the use of vignettes one is able to examine both determinants of judgments that respondents are aware of as well as tacit determinants of judgments and thereby researchers may help make tacit assumptions explicit (Wallander, 2012: 373-7). Furthermore, when studying the decision-making of professionals with regards to poverty the factorial survey may be used both to examine the classification of a situation as poverty (the professional "diagnosis") as we have done in this study, and the actions with regards to the situation preferred by professionals (the "treatment") (Wallander, 2012). An important methodological advantage of the factorial survey is that the random variation of factors in the vignettes makes it possible to separate the effect on judgments of variables that in real life situations are highly correlated (Alves and Rossi, 1978: 545-6). For instance, researchers may separate the effect of income and position or education that in real life may be entangled and therefore hard to analytically tease apart.

Limitations and Generalizability

The study found that gender and ethnicity are insignificant for the perception of poverty. However, the methodological setup of the study may have affected this finding. In designing the study, we chose to have each respondent judge 20 vignettes. This was done in order to study a large amount of factors and still be able to separate them analytically without increasing the sample size tremendously; however, this design allows the respondents to recognize the manipulation of factors. We deemed this to be relatively unproblematic for most factors (e.g. deprivations and income), since no social desirability bias was expected and since we were interested in examining professional judgments, not in revealing the hidden biases of respondents (which would require the manipulation of factors to remain obscure to the respondents). However, particularly with regards to gender and ethnicity and perhaps also age, the evident manipulation of the factors might have made respondents make a conscious effort not to discriminate. Thus, the validity of the findings regarding these factors may be limited. However, it should be noted that if we look only at the first vignette judged by each respondent, where the respondents arguably are less likely to have noticed the manipulation of factors, gender and ethnicity remain insignificant.

Several limitations regard the sample characteristics. Firstly, the sample consists only of students and though some age variation is present, it is a relatively young group of respondents who are in a similar life situation and with a similar and relatively low income. These characteristics of the sample make it impossible to statistically generalize the perception of poverty to the general population or to welfare professionals in practice. In particular, it makes the generalizability of the findings regarding the significance of the students' own income for their poverty judgments problematic. Further research should examine the concepts of poverty held in broader samples, in particular among welfare state practitioners and the general public. Secondly, due to practical hindrances it was impossible to ensure that the students were in the same year of their studies and hence, both students of nutrition and health and students of nursery teaching are early in their studies, while students of social work are spread out on different stages of their studies. This makes it impossible to draw conclusions regarding the effect the different educations might have on the students' perception of poverty. Hence, the attitudes of social work students may reflect both selection for this line of study and their secondary socialization during their studies, while students in the two other fields of education have only just begun their studies and therefore their attitudes may only reflect the selection to the study. Thirdly, the data was collected during lectures and while this ensured a high rate of participation at the time of data collection, the actual sample may be affected by unobserved characteristics of the students due to the self-selection inherent in attending class (we do not know the characteristics of students choosing not to attend class).

Conclusion

This study has addressed perceptions of poverty by examining what factors enter into the judgment of a person as poor or not. Using the factorial survey approach, the study has shown that students of welfare professions primarily draw upon an income-based conception of poverty. Several deprivations also enter into the poverty-judgments of the students, but deprivations are ascribed far less weight than income. Furthermore, the duration of deprivations was insignificant for the perception of poverty indicating that respondents do not hold the persistence of poverty as defining for the phenomenon of poverty. In addition, the study has shown that the social background of the vignette person is generally relatively unimportant for the judgment of poverty. Thus, the gender and ethnicity of the vignette person were found to be insignificant for the judgments. And while respondents take into account both age and labor market affiliation when judging the poverty of a single adult, social background characteristics play a lesser role when a child is present in the vignette.

The judgments of the students are found to be in accordance with the OECD poverty line, but conflicts with the poverty line recently suggested by the Danish Expert Committee on Poverty. This finding challenges the legitimacy of the Danish poverty line proposed by the Committee and warrants a distinction between assessments of poverty and persistent poverty if official poverty measures are to reflect community attitudes.

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Endnotes

[i] The design of the study and the data collection was carried out in collaboration with Morten Ejrnæs (Aalborg University), Stine Erbs Ludvig (University College Metropol), Tine Fuglsang (Aalborg University) and Ulla Søberg Nielsen (University College Metropol). The author would in addition like to acknowledge the effort of Karina Estrup Eriksen (University College Capital) in making possible the data collection among students of nursery teaching.

[ii] The household equivalent disposable income is calculated by multiplying the disposable income at the poverty line by (number of adults + number of children)[b.s.]

iii Based on a pilot study and in line with research on poverty showing that parents shield their children from the consequences of poverty (Ejrnæs, Hansen and Müller 2013; Ottosen and Skov 2013), we chose to let the number of general deprivations in each vignette be larger than the number of specific deprivations for the child.

iv It should be noted that performing a backwards model search on the single adult vignette "refraining from visiting the dentist" and "doing leisure-time activities" also achieve significance; however, the estimates remain very low.

v The intraclass correlation is the respondent-level variance as a proportion of the total variance (Hox 2002: 15).

An Online Survey of Social Workers' Family Values

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Abstract

Little is known about the "family values" espoused by social workers and how these values may affect their practice. Our study reviews the conceptual nature of "family values" and explores the family values of social workers. We review literature on the measurement of values and present findings from an online survey of the family values of National Association of Social Workers (NASW)-Oklahoma Chapter members (N=283). A principal components analysis identified seven family values factors. A regression on the unrotated principal component of progressive family values identified three predictors ($p \leq .01$) of progressive values: years of social work practice, metropolitan (rather than rural) residence, and not being engaged in direct social work practice. On balance, respondents expressed progressive family values in most but not all areas. Recommendations for research and practice are developed.

Keywords: family values, values measurement, values scale, and social work values

Introduction

Little is known about the family values espoused by social workers and how these values may affect practice with families. Social workers are guided by a Code of Ethics, which identifies a set of core values embraced by the profession. The code's preamble states: "The mission of the social work profession is rooted in a set of core values. These core values, embraced by social workers throughout the profession's history, are the foundation of social work's unique purpose and perspective" (NASW, 2008, p.1). Furthermore, social workers are expected to impartially consider the values of individuals and groups despite potential opposition to their own values. The code also advises social workers to be aware of how their personal values and cultural and religious beliefs affect their work with clients (NASW, 2008, p.3).

This study focuses on one aspect of core values of social work that address the importance of human relationships—purposeful efforts to promote, restore, maintain, and enhance the well-being of families. Our study reviews the conceptual nature of "family values" and represents an initial look at the family values of social workers. We examine how congruent social workers' values may be with those of individuals and families for whom they provide services or administer policy practice. We present a comprehensive review of the values measurement literature and the link of that literature to social workers' values. We also present results of an online survey of the family values National Association of Social Workers (NASW)-Oklahoma Chapter members (*N*=283), identifying espoused family values and priorities.

Background and Content
Values Defined

The concept of values is broad and encompasses numerous definitions. The study of values is multidisciplinary and includes, but is not limited to, the fields of social work; sociology; philosophy; psychology; economics; political science; business management; communications; and anthropology (Abbott, 199; Abbott, 2003; Lindeman & Verkasalo, 2005; Mumford et al., 2002; Rokeach, 1979; and Karp, 2000). Furthermore, the "different disciplines have pursued this topic with unique orientations to the concept of values" (Karp, 2000, p. 3212). According to Rokeach (1979), "understanding human values is a never-ending process—a groping toward an ultimate objective that can be attained only by a method of successive approximation" (p. ix).

In many ways, values are the means by which we define ourselves. Moreover, "values are a reflection of who we are, of our culture, and of our own unique heritage" (Thames and Thomason, 2000, p. 1). Values are integral in our lives. According to Kluckhohn and Stodtbeck (1961), "values answer basic existential questions, helping to provide meaning in people's lives" (as cited in Karp, 2000, p. 3212). Values can affect choices,

decisions regarding courses of action and outcomes, goals, attitudes, and behavior (Thames and Thomason, 2000; Mumford et al., 2002; Rokeach, 1979; and Karp, 2000). Mumford et al. (2002) maintain, "it seems fair to say that whenever the phenomenon of interest involves choice, or preferences, values are likely to be a crucial explanatory construct" (p. 348). Additionally, values mold our beliefs and perceptions (Thames and Thomason, 2000). Referencing the work of the sociologist, Robin Williams, Rokeach (1979) affirms that "values are core conceptions of the desirable within every individual and society. They serve as standards or criteria to guide not only action, but judgment, choice, attitude, evaluation, argument, exhortation, rationalization, and one might add, attribution of causality" (Rokeach, 1979, p.2).

Values are often fraught with conflict. For example, Trotzer (1981) states, "efforts to identify the nature of values are always jeopardized and often contamination by the connotation that values inherently contain a right-wrong, good-bad component" (p. 43). Additionally, Trotzer (1981) states, "this ultimately generates judgments of affirmation or condemnation, depending on which side of the polarity the evaluator stands." (p. 43). Despite their conflicted nature, values are integral to the functioning of social life. According to Rokeach (1973):

> Values are multifaceted standards that guide conduct in a variety of ways. They lead us to take particular positions on social issues and they predispose us to favor one ideology over another. They are standards employed to evaluate and judge others and ourselves (p.13).

From a sociological perspective, values connect individuals to society. For instance, "values…help ease the conflict between individuals and collective interests" (Karp, p. 3213). Furthermore, values join people and enable them to "work together to realize collectively desirable goals" (Karp, 2000, p. 3212).

The Measurement of Values

Given their centrality to both individuals and society, values "deserve more research attention than they have received thus far" (Lindeman & Verkasalo, 2005, p. 170). Further, given the significance of values to the field of social work, one would presume that much social work literature has focused on values and values measurement. However, such is not the case. According to Abbott (2003), "the profession of social work's value base continues to be recognized as an essential ingredient of sound social work practice; however, few instruments have been developed to measure its presence" (p. 641). Therefore, we now examine research on values in related fields.

The social psychologist Milton Rokeach is among the most influential researchers on values (Karp, 2000). Towards the end of his career, he developed an instrument to examine "individual commitment to a set of values" (Karp, 2000, p. 3214). This instrument, the Rokeach Value Survey, has been used widely across numerous disciplines (Rokeach, 1973). It comprises two sets of values with 18 individual values in each set. *Instrumental values*, "reflect modes of conduct, such as politeness, honesty and obedience" (Karp, 2000, p. 3214). Contrastingly, *terminal values*, "reflect desired end states, such as freedom, equality, peace, and salvation" (Karp, 2000, p. 3214).

Using a modified version of the Rokeach's instrument, Edwards et al. (1981) examined the configurations of values of professionals in varying fields and of students preparing for professional livelihoods. Specifically, the study examined "the espoused value preferences of first-year graduate students and alumni from four professional programs at the University of Kansas-Public Administration (MPA), Social Welfare (MSW), Law (LLB), and Business (MBA)" (Edwards et al., 1981, p. 124). Their findings suggest significant values differences for those in the different programs.

Schwartz expanded values measurement based on Rokeach Values Survey. Schwartz's Value Survey (SVS) includes 57 items that represent "10 motivationally distinct values that are theoretically derived from universal requirements of human life, namely Power, Achievement, Hedonism, Stimulation, Self-Direction, Universalism, Benevolence, Tradition, Conformity, and Security" (Lindeman & Verkasalo, 2005, p. 170). Just as did Rokeach's survey the SVS "focused on the measurement of values that are assumed to be universal" (Karp, 2000, p. 3216). Lindeman & Verkasalo (2005) examined a modified version of the SVS, the 10-item Short Schwartz's Value Survey (SSVS), and found that measure to be reliable and valid (Lindeman & Verkasalo, 2005).

Rokeach's and Schwartz's surveys pose direct questions to clients about their values and, as such, can be characterized as direct values measure. In contrast, the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ), also developed by Schwartz, describes persons who hold given values and then asks respondents to rank how much they would like each person. As it doesn't ask direct questions about values, the PVS can be characterized as an indirect measure. It has demonstrated good validity (Lindeman & Verkasalo, 2005).

Mumford, Connelly, Helton, Van Doorn and Osburn (2002) developed an experiment to compare direct versus indirect values measurement. They found that indirect measurement better predicted clients actions in a performance task and that indirect measurement assesses "expressed choices of the individual," rather than "social ideals" (p. 70). They conclude that indirect tools may be the best means with which to measure values, however, for those who have well-formulated values and are able to articulate them, direct measures may be just as or more appropriate (p. 370).

A final values measure, the Professional Opinion Scale (POS), (Abbott 1999; 2003) provides a "methodologically sound and convenient means for assessing degree of commitment to social work values" (Abbott, 2003, p. 641). According to Abbott (2003), "the POS is made up of items reflecting the broad spectrum of public social policy issues identified as being a major concern by the membership of NASW" (p. 645). Additionally,

the social policy statements are regularly revised "to reflect changing trends and new developments" in the profession (Abbott, 2003, p. 645).

The Importance of Family Values

All families possess values, though values vary with the diversity of families (Walsh, 1998). Several factors shape families' value systems. According to Trotzer (1981) "…families and family members espouse certain identifiable value characteristics of their peculiar heritage in interaction with their surrounding environment" (p. 42). Furthermore, "the process by which families and family members develop their value orientations emerges out of some multiple combination of genetic, ethnic, racial, socioeconomic, sociopolitical, education, environmental, and experiential factors which are translated from one generation to another through the basic fabric of family interaction" (Trotzer, 1981, p. 43). Values are passed forward from generation to generation. Though the core values tend to remain similar, both internal and external factors modify these across time. Trotzer (1981) maintains:

> Parents serve as carriers, monitors, developers, reinforcers, stimulators, interpreters, and evolvers in regard to their children's values. Children, in turn, merge their experiences with their own set of values that they, in turn, pass on to their children. So the process recycles ad infinitum. But always the result is that values are the foundation upon which lifestyles are built (p. 43).

Some might argue that values have deteriorated or that they have little role in the shaping of society. Yet, values are what help bind families and societies together. According to Walsh (1998), "in today's cynical and political climate, holding ideals may seem naïve, and yet values are needed more than ever in facing unprecedented challenges in our family and social world" (p. 69). Therefore, by acknowledging and studying the values of families, we can better understand how families function in society. Trotzer (1981) asserts "when

values are not effectively accounted for, disintegration of basic social units (the family) occurs" (p. 53). Lastly Trotzer (1981) states, "this, in turn, undermines both the stability (order and security) and the support (belongingness and nurturance) that civilized man has come to depend on for individual existence, societal progress, and creative advancement of the human species" (p. 53).

As previously stated, there is little research on the particular values of social workers, especially in comparison with social work clients. One such study by Hodge (2002) compared the spiritual values of social workers to its client base (Hodge, 2002, p. 573). Instead of using one of the value measurement tools previously listed, Hodge (2002) took data from the General Social Survey (GSS). The GSS is representative of the national U.S. population and the same questions are asked every 2-3 years (Hodge, 2002, p. 575). Hodge (2002) separated out the participants that self-identified as "lower class" (p. 576). Hodge (2002) states that these self-identified "lower class" participants were retained because of the profession's commitment to the poor, and thus these "lower class" participants are more likely to represent the clients that social workers will interact with (p. 576). The variables examined included the participants' theology (whether conservative, moderate or liberal), as well as their involvement in religious practices (p. 577-578). Hodge (2002) found that social workers were much more likely than their client base to hold liberal religious views, and that the client base was more likely to hold more conservative views (p. 579). However, in terms of religious practice, social workers and their client base were equally as likely to be active in some type of religious practice (Hodge, 2002, p. 579). Hodge (2002) states that these findings are important, because social workers must be culturally competent when working with clients. If many of the clients that social workers come into contact with are religiously conservative, social workers who hold different spiritual views must be aware of these views and prepared to work with such clients in an unbiased manner (p. 579-580).

A Historical Perspective on Family Values

Values of families have changed in American culture over the years. One can perhaps conjure up an image of the nuclear, two-parent American family. Yet, such families make up only about 20% of today's American households (Stone, 1994, p. 69). Using data from three studies—The General Social Survey, the Monitoring the Future study, and the Study of American Families—Thornton (1989) examined nearly thirty years of changing values and norms. Thornton (1989) found changes in "the normative imperative to marry, they remain married, to have children, to restrict intimate relations to marriage, and to maintain separate roles for males and females" (p. 879). His study revealed large values changes in certain years, but little change in others: "the changes in family attitudes and values were particularly striking during the 1960s and 1970s, but during the yearly 1980s there was a general flattening of the trends" (1989, p. 873). Thornton also found correspondence between family values and social trends. Thus, "many family changes parallel trends in socialization values, religious beliefs, political allegiances, and support for civil liberties" (1989, p. 873).

If two-parent family structure is no longer the norm, changes in family structure are increasingly defined along sociodemographic lines, and increasingly affect 'middle-class' America. Wilcox (2010) addresses the institution of marriage in contemporary America:

> Among the affluent, marriage is stable and may even be getting stronger. Among the poor, marriage continues to be fragile and weak. But the most consequential marriage trend of our time concerns the broad center of our society, where marriage, that iconic middle-class institution, is floundering. For the last few decades, the retreat from marriage has been regarded largely as a problem afflicting the poor. But today, it is spreading into the solid middle of the middle class. (p. 13).

A Political Perspective on Family Values

Just as in earlier times, family values continue to provide ammunition for political debate and controversy (Cahn & Carbone, 2010; Cloud, 1998; and Tankersley, 2008). In *Red Families v. Blue Families*, Cahn & Carbone examine family values in terms of rhetoric and political mannerisms. They assert that controversies regarding the values that guide family life have "…challenged our images of the American family" and have wide ranging effects "…at the national level, in state courts and legislatures, in drafting local ordinances, and in our own families" (p. 1). Cloud (1998) examined political speeches, interviews, and political editorials along with secondary material that used the term 'family values' in the 1992 Presidential campaign. Both political parties used family values rhetoric for political gain, while scapegoating minority families and families that faced poverty or other social problems.

Methods

Participants and Sampling

Members of the Oklahoma Chapter of the National Association of Social Workers (NASW) in 2010 or 2011 comprised our pool of potential study participants. Among 1,243 study-eligible members, 983 had email addresses at Oklahoma NASW. Three "e-mailings" were sent to potential participants, each containing a link to our online Qualtrics survey. The first mailing was in May 2011; the second was about one week subsequent to the first, and the third was about one week subsequent to the second. Twenty-two email addresses were not valid. Among the 961 members with valid addresses, 283 responded, a response rate of 29%. These 283 respondents form our sample.

Study Variables

Given the near absence of research on social workers' family values, we developed our own survey instrument. We piloted it first with a sample of undergraduate social work students (N=17) at the University of Oklahoma. Our final survey comprises two sections. The first comprises

44 pairs of opposing values statements presented in semantic differential format and tapping varied aspects of family life and values. Using a six-point (1-6) scale, participants indicated their relative preference for one statement over the other. For instance, one section was anchored with "elder care should occurring only within the family" (coded as 1) and "elder care may occur outside of the family" (coded as 6). The second section comprises sociodemographics and questions regarding social work practice. To protect anonymity, no data was gathered on ethnicity. The survey took about 15 minutes to complete.

Analyses

We begin presentation of results with an overview of sample characteristics, including those related to social work practice. Next, we present responses to the 44 opposing values statements. Then, we present findings from a principal components analysis based on 35 of the statements. Six of the 44 items were eliminated from our factor analysis because of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy was less than .65. Two more items were eliminated because they loaded at less than .35 on all items. Our analysis uses a (orthogonal) varimax rotation. We experimented with factor analyses (estimated of communality in the main diagonal) and with oblique rotations, but did not see substantial improvement, and, thus, rejected these options. Next, we examine relationships between sample characteristics and scores on the rotated components. Our final analysis regresses sample characteristics on the unrotated first principal component.

Results

Sample Characteristics

Table 1 presents selected characteristics of the study sample. As expected, a majority respondents, almost 84%, were female. Respondents ranged in age from 20 years old to 80 years with more than 50% reporting that they were aged 53 or older. More than 90% had MSW degrees or were pursuing this degree. About two-thirds of

respondents responded that they engaged in direct practice with families. More than 80% had children and almost 70% reported that they were married.

Table 1

Demographic Characteristics of 2010-2011 National Association of Social Workers (NASW) Oklahoma Chapter Survey Respondents

	Frequency (*n*)	Percent (%)
Sample Size	283	100%
Gender		
Male	41	14.5%
Female	237	83.7%
Missing	5	1.8%
Age (year)		
<=33	45	15.9%
34-43	47	16.6%
44-52	45	15.9%
53-59	46	16.3%
60-63	40	14.1%
64+	44	15.5%
Missing	16	5.7%
Degree level		
BSW or pending	15	5.3%
MSW or pending MSW or above	264	93.3%
Missing value	4	1.4%
Years of practice		
<=5	56	19.8%
5.1--13.0	43	15.2%
13.1--21.0	54	19.1%
21.1--30.0	46	16.3%
30.1+	48	17.0%
Missing	36	12.7%
Direct practice with families		
Yes	187	66.1%
No	88	33.1%
Missing value	8	2.8%
Practice Setting		
Metropolitan	95	33.6%
Rural	37	13.1%
Mixed	151	53.4%
Marital Status		
Previously or currently married	235	83.0%
Never married	43	15.2%
Missing	5	1.8%
Have Children		
Yes	197	69.6%
No	81	28.6%
Missing value	5	1.8%

Responses to Family Values Items

Table 2 presents the 44 values items. For each item, Table 2 presents the statements that anchor the lower (a response of 1, left) and upper (a response of 9, right) polies of the response continuum. A response of 5 is exactly in the middle and, thus, conveys indifference/neutrality with respect to the two anchoring statements.

To facilitate interpretation, when an item's mean response is less than "4," Table 2 bolds its left-side statement, and when its mean is greater than "6", Table 2 bolds its right-side statement. Hence, the bolded statement indicates the anchoring statement that the sample, taken as a whole, "leans towards." For means between "4" and "6," neither statement is bolded; such a mean conveys that the sample is fairly "balanced" on the item in question.

Table 2
Items in Principal Components Analysis and Rotated Components

#	Anchor on Left (Scored as '1')	M	SD	Anchor on Right (Scored as '9')	Component
2	**Pro no-fault divorce** :	3.5	2.4	Against no-fault divorce	-1
3	Time at work prioritized over family:	7.1	1.5	**Time spent at home with the family prioritized over work**	-6
4	Family problems/issues solved within the family	5.6	1.3	Family problems/issues solved by seeking help outside the family	+7
9	Marriage with strict lifelong conditions (covenant marriage):	5.1	2.4	Marriage without strict lifelong conditions (non-covenant marriage)	+1,+2
10	Elder care within the family:	6.6	1.7	**Elder care outside of the family**	+4
11	The teaching of values to children in the home:	6.4	2.0	**The teaching of values to children outside of the home**	+4
12	Parochial schools (schools with religious affiliations):	5.5	1.3	Secular schools (schools without religious affiliations)	+2
13	**No corporal punishment of children:**	3.9	2.5	Corporal punishment of children	-5
14	Involvement in church should occur as a family:	5.0	1.3	Involvement in church should occur individually	+2
17	No active role of religion in child-rearing:	6.2	1.9	**Active role of religion in child-rearing**	-2,-1
18	No lifelong cohabitation outside of marriage:	6.9	2.5	**Lifelong cohabitation outside of marriage**	1,2
19	In support of single parent families:	4.1	2.1	Against single parent families	-1
20	Private providers of familiy social services:	5.2	1.0	Public providers of familiy social services	+7
22	Marriage among individuals of the same faith:	7.4	2.2	**Marriage among individuals of different faiths**	+4
23	Women with young children should stay at home:	7.4	2.0	**Women with young children should be free to work outside of home**	+5,+1
24	**Marriage within different racial groups:**	1.9	1.7	Marriage only within the same racial group	-2,-3
25	Children within wedlock:	5.7	2.6	Children outside of wedlock	+1
26	**Open marriage:**	6.8	1.9	Closed marriage	-1
27	**Religious values taught in schools:**	6.5	2.1	Religious values taught outside of schools	+2
28	**Pre-marital cohabitation** :	3.0	2.3	No cohabitation before marriage	-1,-2
29	Creationism:	5.9	2.8	Evolution	+2
30	The family should be responsible for the long-term care of their elderly family members:	4.7	1.1	The government should be responsible for the long-term care of elderly family members	+6
31	**Sex education within schools and other venues:**	2.2	1.8	Sex education only within the family	-3
32	The Bible (or other religious texts) is the only adequate source for the teaching of values:	7.5	2.2	**There are many different sectors for the teaching of values**	+2
33	**Family planning:**	1.9	1.5	No family planning	-3
34	Abstinence before marriage is preferred:	4.2	2.5	Abstinence before marriage is not preferred	+1,+2
35	**No parental consent for access to birth control devices or drugs (open access):**	3.8	2.5	Parental consent for access to birth control devices or drugs (restricted access)	-3
36	No intervention in dying :	6.6	2.0	**Intervention in dying**	+6
37	**Same-sex marriage should be a recognized as equal** :	3.5	3.0	Same-sex marriage should not be recognized as equal	-1,-2
38	No separation of church and state:	7.0	2.3	**Full separation of church and state**	+2
39	**Gun control:**	3.0	2.3	No gun control	+5
41	**Pro-choice**	3.5	3.0	Pro-life	-1
42	In marriage, the male role as head of the household is preferred:	5.9	2.4	In marriage, the male role as head of the household is not preferred	-1
43	**Community involvement for the family should be priortized:**	3.4	1.6	Community involvement for the family should not be prioritized	-7
44	It is acceptable to have firearms in a household with children:	5.5	2.6	It is not acceptable to have firearms in a household with children	+5

Note: *N* varies from 276 to 283
Note: Only items 8, 9, and 14 do not differ statistically ($p \leq .01$) from a 'middle' response of '5.0'.

A perusal of the bolded statements reveals that, on balance, the sample favors "progressive" values over "traditional" ones. Some of the most "one-sided" responses include: endorsement of time at home over work (Item 3), interfaith marriage (22), women working outside of the home (23), that there are many sources for teaching values (32), and that family planning is important (33). Yet, responses are not towards the progressive end for all items. For instance, respondent do not unanimously register their disapproval of the statement "in marriage, the male role as head of the household is preferred" (42). Similarly, corporal punishment (13) is not condemned by all. Further, we note that the three items with the largest standard deviations –those conveying the greatest diversity of opinion—concern "hot-button" areas at the center of controversy: "pro-choice vs. pro-life" (41), same-sex marriage (37), and "creationism vs. evolution" (29).

Principal Components Analysis

Table 3 presents results from the principal components analysis and subsequent varimax rotation. Prior to rotation, a strong central component emerged, explaining about 32% of total variance in the 36 items. Cumulatively, the seven extracted components explain 57.72% of the variance.

Varimax rotation yielded the seven rotated components, which are "named" in Table 1. The first two rotated components are much stronger than the next five, each explaining about 13% of the variance. The defining item—that with the highest loading—for the first factor, Nontraditional Marriage, was item 25, focused on the acceptability of having children outside of wedlock. The second rotated component, Progressive Religious Values is defined by item 27 which concerns teaching religious values in school. We named the third rotated component Family Planning and Sexuality. In the initial rotation, positive loadings conveyed traditional values, those that are not supportive of family planning and sexuality. Hence, we multiplied loadings for all items by -1.00 so that positive loadings convey support for Family Planning and Sexuality "match" that of all of the six other components: For all components, high scores (and positive loadings) convey progressive values while low scores (and negative loadings) convey more traditional ones. The defining item for Family Planning and Sexuality concerned endorsement of family planning (item 33). We named the fourth component Family Connects to Society. High scores on this factor convey a desire to connect family with the larger society both in terms of services that society can provide and in terms of

Table 3
Results: Principal Components Analysis with Varimax Rotation (*N* = 236)

#	Rotated Component	Prior to Rotation		Subsequent to Rotation		
		Eigen Value	% of Variance	Squared Loading	% of Variance	Defining Item
1	Non-traditional marriage	11.24	32.11	4.69	13.39	25
2	Progressive religious values	1.95	5.58	4.58	13.09	27
3	Family Planning and Sexuality	1.48	4.72	2.74	7.84	33
4	Family connects to society	1.37	4.23	2.40	6.86	10
5	Gun Control	1.31	3.73	2.37	6.78	44
6	Prioritization of Family needs	1.20	3.44	1.84	5.26	3
7	Strong Public Services Total Explained 57.72%			1.58	4.51	20

a general willingness to engage in society. The defining item concerns whether family or 'outside of the family' should provide elder care (10).

The final three rotated components are named Gun Control, Prioritization of Family, and Strong Public Services. Positive loadings (high scores) on Gun Control convey support for fun control as well as a stance against corporal punishment of children. Prioritization of Family Needs involves putting family first. For instance, positive loadings on its defining item (Item 3) endorse prioritizing time at home above time at work. Positive loadings on the final factor, Strong Public Services, convey support for public social services, and, in general, for services designed to support families.

Observe that the right-most column in Table 2 lists the number of the component on which each item loaded most strongly, as well as the direction of that loading. When an item loaded at above .400 (or below -.400) on more than one component, numbers for both components are provided, with the first number conveying the strong component. Scores for the components were saved using SPSS's regression option. For all component scores, the mean score equals 0.00 and the standard deviation equals 1.00.

Associations of Rotated Factors and Sample Characteristics

Exploratory one-way ANOVAs were run using the sample characteristics in Table 1 as grouping variables and the rotated component scores as dependent variables. For respondent's age and years of practice, our ANOVAs examined linear trends as well as overall differences between means.

Gender showed statistically significant association only to Progressive Religious Values. Perhaps surprisingly, men scored higher (more progressive): Men, $M=.48$, $SD=.74$, $N=32$; Women, $M=-.07$, $SD=1.02$, $N=200$; $p=.048$. Educational degree yielded two statistically significant

differences; for both Gun Control and Prioritization of Family needs, those with BSWs (or pending) had more traditional component scores than did those with MSWs (or pending). For Gun Control: BSW, $M=-.82$, $SD=.88$, $N=13$; MSW, $M=.07$, $SD=.87$, $N=220$; $p=.001$. For Prioritization of Family Needs: BSW, $M=-.58$, $SD=1.36$, $N=13$; MSW, $M=.02$, $SD=.97$, $N=220$; $p=.0350$. Participation in direct practice was associated with more traditional values on two factors, Nontraditional Marriage and Gun Control. For Nontraditional Marriage: Direct Practice, $M=-.10$, $SD=1.08$, $N=149$; Not in Direct Practice, $M=.18$, $SD=.82$, $N=81$; $p=.046$. For Gun Control: Direct Practice, $M=-.09$, $SD=.95$, $N=149$; Not in Direct Practice, $M=.12$, $SD=1.04$, $N=81$; $p=.035$.

Those with social work licenses were more progressive on Gun Control and Prioritization of Family Needs. For Gun Control: Licensed, $M=.12$, $SD=.96$, $N=162$; Not Licensed, $M=-.18$, $SD=1.02$, $N=70$; $p=.033$. For Prioritization of Family Needs: Licensed, $M=.07$, $SD=.91$, $N=162$; Not Licensed, $M=-.21$, $SD=1.18$, $N=70$; $p=.048$. In line with expectations, those from rural settings espoused more traditional values on Gun Control than did those in mixed or metropolitan settings: Metropolitan, $M=.05$, $SD=.94$, $N=78$; Rural, $M=-.55$, $SD=1.10$, $N=29$; Mixed, $M=-.03$, $SD=.96$, $N=40$.

Statistically significant differences by age group were found for four components, Progressive Religious Values, Family connects to Society, Gun Control and Prioritization of Family Needs. For the most part, component scores become more progressive as age group increases. An exception is the Progressive Religious values factor, where the youngest age group evidenced more progressive values than did those in the subsequent three agre groups. Table 4 presents mean component scores by age group.

Table 4
Statistically Significant Components by Age Group (*N* = 225)

Rotated Component	Age Group					
	≤ 33	34 -- 43	44 -- 52	53 -- 59	60 -- 63	≥ 64
Progressive Religious Values[a]	.19	-.36	-.29	-.12	.42	.25
	(.97)	(1.05)	(1.16)	(1.00)	(.78)	.83
Family Connects to Society[b d]	-.35	.25	-.17	.04	.03	.34
	(.86)	(1.09)	(1.06)	(.97)	(.91)	(.96)
Gun Control[a c]	-.31	-.39	.12	.36	.19	.16
	(.99)	(1.12)	(.85)	(.96)	(1.08)	(.71)
Prioritize Family Needs[b c]	-.55	-.01	.08	.14	.06	.19
	(1.11)	(.70)	(.95)	(1.03)	(1.03)	(1.03)

Table 5 shows that for years of social work practice, associations to the components were, on balance, similar to those for age group, with three associations achieving significance: Family Connects with society (positive linear trend only, *p*=.002), Gun Control (main effect, *p*=.003 and positive linear trend *p*=0.00), and Prioritize Family Needs (positive linear trend only, *p*=.03). We note that the five-category years of practice variable and the six-category age group variable are highly correlated, *r*=.71, and, this, in part, explains the similar patterns of relationship to the components for these variables.

Exploratory Multiple Regression Analysis

Our final analysis was a stepwise multiple regression analysis on the unrotated principal component. This component's mean equals 0.00, and its standard deviation equals 1.00. High scores convey progressive family values. We entered all characteristics from Table 1 into the regression.

Table 5
Statistically Significant Components by Years of Practice

Rotated Component	Years of Practice				
	≤ 5	6 -- 13	14 -- 21	21 -- 30	≥ 31
Family Connects to Society[c]	-.31	-.23	.01	.35	.37
	(.95)	(1.16)	(.97)	(.83)	(1.01)
Gun Control[a b]	-.23	-.39	.12	.36	.19
	(.94)	(.88)	(1.10)	(.94)	(.76)
Prioritize Family Needs[c]	-.15	-.10	.04	.09	.27
	(1.12)	(.84)	(.96)	(1.04)	(.85)

[a] main effect ($p \leq .01$), [b] linear trend ($p \leq .01$), [c] linear trend ($p \leq .05$)

Those with *p* values under .05 comprise the final model, which is presented in Table 6. Surprisingly, work in direct practice predicted a lower component score and, thus, more traditional family values. Both years of social work practice and, residence in a metropolitan rather than in a rural or 'mixed' area predicted progressive values.

as 'time at work' (item 3) is often instrumental to meeting family needs, characterizing 'time at work' vs. 'time at home' as 'traditional' versus 'progressive' is a poor fit. The reader is cautioned that the means in Table 2 can be interpreted too narrowly. For instance, item 19's mean is near the center of the nine-point scale (M=4.1). This does not convery that some social workers are "against"

Table 6
Regression on the (Unrotated) Principal Component

Predictor	*B*	Beta	Sig.
(Constant)	-.09		
In Direct Practice?	-.58	-.28	.000
Years in Practice	.02	.26	.001
Metropolitan Residence	.54	.16	.002
Adjusted *R* squared .106			

Discussion

Relatively little is known about the family values that social workers espouse and how these values impact social work practice. In fact, our literature review found no instruments specifically designed to measure family values, let alone family values for the profession of social work. This is surprising as values play such a central role in social work.

As we begin to interpret findings, the reader should be aware of several limitations. Our response rate is low (29%), and this recommends some caution in generalizing findings. Our participants are Oklahoma-based and findings may not generalize well to other parts of the United States. Our ratio of sample size (*N*=236) to number of items entered into the principal components analysis is about 7 to 1, and, thus, below the 10 to 1 minimum ratio that is sometimes recommended. This low ratio suggests that different components could have emerged with a larger sample size. Though we have characterized items along a traditional to progressive continuum, not all items fit well along this continuum. For instance,

single-parent families but rather that some view these families as facing substantial barriers—income, time, childcare, etc. Finally, our analyses are exploratory and, thus, some significant associations likely reflect the workings of chance.

Certainly, it is interesting that the legal rights for same-sex marriage (item 37) and pro-choice vs. pro-life (item 41) statements produced the greatest diversity of opinion. Our expectation had been for fairly homogenous opinion on these, as the social work profession strongly supports same-sex marriage as well as the pro-life position. Responses were also varied on the 'Creationism/Evolution' item, suggesting that many respondents strongly favor one of these polies over the other.

Our social work sample concurred on the importance of social services for families. The strong support for family planning (33) and for the statement "Benefits to families should not be cut even if citizens have to pay more taxes" (Item 16; not presented in Table 2) highlight these trends. We found strong support for a 'progressive' role for women in family and society; for instance, our participants feel that "Women with young children

should be free to work outside of home" (23). Yet, support for progressive roles for women was less than unanimous. The diversity of opinion on the 'pro-life/pro-choice' item (41) has already been mentioned. Further, our sample took a centrist position regarding whether the male role of head of household is preferred (42).

Non-traditional marriage and Progressive Religious Values emerged as the two strongest rotated components, that is, as the two explaining the greatest variance. We have no explanation regarding why men expressed more progressive religious values than did women; this may reflect chance. Those with MSWs were more progressive than those with BSWs on two components, Gun Control and Prioritization of Family Needs. Perhaps the values infused into graduate social work education contribute to greater progressivity, or perhaps those with MSWs are, simply, older, and this influenced responses. The more traditional responses of those in rural areas on items connected to Gun Control were expected. Gun ownership is a way of life in many rural settings; social workers in such settings are, presumably, affected by community norms regarding guns. In general, progressivity increased with age (see Table 4). Yet, the youngest age group (≤ 33) scored higher on the Progressive Religious Values component than did the next three groups (34-59). This result is in accord with the greater acceptance of homosexuality and same-sex marriage among younger (rather than older) persons in the wider population.

The final analysis was a multiple regression on the unrotated principal component, in other words, a regression on "progressive family values." Years of social work practice demonstrated positive association with progressivity, more so than did age group, which did not achieve significance. Interpretation of the positive association between years of practice and progressive values presents a conundrum. Do progressive values lead to longer—and perhaps more satisfying—careers in social work? Or do more progressive values build steadily as one continues on in their social work career? This conundrum is beyond the limits of our research design.

We can only speculate regarding why those in direct practice are more traditional in their family values. Does work in the "trenches" temper progressive tendencies into a hardened, more traditional pragmatism? Finally, those in metropolitan settings were more progressive. Just as Oklahoma is more rural and more traditional in values than is the United States as a whole, rural areas in Oklahoma may be more traditional than metropolitan ones—this at least appears to be the case for Oklahoma's social workers.

The less than universally progressive response in our sample reflects, we think, Oklahoma's conservative political and religious values. We suspect that NASW members in "blue" (liberal, Democratic) states hold values that are, on balance, more progressive than those that we found.

A next step in research is perhaps to examine how social workers' values compare to those in the population at large. One way to accomplish this is to administer family values—related questions from large nationwide surveys—for instance, the General Social Survey—to representative samples of social workers. We suspect that such research will more clearly highlight the largely progressive values in social work.

In general, we found more progressive values among more experienced and older respondents than among younger ones. This may create an interesting dynamic between older social work supervisors and their younger supervisees. Our findings highlight the importance of social work curricula that focus on values, and how values enter into one's personal life and professional practice. The generally—though not totally—progressive values of social workers and the more conservative—and perhaps more diverse—values of our clients and society, represent and important and continuing challenge for the profession.

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Updating Ethics Expertise: Supervision of Ethics as a Communicative Action

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Abstract

In addressing ethics expertise, we are looking at the theory of communicative action, in order to stress the need for developing a new ethics expertise model: supervision of ethics. The paper is theoretical, grounded in the theory of communicative action, which we reinterpret in terms of social construction of ethics expertise, customized in social work practices. The ethics of communicative action focuses on an equal inter-subjective communicative action with morally passive patients, incapable of inter-action in any debate generating moral consensus. We argue the need for updating ethics expertise by bringing into practice this new model, which will be able to make professional and organizational values compatible, exercising a supplementary gatekeeping role in the transfer of political theories about the public good through the implementation of programs and practices.

Keywords: ethics expertise, supervision, supervision of ethics, social work, communicative action.

Introduction

The paper aims to present the supervision of ethics as a particular form of ethics expertise. Supervision of ethics is developed as a form of communicative action that follows the consensus of people who are involved in ethical decisions. In the context of using communicative action as a consensus generator, we refer to the supervision of ethics as a communicative practice embodied in ethics expertise, that brings together practices from all other forms of ethics expertise, such as counseling of ethics, ethics audits, ethics committees' activities, ethical consulting, ethical decision-making models and so on.

Communicative Action Theory

habermas (1984) highlighted the idea that social actors seek to reach a common understanding and coordinate actions, based on consensus and cooperation, rather than being strategic-action-oriented strictly to achieve their objectives. Habermas (2000) believes communication is crucial for building the relationship with Otherness, an expression of consciousness underpinning the moral conscience of any form of social action. Habermas's theory starts as a critique of the idea of the rationality of social actors, following the postmodern project of establishing linguistic turns (McCarthy, 1978), the game of language and interpretative agreement which deconstructs the claims of the universality

of ethical and social metatheories. Habermas's theory system is aimed at the empowerment of latent communication contained by modern institutions and rational analysis of the human capacity to deliberate critically in the pursuit of rational interests.

There is a distinction made by Habermas (1987) between *moral agents* – seen as subjects capable of communicative action and *moral patients* – subjects on whom moral action is exercised. The philosopher states three distinct types of action aimed at individual and social success. In the economic field, the search for success, manifested through wealth, generates *instrumental activity (action)*, which is seen by Habermas as success in an unsociable plan (personal wealth). The second type of action is determined by the desire to gain success in the social sphere, where power can be manifested as influence, generating *strategic activity (action)*. *Communicative action,* as a third type of action set out by Habermas in his critical reading of Weber on success, subscribes to sphere of mutual understanding (1984; 1987; 2000).

Habermas (1987) introduces a "paradigmatic turn" bypassing ethics in the field of consciousness, in a constituent frame of communication. Mediation is performed by acts of inter-relations through speech, and not by instrumental acts. Coordination through language positions requires actors to captivate practical-oriented auditors by improving communicative experience, seen as the inherent purpose of any speech (Mitrovic, 1999). As a result of communicative action, Habermas states that a model-generator consensus legitimizes a force without coercion. The model is identified as one that is unifying, allowing the achievement of overcoming personal perspective through argumentative discourse. Interlocutors are in the process of negotiating interpretations, and thereby ensuring an interpretative world.

Based on the work of Habermas (1984, 1987, 2000), *discourse ethics* or *communication ethics* proposes an effective participation of all those involved (listening to all voices), a real ethical deliberation replacing the old theory of ethical decision. Characteristics of communicative action theory applied in ethics are represented by transformation of ethical universalism into particular rules of argument, derivation of moral norms of social processes outside the critical discourse records, the need for minimal interpretive consensus, and "relative" ethical standards (Bohman & Rehg, 2011). Communicative action consists of customized ethical debates giving rise to specific communication frameworks, specific moral norms, and codes of conduct.

Establishment of ethics, based on discursive dialogue and interpretive consensus, involves a number of challenges such as:

- disparities in power and games which manage deliberative context;

- ethical debates which need customization to each particular communicative context, which lengthens the time needed to obtain a decision;

- the possibility of distortion of the results due to the deliberately uneven argumentative ability to negotiate by participants

- admission of some unacceptable rules due to a particular deliberative consensus meeting (Morar, 2006).

Moral debate and negotiation are based on the identification of acceptance criteria of communicative action as moral action, focusing on avoiding arbitrariness and manipulation without moral claims of impartiality.

Ethics Expertise—Delimitations

Ethics expertise and moral expertise seem to be two different concepts that theorists define and debate separately, mainly based on different perceptions of what both *ethics* and *moral* mean. Schicktanz, Schweda, & Wynne claim that there

should be a distinction between ethics expertise and moral expertise (2012). *Morality* is defined as a set of principles and values, whose main role is the guidance of the individual life and social interactions, while *ethics* implies normative reflection, justification, or critique, in terms of validity, desirability, and legitimation. Schicktanz et al. admit that the differentiation between ethics and morality is far from easy: the concrete distinction between these two concepts asks for a distinction between secular morality (of individual non-experts) and ethical reflection (philosophical and academic) which cannot be done fully (2012).

Ethics expertise is seen by Bruce Weinstein (1994) as coming from four different directions: descriptive ethics expertise, meta-ethics expertise, normative ethics expertise, and expertise in living a good life. Ethics expertise is divided into *epistemic ethics expertise*, characterized as the cognitive ability of the individual that implies a theoretical knowledge of the field, and *performative ethics expertise*, which implies the possibility of excellence in a specific field, and the capacity for pragmatic action (Weinstein, 1994). We argue that there is a further difference between *pragmatic* and *performative*, whereas the *performing* represents the action of practicing ethics, in conditions where the ethicist is counseling in relation to ethical conduct. The ethical or non-ethical features of the ethicist's practice or life are not taken into account in establishing the level of ethics expertise (Caras [Frunză], 2014b). Academic discourse on ethics expertise offers at least three different approaches to the concept. Peter Singer claims that ethics expertise requires a profound familiarization with theories, methods, and ethical arguments, as with their application in different situations (Singer, 1979), while Cheryl Nobel (1982), considers ethics expertise to include the manifestation of a moral wisdom. Another perspective on this concept exposes the ability of justifying the moral judgments in a coherent way: Schicktanz et al. (2012) indicate that trust given to ethics expertise, but also the retention of it, depends on

the meta-ethics approach of those who recall ethics expertise (Caras [Frunză], 2014b).

We have considered all these perspectives on ethics expertise studied in this body of research, and we agree with some of these authors' approaches. We consider the perspective of Steinkamp, Gordijn, & ten Have (2008) useful in further developing our own model of ethics expertise: we agree with the idea that ethics expertise is the practice that improves and offers specificity to ethicists in terms of their own expertise, thus contributing to improving non-ethicists' perceptions of their moral competences. Ethics expertise offers perspectives on argumentative styles that are complementary to both ethicists and non-ethicists, contributing in the end to an awareness of ethicists' professional development problems (Steinkamp et al, 2008).

Who Is Entitled to Be an Ethics Expert?

A possible inquiry into the justification for exercising supervision of ethics may occur especially in the conditions where the features of ethics expertise are not clearly differentiated from those of a person who is simply considered to be virtuous. This issue is discussed particularly when examples are raised of ethicists whose particular behavior in certain situations is considered unethical.

Eggleston (2005) treats the issue of ethics expertise from the Moore (1993) perspective and reflects on the nature of ethics expertise: is ethics expertise a theoretical knowledge, or a practical one? Appealing to the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Eggleston (2005) claims there is a pragmatic character to ethics, even if the concept of *expertise* has a rather theoretical connotation. In antiquity, Aristotle claimed that the interest and the scope of philosophical examination was not to identify what virtue is, but how one can become better and apply virtue.

In our opinion the *Nicomachean Ethics* is not entirely a practical treaty of ethics, Aristotle remaining in the theoretical sphere in expounding

upon ethics to his son Nicomach. A more practical implementation of moral values can then be seen in the Gospels, when Jesus Christ sends his disciples to do good deeds by helping the prisoners and caring for the sick people, having the unique moral rule: "Love your neighbor as yourself."

In modernity, Moore (1993) opposes Aristotle's view, claiming that the main aim of ethics is its knowledge, and not its practice. Eggleston (2005), agrees that ethics expertise can be rather theoretical: he suggests a hypothetical situation where a person who does good deeds, without thinking in a particular way of his or her virtuous behavior, or one who is able to teach others how to do good deeds, would be perceived as virtuous, but not as having ethics expertise as such. The association of the *expertise* concept with the one of *philosophy* in itself, allows Eggleston (2005) to sustain the epistemic character of ethics expertise, rather than the pragmatic one.

Another issue which calls into question the specifics of ethics expertise has two possible approaches to it: the ethics expert's interest either in doing *Good*, or in doing *Justice*. Both approaches raise questions about what is meant either by *Good* or by *Just,* and what is thus approved by ethics expertise. The orientation towards accomplishing the *Good* of the ethics expert will put him/her in the position of providing consultancy to agents on what is morally correct or not in the situations with which they deal, while the orientation of an expert towards *Justice* will lead him/her to use his or her expertise particularly in guiding action (Eggleston, 2005).

Moore's (1993) ethics – as a successor to John Stuart Mill – is an ethics of *Good*, that *Good* is the notion on which all ethics depend, the work of ethics determining those things which have intrinsic value and also determining in what measure they have this value (Moore, 1993). Moore (1993) admits the importance of using the *Good* judgment in order to determine judgments on what is *Just*, stating that ethics are entitled to tell us what our duties are as individuals.

Synthesizing Moore's approach, Eggleston (2005) exposes a series of characteristics specific to ethics expertise: the capacity to differentiate judgments between what is good or bad in good and bad judgments, and cause and effect judgments; the capacity to use intuition in order to do necessary judgments between good and bad, and the capacity to use empirical inquiry in order to make necessary judgments of cause and effect. These abilities are considered necessary for a person to be able to determine if a certain act is just/good or unjust/bad (Eggleston, 2005). Automatically, when we choose an action as being good – from a consequentialist perspective – to this action will be attributed the feature of *just*, or more exactly, of *necessary to be done.* This understanding of *just* is not defined by the strict compliance to normativeness, but through result, whose value might exceed, at some point, the value of the norm. Considering the abilities of the ethics expert given by Moore as raising implementation issues, Eggleston (2005) brings a set of clarifications to this approach. The ethicist described by Moore (1993) – a consequentialist – will not need to investigate the agent's intentions, or to be sure of his or her future reasons which could compromise the ethical act. The real consequences of the ethical act will be those that matter for the practice of the ethics expert proposed by Moore (1993), no matter the tendencies or generalities associated with the act. Moreover Moore (1993) orients his attention toward ethical rules that are desirable for society's development; the action grounded in these rules promotes significations and arrangements such as life, liberty, and the security of property, which are considered as intrinsic goods no matter the social circumstances (Eggleston, 2005).

Schicktanz and his collaborators (2012) propose a series of clarifications of the concept of ethics expertise, characterizing the critical evaluation of expertise as the dialectic between social science and ethics in the field of applied ethics, thus approaching the inclusion and exclusion of the public's perspective on these ethics. Schicktanz and his collaborators (2012) argue that "the public understanding of ethics" starts the explication of ethics' grounds as a

participative paradigm and of its normative reasons. The concept of "public understanding of ethics" implies an ongoing public preoccupation regarding scientific and technological progress; this includes all other forms of argument, justification, and normative judgment on, for example, the moral problematic in medicine, such as questions related to the morality of using human embryos in medical research, or respect for the patient in medical practice. This concept of the "public understanding of ethics" can be used for naming the social research of a public vision of the role of ethics and ethicists in different social and political contexts, fields whose ethics are insufficiently studied (Schicktanz, Schweda and Wynne, 2012). Friele (2003) shows that the roles of the ethics expert are mainly the analysis, logical testing, and submission to an ethical validity test of diversely used arguments to sustain an ethical decision. Ethics experts also have to observe the utility of such arguments as a means of discursive augmentation. The roles of ethics experts are to be found in the professional activities of the ethicist, practiced in the teaching of professional ethics, in participating as expert witnesses in the field in certain trials, or in their activity within ethics committees (Friele, 2003).

From this public understanding of ethics at the level of communities, as is approached by Schicktanz et al. (2012), to a more specific ethics expertise, there is necessarily a significant qualitative leap. This leap makes the shift from the exercising of one's own moral behaviors to the achieving of a meta-ethical reflexive capacity, followed by the capacity to transfer achieved competences and expertise from the ethics field to professional practice. This leap constitutes the professionalization of ethics expertise. Therefore, ethics expertise requires rigorous training in the field of moral philosophy, as an imperative condition for an ethics expert, especially because his or her role is to offer counseling to those specialists whose professional expertise does not involve ethics exclusively.

Supervision of Ethics—A New Approach to Ethics Expertise

We call supervision of ethics the practice embodied in ethical expertise that brings together practices from all other forms of ethics expertise, such as counseling of ethics (Sandu & Caras [Frunză], 2013b), ethics audits (Caras [Frunză], 2014a), ethics committees (Caras [Frunză] & Sandu, 2013), ethical consulting, ethical decision-making models, and so on. These forms of expertise exercise a supplementary gatekeeping role in the transfer of political theories about the public good through the implementation of programs and practices (Sandu & Caras [Frunză], 2014), and making organizational values compatible with professional values.

We will focus on the pragmatic perspective (Caras [Frunză] & Sandu, 2014) that places supervision of ethics as a complementary process to ethical expertise's classical functions, partially taking over ethical gatekeeping and the interpretive facilitation agreement between the professional, the organization, and the client.

The intervention of a supervisor of ethics could be beneficial in ethical training of a specialist whose knowledge does not necessarily imply a previous systematic training in ethics. A supervisor of ethics would fulfil the role of an expert and also of an interpreter of the values with which the specialist operates. In the supervision of ethics practice, a Kantian influence can be observed in the gatekeeping role of the supervisor in a deontological interpretation. In the sphere of applied sciences, and even more in applied philosophy, the focus was on the analysis of moral thinking, neglecting the moral conduct which reflects the existing bias in meta-ethics on the rational character of human action. Habermas's (1987) version of a discursive ethics is based on the Kantian tradition. Like Kant, Habermas considers morality as a sum of unconditional moral obligations: prohibitions, positive obligations, and allowed things governing the interaction between people. Habermas associates morality with respect for autonomous agents, as does the Kantian

approach: an individual can follow his or her own conscience and show respect for other agents like him or her. Differences between Kantian autonomy and the Habermasian one underlie the practical reason approach, Habermas having a dialogic approach to practical reason.

We propose a model of ethics expertise, based on Habermas's theory of communicative action, in a generally postmodern and specifically deconstructionist paradigm. In connection with relational autonomy construction, we will expose the main supervision of ethics functions, as follows:

- The function of ethics policies' gatekeeping.

- The function of the mediator in achieving a reflective balance in the organization in the interests of each party involved.

- The function of ethics construction in organizations.

- Function of ethical conformity monitoring.

- Function of counseling of ethics, support and consultancy.

- The administrative and deliberative function. (Caras [Frunză], 2014b; Caras [Frunză] & Sandu, 2014)

The convergence between interpretative consensus at the level of practical activities with the content of interpretative consensus on values can be verified by the ethics supervisor from the perspective of an epistemic and axiological compatibility between them. The necessity of achieving the above-mentioned convergence leads to the gatekeeping function of supervision of ethics results, facilitating ethical policy-making. In this context, by establishing a consensus on organizational values, a supervisor of ethics will have a role not only in the construction of public policies, but also in their implementation. Exercising a gatekeeping function ensures the relationship between constitutive ethical values

and operational ethical values as the shift between those moves towards the practical ethical principle. A supervisor of ethics acts within a triadic construct to facilitate communicative action, and to intervene in the relations between an organization, professionals, and the clients of the services provided by the organization through the specialist. In this hypothesis, the supervision of ethics will accomplish the function of *mediation*, by obtaining reflective equilibrium between the interests of the stakeholders within an organization. We identified *the function of constructing ethics within an organization,* which involves development of an ethical standard in consensus with the development needs of the organization, by promoting the highest ethical standards. Also, the supervisor of ethics has an important role in the process of empowerment of professionals, helping them to balance conforming to their own principles of professional practice, and maintaining consensus with the vision and mission of the organization. Once an ethical framework has been constructed, the adherence of professionals to an organizational culture, *the function of monitoring ethical conformity,* intervenes. This ensures the procedural compatibility of methodology with ethical standards, and also the monitoring of those to be respected by the practitioners who work in fields with explicit ethical impact. Supervision of ethics can contribute to the improvement of professionals' ethical practices, by implementing the ethics audit at the level of organizational culture and of ethics policies. An ethics audit as a paradigmatic model for ethics expertise targets the monitoring of the ethical climate, verifies that the organization's practices are in accordance with the mission, values and vision stated in its statutes and its code of ethics, and identifies potential risk areas when change is necessary (Caras [Frunză], 2014b).

From the perspective of Reamer (2006), an ethics audit should include two dimensions: 1) ethical reflection on the current knowledge of ethics in the field and 2) the relevance of this knowledge to daily practice and the identification of ethical risks and ethical decisions. Organizations whose practices are ethics audited should allocate

resources for reflection on current knowledge, each specialist making a proper inventory of knowledge in ethics, and later, after determining the level of knowledge, the organization should be able to relate this level of knowledge to their daily practice. The ethics auditor identifies the organization's ability to comply with their ethically acceptable values, giving the organization a number of proposals to improve its practice and operation (Caras [Frunză], 2014a).

Directly correlated to the ethics audit is a discussion addressing *the function of counseling of ethics, support, and consultancy*. The implementation of this function implies ethical training of organizations' personnel, in order to apply ethical standards in daily practice. At the level of ethics committees, the supervisor of ethics can have the role of an ethical 'lawyer,' in the client's favor, fulfilling an *administrative-deliberative function.* A supervisor of ethics would also have an activity-reporting brief to acknowledge good conduct or sanction the misconduct of the person being supervised. Together with experts from complementary social services, the supervisor of ethics, as a member of a committee, would intervene in the administrative-deliberative process of maintaining ethical acceptability in favor of the beneficiary of the services.

From the perspective of communicative action theory, then, the role of supervision of ethics should be to facilitate the arrival of a consensus on ethical action in practice. There is also a distinction between the supervision of ethics, aimed at supervising ethical practices in terms of methodology, and ethical supervision that focuses on the practical application of the professional ethics of supervisors in their own daily activities (Caras [Frunză], 2014b; Caras [Frunză] & Sandu, 2014).

How Could Supervision of Ethics Work in Social Work Practice?

Social intervention can represent a form of communicative action. Social intervention, as part of social work, can be treated from a psychological perspective as a form of psychotherapy derived

from current existential humanistic, personal, problematical (Parrish, 2010), or sociological perspectives, which concern social work as a form of social therapy, of social reintegration and the social worker as a specialist in applied sociology. Social services' clients perceive themselves as beneficiaries of those services, because they see the increase in the quality of their lives as faster than in a social system operation (Dominelli, 1997). We observe a distinction between social practice and communicative practice, which we see as being correlated to the distinction between social/strategic action and communicative action. Social action aims at efficiency in a social plan, through social change, while communicative action follows an interpretative consensus and the identification of best practice.

In our vision, social services are grounded in social action, because they are directly interested in the efficiency of transforming social spaces, while supervision, both in a classical professional sense and supervision of ethics, is grounded in communicative action. Strategic action and instrumental action can be seen as forms of social action, which aim at the institution of the relationship of power. What Habermas calls *efficiency*, we interpret as the institution of the relationship of power (Foucault, 2005), especially in terms of the power of influence – soft power (Nye, 1999; 2004; 2011). The communicative action in itself, we see as a normalization of power relationships, being opposite and complementary to other types of action.

The character of the communicative action of social work is formed by the relationship between the beneficiary and the social worker, centered on social change. This relationship is based on behavior modification, as the influence of the social services on the social environment of beneficiaries facilitates their social integration. We can see in social work activity all the interpretative interests mentioned by Habermas:

- *Instrumental activity* aims at obtaining resources, including financial ones, for the individual. From this perspective we

consider the social benefits, which are established as forms of obligatory social solidarity. These social benefits are defined as financial transfers, as familial and social allowances, and facilities. Social benefits transpose in practice the social policies that aim for social justice and equity, being nothing else but a deconstruction of *charity*, at the level of the welfare state. In our opinion social work practice is an implementation of the ethical principles that dominate the community at the level of social policy, without an ethical reflection on the ethical considerations of the practice in itself. We can see an analogy between Eggleston's (2005) distinction between the virtuous individual and the ethics expert, the first being analogous to the social worker, who has practical knowledge of how to implement social equity, but who needs also the guidance of a supervisor of ethics to be a gatekeeper of ethics policies. Such a gatekeeper facilitates practitioners' reflections on the ethical values of their own practice and on the social significance of that practice.

- *Strategic activity* aims at obtaining social success and power as influence. From the social work perspective, we refer to the programs of social integration of diverse categories of vulnerable people through measures, prevention, or support actions, in order to limit their risk factors and to develop their personal capacities, or their familial capacities to deal with their vulnerabilities (Sandu & Caras [Frunză], 2013b).

- *Communicative action* aims at the inter-comprehensive understanding of social actors; it exemplifies the rehabilitation based on community, and on community and social development programs. The most appropriate model of this communicative practice is the process of

counseling in social work. The purpose of counseling, as it was initiated by Carl Rogers in the field of non-directive psychotherapy, and used further in social intervention techniques (client-centred techniques) (Zastrow, 2010), constitutes the development of clients' autonomy and capacity as moral agents.

Along with the communicative relationship between the client (beneficiary) and the social worker, we can identify a communicative triad, formed at the level of the beneficiary – social worker – supervisor relationship. From the communicative action theory perspective, the role of the supervision of ethics could be to facilitate a consensus with regards to ethical action, within the social intervention between the organization providing social services, the social worker or case manager, the beneficiary, and other stakeholders. An example of communicative action implementation is using a tool named an "eco map" – specific to social work - which allows the identification of the types of relationship of the beneficiary with his family members, or with the community (Miftode, 2010).

As an example of supervision's usefulness as a form of ethical gatekeeping in establishing policies for redistribution-based social work, we expose a hypothetical ethical dilemma: two development regions, A and B, simultaneously require funds from the government, through a budget supplementation based on two projects. The administration of Project A, which aims to create jobs, could be motivated by the capacity for sustainable development existing in the region. The project of region B aims at the development of social work for the long-term unemployed, motivated by the large number of unemployed people, by reduced employability within the region, and by the risks of social exclusion or self-exclusion among the long-term unemployed. The decision maker – the administrator of the funds intended for community development – must balance both proposals and choose the one that fulfills higher ethical criteria. Both projects require

a central redistribution of existing resources, in order to help equally the beneficiaries of those regions. The role of the supervisor of ethics is to analyse the relative priority of each redistribution. Both projects are grounded on the principle of social solidarity, being different only from the point of view of the consequences. Both projects aim to support a target group formed from unemployed people. The first project creates the possibility of sustainable development, while the second one aims at solving social problems in the short or medium term, but with the possibility of a perpetuation of dependency on social services. From the justification perspective, neither of the target groups is more entitled to the benefits of redistribution, because it cannot be claimed there is a causal relationship between the subjects' status and their actions. Unemployed people from either project cannot be held responsible for the lack of jobs. From a strict Rawlsian perspective, group B would have the priority, justified by the fact that it is the most disfavored group, as long-term unemployed. In group A, the beneficiaries can be both long-term unemployed people and other disadvantaged people, such as young graduates, and therefore the vulnerability level would be, at first analysis, smaller.

By analyzing their marginal opportunities, group A would have the bigger chances, in the long term, of getting out of their vulnerable status, and therefore this group would be more entitled to the benefit of this chance, the entitlement, as the Rawlsian distribution, being rational and based on good will. The decision cannot be equitable to both groups: one of the groups must be favored, and the other one rejected. In our opinion we have no criteria for decidability in any of the distributive paradigms, the ethical dilemma being placed on the horizon of a series of equal values, equal chances, and the chance for a better life for one of the groups. The decision must consider the larger social interest and from the libertarian perspective the greater social interest is the prospect of development. Therefore, the entitlement is in favor of the first group, although not through its own

position, but through the contextual perspective of the proposed project. Maybe the most claimed ethics are the utilitarian ethics, at the level of long-term consequences, which would put the choice in the first group's favor, or on the contrary, the short-term utility for the second group and the resulting social peace might be preferred. Both situations transfer the decision into the public- interest sphere, which transcends the relative equity of the target groups. The role of the supervisor of ethics, as ethics gatekeeper, is to provide counseling to those who have to make this sort of decision, relating to the ethical context of the decisions' potential to the framing of the public reason in a moral context.

Instead of Conclusions

Overall grounding in communicative action is given by the fact that supervision aims at a practice of reflection on specialists' own action strategies, in terms of professional efficiency – in professional supervision and ethical values of an action in itself, and also of utility and its consequences, both at the level of the supervision of ethics. Efficiency in the social plan of communicative action is generated by the subsequent possibility of the identification of new interpretative practices.

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Book Review

Vieten, C., & Scammell, S. (2015). *Spiritual and religious competencies in clinical practice: Guidelines for psychotherapists and mental health professionals*. Oakland, CA: New Harbinger.

Review by Laura Gibson, Ph.D., LCSW
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When I received my MSW training, I don't recall teachers or field instructors ever bringing up the role, or lack thereof, of religion or spirituality in clients' lives. I wouldn't describe it as a taboo subject, exactly, but we were somehow subtly discouraged from asking clients about their religious beliefs and traditions. Perhaps it was not considered to be relevant to the presenting problem, or perhaps there was concern that clients who did not follow an organized religion might feel judged or otherwise infer that we were pushing them in that direction. I also don't remember clients bringing up their spiritual lives, but probably because I never asked. This is slowly changing. However, many social workers still have not had any professional training in the area of spirituality and religion, and consequently, do not feel confident in supporting this area of clients' lives. Vieten and Scammell present 16 competencies resulting from six years of research. They recommend these competencies for all practicing psychologists. They are applicable to all behavioral health professionals, including social workers, mental health counselors, marriage and family therapist, and psychiatric nurses.

Cassandra Vieten is a clinical psychologist. She earned her PhD at the California Institute of Integral Studies where she studied the integration of Eastern philosophies into psychotherapy. She is CEO of the Institute of Noetic Sciences and a scientist at the Pacific Medical Center Research Institute. Her primary research interest is exploring how psychology, biology, and spirituality interact to affect experience and behavior.

Shelley Scammell is also a clinical psychologist. She earned her PhD at the California Institute of Integral Studies. She has taught as an adjunct professor at that same university, as well as at Sonoma University and the American College of Chinese Medicine. Since 2005, she has maintained her own psychotherapy practice in California.

The authors frame spiritual and religious competence as a dimension of cultural competence. Cultural competence comprises the awareness, knowledge, and skills necessary to engage with clients from different cultural backgrounds. The authors argue that it is not possible to fully understand clients without also understanding the influence, or lack thereof, of spiritual and religious attitudes and behaviors.

The authors' intent is to help professionals who want to develop competence in the areas of religion and spirituality. They caution that this text will not teach the high level of proficiency needed for clinicians to develop a specialized practice where they overtly use religious or spiritual interventions. It will, however, help clinicians learn the attitudes, knowledge, and skills necessary to competently identify and address religious or spiritual issues and help clients draw upon those resources, as appropriate.

The book is divided into three sections. In the first section, the authors use the first three chapters to introduce key concepts such as religion, spirituality, and cultural competence; and they explain the difference between professional competence and proficiency. They discuss how conscious and unconscious attitudes and biases can influence our ability to convey empathy, respect, and appreciation. The second section of the book is comprised of seven chapters that address the knowledge clinicians need to do clinical work. The six chapters in the final section discuss the skills necessary to practice ethically and competently.

Religion refers to affiliation with an organization guided by an understanding of the divine. Spirituality is defined by the authors as a personal connection to the sacred. The authors identify five important reasons to develop spiritual and religious competence. First, spirituality and religion is important in the lives of many clients. We cannot know clients without knowing about this dimension of their lives. Second, the role of mental health treatment is expanding. Previous generations may have turned to clergy for guidance with problems, but today's generation more commonly turns to mental health professionals. Third, clients *want* to talk about their spiritual and religious lives. The authors assert that clients feel more satisfied with services when clinicians acknowledge this dimension to their lives. Fourth, there is a link to psychological functioning. Religion and spirituality can provide comfort, support, and positive coping mechanisms in times of stress. Finally, while the author's acknowledge that social work has made some attempts to create guidelines for practice, they report that psychologists need to catch up to other professions that have recognized and established such competencies. The authors stress that clinicians do not need to be spiritual or religious themselves in order to attain religious and spiritual competence.

Chapters 1, 2 and 3 comprise the first section of the book that addresses attitudes. It begins with what the authors consider to be the most fundamental spiritual competency: **demonstrating empathy, respect, and appreciation**. They recommend that the first step is to develop an awareness of implicit biases and to engage in reflection to challenge those biases. Mindfulness is suggested as an approach to become cognizant of the thoughts, feelings, and body sensations that occur in response to the content shared by clients. The recommended approach is a "warm and curious stance" toward clients and their beliefs and practices (p. 26).

The authors identified the competencies of **appreciating religious and spiritual diversity** and **being aware of one's own beliefs**. Religious and spiritual diversity are discussed as essential components of multiculturalism that are easily overlooked because they are invisible to outsiders. To avoid making assumptions about clients and to better understand their worldview, clinicians are encouraged to directly ask about this dimension of clients' lives. Recognizing and appreciating diversity helps clinician's build understanding about what aspects set clients apart from others, what aspects they share in community with others, and which aspects have relatively no effect on their emotional well-being.

Self-understanding diminishes the power that personal beliefs have to filter our perceptions of constructs such as free will, locus of control, and forgiveness versus punishment The authors suggest strategies to increase self-understanding such writing in a journal or creating a timeline of the clinician's spiritual history.

Chapter 4 begins the second part of the book, which discusses knowledge as a necessary component of religious and spiritual competence. The authors first identify the competency of **exploring diverse beliefs and practices**. In growing up, some people are more exposed to diverse religious beliefs than others. We are cautioned not to rely on generalizations about specific groups, but to ask clients about their specific beliefs.

The next competency, which is discussed in Chapter 5, is **understanding spirituality and religion as different, but overlapping**. The authors elaborate on the distinction between religion and spirituality. They report that an increasing number of Americans belong to no specific religion, yet confirm a belief in God. They state that the majority of young adults between 18 to 29-years-old describe themselves as spiritual, but not affiliated with organized religion. Religion and spirituality are conceptualized as a continuum of diversity, rather than as a dichotomy.

A discussion of knowledge for clinical practice would not be complete without the competency of **knowing the difference between spirituality and psychopathology**, which is discussed in Chapter 6. The authors acknowledge that psychiatric symptoms sometimes have strong religious or spiritual content. Distinguishing visions from hallucinations and existential distress from depression is important, not only to recognize when mental health interventions are appropriate, but to also avoid pathologizing behaviors that are understandable within a cultural context. They offer a screening tool to help distinguish between spirituality and psychopathology.

In Chapter 7, the authors present **lifespan development as a framework in which to view religious beliefs and practices**. They present Rambo's 7-stage model of religious conversion as a way to understand conversion. Fowler's model of faith development is discussed as a way of understanding the client's growth and change in this area. Chapter 8 builds upon this by discussing the empirical research that **links spiritual and religious practices to psychological well-being**. As an example, mindfulness is discussed as an intervention to improve symptoms of depression. Other examples include improved outcomes related to substance abuse, stress-related disorders and dementia and an increased sense of meaning, resilience, and happiness. The authors urge clinicians to explore professional literature to identify best practices that have empirical support.

Chapter 9 goes on to discuss **practices that may be counterproductive to psychological well-being**. These include negative religious coping, religious scrupulosity, over-involvement, belonging to a cult, unresolved spiritual struggles, and difficulty integrating religious experiences. The authors assert that religious coping strategies such as understanding events as punishment or abandonment by a higher power are generally not helpful. Scrupulosity may be associated with obsessive-compulsive disorder. Over-involvement also suggests a compulsive quality to the cognition or behavior. To determine if a group is cult-like or just promotes extreme beliefs, a clinician should consider how the beliefs affect the client's wellbeing, and they discuss features of a cult.

In Chapter 10, the authors identify the competency of **being aware of legal and ethical issues**, such as bias, scope of expertise, dual relationships, and self-disclosure. Clinicians without adequate training in these areas should not recommend that clients practice spiritual interventions. Clinicians should choose interventions based upon best practice and clinical expertise, not on personal religious or spiritual beliefs.

Chapter 11 begins the last part of the book, a discussion of skills. The authors begin by identifying the competency of **working with religious and spiritual diversity**. Clients should be considered the experts of their own religious and spiritual experiences. The authors challenge the frequently cited idiom of being "color blind" as an faulty expression of an absence of bias, because most people do have biases. A more skilled approach would be to increase self-awareness of biases and to appreciate the rich differences that clients bring to a professional relationship rather than leaving those differences unacknowledged. They caution, however, against taking too much time and attention away from the presenting problem. They recommend that clinicians respond to clients using open-ended questions, affirmations, reflective listening, and summarizing (OARS), reminiscent of motivational interviewing.

Chapter 12 identifies the competency of **taking a religious and spiritual history**. The authors recommend four main areas of inquiry for an initial assessment: 1) determining the importance of religion or spirituality to the client, 2) learning if the client attends formal services, 3) exploring how spiritual beliefs offer strengths and challenges to clients, and 4) assessing the degree, if any, to which religion or spirituality influences the presenting problem. Chapter 13 discusses the competency of **helping clients access their religious and spiritual resources**. It emphasizes that doing so will help them draw upon their strengths to improve psychological wellbeing. Recommended strategies include helping clients access outer resources (e.g., clergy, place of worship, places or objects with sacred meaning, sources of meals and housing), inner resources (e.g., nurturing a personal relationship with the divine, dreams, journaling), bibliotherapy, and religious and spiritual coping methods and interventions. Use of spiritual traditions, guided visualization, mindfulness, mantra repetition, tai chi, and yoga are given as examples of religious and spiritual coping methods.

In Chapter 14, the competency of **identifying spiritual and religious problems** is discussed. A four-step process is offered to help determine which intervention is most appropriate for a particular client. In working with religious and spiritual problems, clinicians should learn more about the problem, identify its source, help clients counter imbalanced beliefs, and witness the client's processing of the issue through the OARS approach. They should be authentic, patient, and understanding rather than confrontational.

In Chapters 15 and 16, clinicians are encouraged to **stay up-to-date and current with new theories and treatments**. The authors recommend continuing education to maintain professional competence. When situations present themselves that are beyond our scope of expertise, we are advised to **know our limits** and seek consultation, get additional training, or make a referral.

Although it was written by authors whose background is in psychology, I found this well-researched book to be entirely consistent with the social work values of developing cultural competence, recognizing clients as the experts of their own experience, respecting and appreciating diversity, and starting where the client is at. The authors have used empirical research to identify specific competencies for use by all behavioral health practitioners. It would be an appropriate text in a spirituality course in the Specialization year or perhaps as a supplemental text in an HBSE course.

Book Review

Wodak, R. (2015). *The politics of fear: What right-wing populist discourses mean*. Los Angeles, CA: Sage.

Reviewed by Wayne C. Evens, Ph.D.
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Professor Ruth Wodak is professor of discourse studies at Lancaster University. She moved to the U.S. from Vienna, Austria, where she was full professor of applied linguistics since 1991. She has stayed co-director of the Austrian National Focal Point (NFP) of the European Monitoring Centre for Racism, Xenophobia and Anti-Semitism.

Besides various other prizes, Dr. Wodak was awarded the Wittgenstein Prize for Elite Researchers in 1996, which made six years of continuous interdisciplinary team research possible. The main projects focused on "Discourses on Un/employment in EU organizations; Debates on NATO and Neutrality in Austria and Hungary; The Discursive Construction of European Identities; Attitudes towards EU-Enlargement; Racism at the Top. Parliamentary Debates on Immigration in six EU countries; the discursive Construction of the Past - Individual and Collective Memories of the German Wehrmacht and the Second World War." In October 2006, she was awarded the Woman's Prize of the City of Vienna. (Taken from http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/fass/projects/ndcc/download/rw.htm)

The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean is a linguistic deconstruction of right-wing populist parties' presentations and coded messages. The author seeks to understand and explain the movement of right-wing political parties from the fringe of European and, to some extent, United States politics to the center. She argues that these groups prey on and develop fear of change by exploiting upsets and change in the world and construct scapegoats, whom they argue are responsible for the trouble. Each chapter analyzes vignettes from campaign materials, television interviews and news stories, which demonstrate how various rhetorical devices are used to communicate coded and ambiguous content.

Chapter 1: Populism and politics: Transgressing norms and taboos, states, "Most importantly, right-wing populism does not only relate to the form of rhetoric but to its specific contents… (p.1 italics in original)." Right-wing populism creates scapegoats, who are blamed for threatening or damaging European societies. Proponents also encourage renationalization and oppose the European Union. They play to and encourage fear and propose a politics of exclusion. They are outrageous in their public statements, which gains them press coverage and helps them control the political agenda. Right-wing politicians claim to say what others are thinking but fear to say.

Chapter 2: Theories and definitions: The politics of identity, reviews many scholarly approaches to defining and explaining right-wing political effectiveness. It distills three main themes: a concept of "the people" or the "homeland," a racially pure community, and the nation as a body. These themes are developed through the rest of the book. In other words, identity politics.

Chapter 3: Protecting borders and the people: The politics of exclusion, distinguishes between left-wing and right-wing populism based upon content of arguments. Right-wing populism is exclusionary and assumes a homogenous internal

population in the nation-state. It defines "others" and seeks to exclude them. The chapter ends with a summary of the politics of fear.

Chapter 4: Language and identity: The politics of nationalism, explains how right-wing populists use the "mother tongue" to construct their picture of national identity and propose exclusionary practices based on who speaks a particular language. They do this in spite of, and in contradiction of the European Union's acceptance of multiple languages. They propose that citizenship must be based upon speaking the native language. The author states, "It is obvious that we are dealing with nativist ideologies of ethnic nationhood, related to birth, blood and a mystical notion of a homogenous demos and history (p.94, italics in original)."

Chapter 5: Antisemitism: The politics of denial, establishes that anti-Semitism has not been replaced by Islamophobia, but the European history of anti-Semitism continues. The chapter demonstrates how through techniques of plausible denial, right-wing populists convey coded anti-Semitic messages. Actors claim to have Jewish friends and/or claim to be the victims of their statements being misunderstood while communicating holocaust denial and other biased messages.

Chapter 6: Performance and the media: The politics of charisma, analyzes how right-wing political actors construct their appeal. They construct immigrants as threatening the country's way of life and as taking jobs. The chapter notes that in both Europe and the U.S. right-wing actors do not oppose wealthy immigrants. Right-wing demagogues promote the fear and danger then promote themselves as the "savior" of the people and the nation. They claim they will speak what others know, but fear to say. They offer no clear plans, but ask that they be trusted to save the nation.

Chapter 7: Gender and the body politic: The politics of patriarchy, deconstructs how these groups and leaders use the idea of freeing Muslim women from the burqa to exploit Islamophobia and to promote traditional female roles. They promote motherliness as the primary value of women. The chapter notes that abortion is not an issue in Europe, but has been made a major line of division by American right-wing groups. In Europe, the burqa-wearing Muslim woman symbolizes the threat to the culture. In the U.S., the threat to "family values" is constructed as the threat.

Chapter 8: Mainstreaming: The normalization of exclusion, analyzes how the rhetorical strategies, coupled with right-wing content discussed throughout the book, have gained control of much of the political debate. It presents the author's strategies for changing the debate and her hopes for a better approach.

The book was published before Donald Trump began his campaign, but he and Ted Cruz are using many of the approaches discussed in the book. I believe this book could be very useful in social work macro-practice courses. It could help students understand how politicians use rhetorical devices to communicate their content. It could help them understand the logical fallacies in much political rhetoric. Every social worker, who is concerned for social justice and bothered by policies being promoted by right-wing demagogues will find this analysis helpful in understanding how rhetorical devices are used to communicate often fallacious content.

Book Review

Gerapetritis, G. (2016). *Affirmative Action policies and judicial review worldwide.* From Series: *Ius Gentium: Comparative perspectives on law and justice: Volume 47* (Sellers, M. and Maxeiner, J., Series Eds.). Cham, Switzerland: Springer International.

Reviewed by David H. Johnson, Ph.D.
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As I finished reading this book and prepared to write the review, the news arrived of the sudden, unexpected death of Associate Justice Antonin Scalia of the United States Supreme Court. Judge Scalia was a conservative icon known particularly for his acerbic dissents and originalist views over his 30 years of jurisprudence on that lofty bench, and his service before that on the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Even now, the nation awaits the second decision of the court in *Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin* (No. 14-981; full disclosure requires that I inform the reader that I am an alumnus of the University of Texas at Austin). This is a pivotal case surrounding the use of race in university admissions decisions, touching on the affirmative action sphere of the book under review, and the death of Justice Scalia has the potential to change the outcome of the case markedly since it was heard before his passing but the decision is not yet delivered.

One cannot help wondering if Gerapetritis would have treated the *Fisher* case differently in his judicial review text (he discusses it at length in the "policy" section) after the decision in the second case is delivered. He approaches affirmative action, which he views on an international scope, from the standpoint of four questions: the moral question, the sociological question, the policy question, and the legal question, though he devotes about twice as much space to the policy question as to each of the other three questions. The book is an interesting read for those of us who are wonkish in our reading habits, and the policy scholar will find herself or himself absorbed enough in the topic. The policy question section runs almost 100 pages exactly and is well-divided geographically among the continents, and then subdivided among the countries on each continent, with final sections on "International Law" and "Comparative Syntheses and Antitheses" that are quite well constructed.

What was mildly disappointing to this reader was the lack of a full integration of the four questions. Of course, the advanced reader will draw connections between moral, sociological, policy, and legal issues themselves, but if I were using this book in a classroom, I think students would find it much more challenging to make those inferences or draw those conclusions without some additional assistance from the author. Admittedly, the author might point out that this is the role of the faculty member, an argument not without its merits. Still, it would have shown remarkable brilliance on the part of Gerapetritis to have made more explicit how the moral (or philosophical) influences the policymaker's craft, how policies and environments influence each other reciprocally

leading to sociological disruption or cohesion, and whether judicial review is dependent on the moral and sociological constructs of the time in which they are delivered or whether the judicial dicta themselves are *vocem creatricem* bringing morality and society into existence by their own power. Gerapetritis gives limited voice to such ideas in the very brief conclusion, but this brief nibble only whets this reader's appetite for the larger dessert and leaves me wanting much more. The only other disappointment is that the indices are woefully inadequate, having no index for judicial cases and no index for people. These additions would make the book most useful as a reference tool for the scholar, and without them the book is rendered nearly useless as a reference tool, which is a shame as it really is replete with useful material.

For the student interested in comparative policy analysis of the judicial decisions surrounding affirmative action policies, I would say this book makes an excellent starting point. My objections are minor, at best. As one who co-authors policy texts, the challenge is always knowing when to stop writing and to let it go to press, since policies (especially from the judicial bench perspective) are always changing, and the time between ending the writing and the book reaching the reader automatically means you are going to be at least a little bit "stale." Even with that, I found the book useful and fresh, the writing not overly academic or inaccessible, and the questions raised stimulating of my own thoughts which is what most of us hope our writing will do for our readers.

Book Review

Nordlinger, J. (2015). *Children of monsters: An inquiry into the sons and daughters of dictators*. NY: Encounter Books.

Reviewed by Stephen M. Marson, Ph.D.
Editor, *The Journal of Social Work Values and Ethics*

I first gained knowledge and interest in *Children of Monsters: An Inquiry Into the Sons and Daughters of Dictators by seeing an* [interview of Jay Nordlinger](#) *on C-SPAN.* For those interested in child welfare, Nordlinger's work is worth a look. In both the video and the book, Nordlinger reports that writing this exposé was emotionally draining. However, in the end, he was glad that he made the Herculean effort. Interestingly, I would best describe Nordlinger as on the right of the political continuum. With this knowledge, I think he might be a bit shocked to see this positive review and learn that his book is strongly recommended for social work professors, students and practitioners with an interest in child welfare. *Yes, I think reading this book would be a great benefit to professors, students and practitioners within the field of child welfare.*

Nordlinger provides biographical sketches of each dictator's relationship with his (no women dictators) children. Nordlinger provides a comprehensive list of 20 infamous dictators including: Amin, Assad, Bokassa, Castro, Ceausescu, Duvalier, Franco, Hitler, Hoxha, Saddam Hussein, Khomeini, Kim, Mao, Mengistu, Mobutu, Mussolini, Pol Pot, Qaddafi, Stalin, and Tojo. Although I have placed the dictators in alphabetical order here, Nordlinger does not introduce the dictators in the conventional alphabetical format. I found his presentation order a bit curious. In fact, he begins with Hitler who was never married and officially had no children. According to the author, Jean-Marie Loret claimed to be Hitler's illegitimate son until the day he died in 1985. Most historians do not accept Loret's claim, even though there is a credible facial resemblance between Hitler and Loret. The resemblance is enhanced by the Hitler mustache under Loret's nose. If there is a blood tie between Loret and Hitler, it is irrelevant! Loret believed there was a blood linkage and throughout his life embraced a social script that stressed this linkage. This perceived linkage sets the stage for the rest of the parent-child relationships in the 19 following chapters. Nordlinger shows us that father-child relationships have a profound influence on the adult-child even if the relationship is distant or virtually nonexistent.

For social work students, practitioners and professors, the strength of this book is also its weakness. Although Nordlinger provides an ending chapter that attempts to establish an analysis of patterns within the father-child relationships, I must say the he does a poor job at this. Nordlinger received academic training in political journalism and has little to no experience in social science theory. Thus, he offers brilliant portrayals of the children of monsters, but his presentation is theoretically barren. Frankly, I believe that if he had coauthored his work with a family theorist, *Children of Monsters* would be required reading in many graduate programs for decades.

Paradoxically, the strength of the book in the world of academia could also be seen as the lack of theory. Within the classroom, learning family theory by applying it to reality is a robust manner to learn theory. A professor could have students analyze the material in the book then link appropriate theory to it. This is a great way to make boring theory relevant. Although I like teaching in this manner, I believe that most professors do not.

Nordlinger writes in a folksy, informal manner that is quite foreign to the academic writing for which I have the greatest comfort in reading. He commonly employs a great deal of colloquial expressions that I found unnerving. In my head while reading it, I would often think: "If I had a student who submitted this sentence, I'd redline it!" Here lies the difference between journalism and academic writing. Academics are expected to write in a neutral and dry manner, while journalists are expected to write in an endearing and attractive manner. Is something lost within colorfully written lines? Perhaps there is, but not significantly so. Nordlinger makes a major contribution to understanding family relationship. Yeah man, this is a groovy piece of paper!

Book Review

Vega, W. A., Markides, K. S., Angel, J. A., & Torres-Gil, F. M. (2015) Edited work, *Challenges of Latino aging in the Americas.* Switzerland: Springer.

J. Porter Lillis, Ph.D.
University of North Carolina at Pembroke

This edited book is the sixth in a series for the Conference Series on Aging in the Americas, sponsored by the National Institute on Aging of the National Institutes of Health. The purpose of the series is to investigate issues about the health of older Hispanics.* This book in particular looks at both Mexico and the United States, as the issues of aging Hispanics for both countries are intertwined and, with unprecedented migration, the editors argue that a binational and transnational migration perspective is pertinent. Readers are invited to "participate in the unraveling [of] a very complicated story of Hispanic population diaspora and health" (p. v).

There is an incredible amount of socio-demographic and study-specific variable information in the text. There are 24 edited chapters, more than 420 pages, broken down into four sections. This review will be broken down into those four respective sections. Within each section are not only policy articles, but research articles outlining historic trends, current analysis, and future issues.

The authors use the ethnic terms "Latino" and "Hispanic" interchangeably. For this review, I use the term Hispanic.

Part I   Demographic and Economic Implications for Health and Well-being (Perspective) in Mexico and the USA: An Overview

Chapters 1-5 address immediate and future implications of the current migration patterns and population growth of Hispanics in the United States. As a direct cause of a significant portion of the United States population growth, the greatest of which is represented by relatively high birth rates and migration of Mexican Americans. Educational attainment is lower on average than whites and blacks, the median age is younger than non-Hispanic whites, and a less economically secure old-age is predicted. The future of the United States is inextricably intertwined with its burgeoning Hispanic population, specifically, its socioeconomic future. With this growing population are the concomitant issues of aging and politics. As the Hispanic percentage of total population increases, Hispanic political 'leverage' will increase at a time when aging policy for Hispanics will be center stage. There are three trends seen to be important for the labor market activity of older workers of Mexican origin— the rapid growth of the Hispanic population, increased later-in-life migration, and increase in late-life labor force activity. There are implications for demographic changes as a result of mass migrations, where and how late-life labor will fit into the labor market, and Social Security participation for late-age migrators. Lastly, issues surrounding aging and retirement security for

Hispanics in both Mexico and the United States are reviewed.

Part II   New Data and Methodological Approaches on Aging Research in Mexico and the United States

Chapters 6-10 discuss and utilize data sets (of Mexican and United States origin and populations) as well as techniques to study the aging Hispanic populations and predict future trends. Studies on self-employed and entrepreneur workers and health insurance, migrant remittances and caregiving for transnational aging populations, dementia and informal caregiving, as well as prevalence and determinants of falls are among issues presented to explore data sources and methodologies.

Part III   Binational, Transnational Migration Perspectives: Mexico, Latin America, and the USA

Chapters 11-17 explore the interconnected "worlds of migrating and non-migrating people of Mexican heritage in the U.S. and Mexico, and examines selected issues accompanying consequences of resettlement and rebuilding lives and lifestyles" (p.191). Issues surrounding foreign-born aging in the United States, including social, psychosocial support, geographic mobility and environmental issues for "older people's social adjustment and well-being" are reviewed (p. 191). The demographic transitions of Mexico, the United States and Latin America are explored. Of particular interest is the greying of Mexico and the United States, but at different rates; the differences in health insurance for the older adults in both countries; and variations in mortality. Differences in formal medical care and family caregiving between the countries are discussed. Family living arrangements, particularly those that have proved advantageous for multigenerational migrants, also prove to be important to providing care to aging family members. Issues involving separations of generations as well as intergenerational family

members that deny structure and support for migrant families are discussed. Housing issues, substance abuse (alcohol) and demographic profiles for late-life Mexican migrants are also reviewed.

Part IV   Cost and Coverage Fiscal Impacts

In Chapters 18-14, political issues, economic politics and how to care for a changing, aging, and increasingly longer living Hispanic population, and their relationships to entitlement programs are discussed in the last section. Novel are the issues surrounding the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and the issue of expanding and non-expanding states (expansion of Medicaid without losing Medicaid funds). Disparities in willingness to pay for health improvement, economic security of Hispanic baby boomers, the current state of elder care in Mexico, pension reform for financial security for elders in Latin America, and politics surrounding aging in the United States for the majority-minority Hispanic population are covered.

The readings would be a great supplement to a course covering aging, minority aging, and aging policy. The book is big, the number of studies and issues covered are just as big. The chapters are short, concise, with the policy chapters straight to the point and the studies asking and providing clear answers. The book would also serve as a concise reference to any of the topics involving Hispanic aging and Mexican and American demographic changes and policies for Hispanics. The greatest strength of the sixth book in this series is how it demonstrates the intricacies of Hispanics in the United States and issues of their binational and transnational statuses, both in the United States, in Mexico, and their migration between the two countries. The facts and research speak to the complex social nature of the rapidly increasing Hispanic population, the aging of both the Hispanic and white non-Hispanic populations, and the political and economic milieu of both nations.

Book Review

York, M. (2016). *Pagan ethics: Paganism as a world religion*. New York, NY: Springer.

Reviewed by Peter A. Kindle, Ph.D, CPA, LMSW
The University of South Dakota, Vermillion, South Dakota

Michael York, Professor of Cultural Astronomy and Astrology at Bath Spa University in England and self-professed pagan sociologist, has provided a monumental work arguing that humanity is essentially pagan, that "morality is a pagan product" (p. 5), and that the contributions generic paganism offers the global discussion of ethics are more suitable for multicultural cosmopolitanism than the rigid morality of Abrahamic faiths or the denial of the sensual in dharmic orientations. To York, contemporary paganism is the sequel to secular humanism and science, adding intuition and mystery back into the human experience. This book is, accordingly, not a discussion of what paganism once was, but rather, an inquiry into what it currently is becoming in a largely European resurgence over the last 35 years.

The breadth of learning York demonstrates is astonishing in the sixteen chapters. They are grouped into five sections that include a two chapter overview on ethics and idolatry, five chapters in which York engages in philosophical and ethical concourse with the Western traditions, three chapters in which York delineates the essence of an applied pagan ethics, three chapters devoted to contemporary moral issues as understood from a pagan ethical perspective, and three concluding chapters addressing pagan and Western ethics, contemporary and sectarian pagan ethics, and a somewhat indulgent final paragraph in which York ties up what he calls *loose ends*.

The salient features of paganism as a world religion "include a this-worldly emphasis, a corporeal understanding of the spiritual, a stress on nature and the natural, an appreciation of deity as multiple and gender differentiated, humanistic valuing and an approach to the sacred as pleasurable and to pleasure as sacred" (pp. 4-5). There is no divine transcendence in York's paganism. Instead, the divine is wholly immanent, and "any pagan understanding of ethics as either the goal of life or the correct way to live life is guided and informed by this interconnectedness between the individual, the community, the world and the cosmos" (p. 34). Idolatry, although not an essential feature of all paganism, is central to York who understands the idol as a corporeal image offering an "interactive experience between sentience and tangibility" (p. 35).

In the five chapters that comprise the second section of the book, York essentially compares and contrasts his understanding of a pagan ethics with all of Western philosophy. He anchors this discussion in Aristotle's virtue values that lead to the good life or happiness understood as that which is "completed by the pleasures which are most proper to humanity" (p. 50). Plato's transcendentalism is rejected, but York adopts Plato's terminology for excellence to describe the four cardinal virtues of the ancient world – prudence, fortitude, self-control, and justice. In a sense, this entire book is about York's attempt to develop a contemporary pagan alternative to these four cardinal virtues. York argues the importance of pleasure in his pagan ethics finding support in the Cyrenaics and Epicureans and extension in utilitarianism, but contrasts his embrace of earthy pleasures with Stoicism and Christianity, especially as understood by Augustine and Thomas Aquinas.

The comparisons and contrasts continue with Benedict Spinoza, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Friedrich Nietzsche, John Mackie, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Anthony Grayling. I suspect that York will find few readers capable of completely understanding and evaluating all of the arguments and assertions he makes in these very dense chapters.

In the third section, York distills all that has gone before into a sevenfold *heptatheon* of pagan virtue-values that lead to well-being, happiness, and the good life. The primary goals of human life are freedom, comfort, health, and worship; the last being comprised of pleasure, productivity, and generosity. The derivation of such a positive ethical orientation grounded only on nature and the natural is, of course, York's largest challenge. Appealing to the natural aesthetic (beauty) to identify that which is good or has value must equally embrace nature's brutality, pain, and caprice. York solves this by giving primacy to freedom created through the agency of Nietzsche's will to power, "Whatever liberty we have as individuals and social collectivities is to be found in and through our abilities to exercise will – our capacity to wish and, finally, to bring that wishing to fruition" (p. 183). Desire, the capacity to want, is at the heart of pagan ethics. As long as that desire harms no other, its pursuit is worthy. Comfort, the second virtue-value, comes closest to Aristotle's understanding of happiness. "To be comfortable is to be at home in one's conditions, to have the courage afforded by one's present situation" (p. 198). Health is understood in a holistic manner, embracing bodily appetites and the physical, psychological, social, and spiritual dimensions. York uses worship in the sense of "making or creating worth/value" (p. 204) which can be created formally through ritual, but informally through the pursuits of pleasure, productivity, and generosity. York's "paganism is not a religiosity of abstinence and renunciation but instead one of affirmation and indulgent celebration" (p. 222) of carnality, education, friendship, consciousness, and conversation. In productivity, York finds humanity's ultimate purpose whether the individual contribution is in art, education,

progeny, conversation, or simply living the good life. In generosity, York finds a corrective to base selfishness whether that is anchored in the Golden Rule, simple kindness, or a commitment to service for others. In this context York makes his singular reference to social work, an exemplar in his view of pagan service.

The moral issues York addresses from a pagan ethical perspective in the fourth section include same-sex unions (affirmed), recreational drug use (affirmed in moderation), terrorism (denounced), abortion (affirmed due to lack of fetal consciousness), capital punishment (denounced), and euthanasia (affirmed). He devotes an entire chapter to hegemonic dominations such as rape (denounced), gender equality (affirmed), depersonalization through bureaucracy, government, and corporations (all denounced), and environmental degradation (denounced). Many may find York's pagan ethics quite similar to libertarianism in application.

In the last section, York returns to a comparison of his pagan ethics to Western ethical traditions adding Jurgen Habermas, Emmanuel Levinas, George Santayana, and Confuscianism into the mix. Another chapter describes contemporary sectarian pagan societies including Shintoism, Santeria, Germanic and Nordic societies, Druidry, Romuva, Slavic and Kemetic spiritualites, the classical Greek/Roman legacy, and Wicca. York's loose ends include interconnectedness and tribalism, violence and over-consumption, and the importance of children.

I believe that York is best understood as a pagan writing primarily for a pagan readership. He hopes to convince contemporary pagans to embrace a broader and less sectarian form of paganism in order for paganism to earn a metaphorical seat at the table along with other world religions. There is no doubt that he believes that his heptatheon of virtue-values will lead to less global strife, greater personal freedom, and expanded human wellbeing. There are, however, several problems with York's inquiry into the potential for pagan ethics that may

prove less than convincing to non-pagans. First, only those predisposed toward paganism are likely to find his neglect of nature's pain, brutality, and caprice completely satisfying. Secondly, the self-interest imbedded within a pleasure-seeking ethic may seem to be a dangerous counterpoint to Nietzsche's will to power, York's only means of reconciling nature's beauty and brutality. Thirdly, York acknowledges the moral failings of pagan deities, but does so in an off-handed manner that does not take seriously the injustices meted out as examples more aptly termed godlessness than godliness. Non-pagans are unlikely to be so generous in their assessment. Finally, many will find it absurd that York presents paganism as the successor to secular humanism and science. Human intuition does not require a return to idolatry, and the acknowledgment that all is not yet known (i.e., mystery) does not demand a return to ancient ritual.

However, York's heptatheon of virtue-values may be appealing to some social workers who are not already committed to another faith dynamic. While social justice and integrity are not particularly prominent in York's ethic, freedom, comfort, and health are clearly compatible with the value of human dignity we hold dear. Both service and competence fit nicely into York's understanding of productivity, and the importance of human relationships can be found in York's generosity. So if there are any pagan social workers out there looking for a pragmatic ethic, this may be the book for you.

Book Review

Teege, J. & Sellmair, N. [Carolin Sommer, Translator], (2015). *My grandfather would have shot me: A black woman discovers her family's Nazi past*. NY: The Experiment.

Reviewed by Stephen M. Marson, Ph.D.
Editor, The Journal of Social Work Values and Ethics

For decades, I have been approached by adopted students seeking guidance in finding their birth parents. I suspect that I share this experience with most senior professors of social work. I find it chilling to witness the results of their discovery. In my limited experience, when an adult is able to communicate with a birth parent, the result is warm and positive. I never have seen a disaster after or during the connection of child and birth parent. Within my limited experience, I also include the adoptive parents. They tend to face the prospects of having their child meet the birth parent with great trepidation. In the end, the relationship between the adoptive parents and the adopted child is strengthened. However, this is only my limited experience!

Jennifer Teege and her friend and colleague, Nikola Sellmair, tell a different story in this autobiography titled *My Grandfather Would Have Shot Me*. Jennifer is aware that she was born out of wedlock by a German teenager and a young Nigerian man. She was placed for adoption at the age of five and was quickly accepted by a loving white German couple who had sons. Jennifer was indeed fortunate to have such a healthy environment. Although her adopted brothers and parents were white, she experienced unconditional love and acceptance by her family, their friends and her neighborhood. Jennifer was aware of her birth mother's name—Monika Goeth. By random chance, she found a book in the library titled *The Life Story of Monika Goeth, Daughter of the Concentration Camp Commandant From "Schindler's List."* It is the autobiography of Jennifer's birth mother.

Jennifer faces a twofold emotional trauma. First, she realized that if she was born during the pinnacle of Captain Amon Goeth's leadership of the Płaszów concentration camp, she would have been killed. Even worse, because of her heritage, she might have been subjected to a variety of unthinkable medical experiments—then would die. Second, she was subjected to the distress of wondering of her genetic heritage. Is there something in a person's genes that would propel him/her to derive personal satisfaction in the brutal suffering of others? These themes tormented Jennifer to the point of requiring psychiatric intervention.

One can see a fascinating interview with Teege on C-SPAN. Social work students and faculty who have an interest in adoptions and foster care will find this book nothing less than intriguing. Also, this autobiography provides a great case study for HBSE courses. In addition, the work of Teege and Sellmair supports the findings of Jay Nordlinger's book *Children of Monsters: An Inquiry Into the Sons and Daughters of Dictators*. Both of these respectable books provide the fresh perspective on the influences of family linkages for those who had infamous parents and grandparents. Teege and Sellmair show how one can develop empathy for the pain of others while Nordlinger illustrates how some descendants of monsters can relish the destruction of their ancestors. In the end, it is a fascinating and thought provoking story that I must recommend for others to read.